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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
On January 7, 1950, the People's Daily of the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) reported: "Our troops on the east coast salute the New 
Year. This year Taiwan will be liberated. People from all walks of life 
in Taiwan are thirsting for liberation."' Six days earlier, the Central 
Daily News of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan in a front page 
story reported: "President Chiang Kai-shek proclaims 1950 they are 
to counterattack and recover the Mainland."2 Thirty-six years later, 
Taiwan is still not "liberated," nor the mainland "recovered." Politi-
cally, they are divided; geographically, separated; each government 
hostile; each contending; each proclaiming its right to govern the Mid-
dle Kingdom, China; each being recognized by various countries; each 
placing major emphasis on the China reunification issue: the old polit-
ical philosophy of "one unified China" commemorates the only com-
mon tradition shared by the two governments. 
As the propaganda organs of their respective governments, the 
People's Daily and the Central Daily News have reported on the China 
reunification issue for the past 36 years strictly along party lines. 
The two reports have been diffuse, have portrayed images dressed 
with the language of propaganda, images clothed with political cliches, 
with the rhetoric of persuasion. The news of the 1950s was not impar-
tial, the news in the 60s unrealistic; the news of the 70s focusing on 
atrocities; all of the news for the past 36 years biased and subjective. 
On December 15, 1978 came the abrupt announcement establish-
ing diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States. This 
news marked the beginning of a dramatic change in the reporting di-
plomacy concerning the China reunification issue. The approach be-
came more subdued, showing more recognition, displaying more 
acceptance toward the other side. 
On December 17, 1978, the People's Daily terminology "ruling 
clique" was used for the last time. The ROC leaders were now labeled 
"Taiwan authorities" by the PRC; Chiang Kai-shek became "xian-
sheng" or "Mister," illustrating a polite alteration in language, a less 
I. Jorg-M. Rudolph, Media-Coverage on Taiwan in the People's Republic of China 
(Baltimore: Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 1983) No. 
3 (56), p. 58. 
2. Central Daily News, January I, 1950. 
(1) 
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antagonistic use of vocabulary. 3 
In 1979, "the Chinese Communist bandits" in the Central Daily 
News became "the Chinese Communists." The People's Republic 
China and titles of PRC leaders were printed in quotation marks. 
Thirty years of the People's Daily's pledge to "liberate Taiwan by 
all means" became the "return of Taiwan into the arms of the 
motherland." 
The Central Daily News' "We will counterattack and recover the 
mainland" became the non-military language of "unifying China 
under the Three Principles of the People." 
These changes reveal a tendency toward objectiveness, a measure 
of leniency toward the other side; they suggest the development of a 
political atmosphere more conducive to achieving a reunification, 
more open to communication between the two governments. Were 
these changes superficial or substantial? 
The major shift in coverage centers on the peace overtures offered 
by the PRC to the ROC. The PRC government announced the first 
overture five and a half years ago, the People's Daily reported. Before 
that, reports had often focused on the "bloody liberation of Taiwan," 
not on a peaceful reunification. Despite the change to support of a 
peaceful reunification, the PRC has refused to make a commitment of 
nonviolence toward the ROC. 
Before December 1978, the Central Daily News was vague about 
these overtures. Now it covers them with rejection, with malice, 
spurning every overture, discrediting every intention of the PRC. 
These overtures, their responses, and the issues of reunification are 
complex issues; they raise many questions. Are the PRC's peace pro-
posals too unreasonable, too inconceivable for the ROC to accept? Is 
the ROC too stubborn, too apprehensive to give any peace plan a 
chance? Are both governments sincere enough to achieve reunifica-
tion? Do these peace proposals, with their goal of reunification, repre-
sent the opinion of the majority of the Chinese people? These answers 
must be found through a scientific survey of the one billion Chinese on 
the mainland and on Taiwan. Obviously, such a survey would prove 
difficult, indeed impossible, to conduct; therefore, a survey of media 
coverage of the issue offers an alternative approach, offers insight and 
understanding the potential of unification, its form and possibility. 
These insights would be worthwhile not only academically but also 
practically. 
3. People's Daily, December 17, 1978. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The primary purpose of this study is to test the relevance of a 
communications approach of the integration theory of international 
relations; to study the issues of China's national integration. The test 
is made through a quantitative survey and a qualitative analysis of 
coverage of the issue in the official party newspapers of the PRC and 
the ROC. Specifically, the study uses survey and analysis to test five 
assumptions of integration theory. 
Assumption 1: National integration is a multidimensional 
phenomenon. 4 
Test 1 : The study chooses variables and selects factors computed 
from the survey; they determine if China's potential reunification is 
multidimensionally reported in the two newspapers. 
The study adopts the model of Karl Deutsch, developed in the 
mid-1960s, that used transaction flows as one set of variables to assess 
the level of national integration in Europe. 5 Deutsch used variables, 
which included interviews with elites, and content analysis of selected 
key newspapers in France and Germany.6 
The study also adopts the approach of integration theorist Bruce 
Russett. Russett used factor analysis to distinguish regional groups; 
he reduced larger separate variables to smaller ones. Small groups can 
be used as indicators of political integration.7 
Assumption 2: Consensus is an essential prerequisite for political 
integration. Political consensus determines what functions integration 
institutions should perform.8 
Test 2: The study attempts to determine if a consensus exists be-
tween the two Chinese party newspapers in their attitudes about 
China's national integration. 
Assumption 3: The mutual relevance and responsiveness neces-
sary for integration are brought about by a growth in transactions be-
tween members of the two systems. Integration may be identified 
from community-building efforts in the past. By measuring changes in 
the intensity and scope of transactions between a given group of ac-
tors, the growth of a sense of community in a region can be 
4. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Contending Theories of Interna-
tional Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), p. 424, 438 and 459. 
5. Ibid., p. 454. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid., p. 446. 
8. Trevor Taylor, ed., Approaches and Theory in International Relations (London and 
New York: Longman, 1978), pp. 241-242. 
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determined. 9 
Test 3: To determine the quantity, quality and make-up of trans-
actions between people or elites of the PRC and the ROC, the study 
examines the trends that the two party newspapers have followed in 
reporting about the other side and about the common issue. 
Assumption 4: Outside governments and international organiza-
tions, and nongovernmental actors, act as important catalysts in inte-
gration schemes. 10 
Test 4: The study aims to provide evidence that China's national 
integration involves foreign factors, and is not just an internal affair as 
some decision makers in the PRC, the ROC and the United States 
have proclaimed. Specifically, the study examines U.S. involvement in 
China's national integration, as a major foreign or external factor. 
Assumption 5: The "spill-over" or "ramification" concept of inte-
gration theory claims that economic interdependence may lead eventu-
ally to political unification; hence, initial attempts to integrate along 
relatively non-controversial, economic lines may eventually spill over 
into attempts to integrate along more controversial political lines. 11 
Test 5: The study attempts to determine the relevance of eco-
nomic integration between the two ·chinas and examines the extent of 
this integration. Using information from the survey, it analyzes eco-
nomic developments, specifically the competition in foreign trade and 
the different domestic standards of living of the PRC and the ROC. 
Importance of the Study 
The unification of China has been a major source of conflict be-
tween the PRC and the ROC since 1949. The shift of U.S. diplomatic 
recognition from the ROC to the PRC in 1979, and the 1984 agree-
ment between the PRC and Britain regarding Hong Kong, have en-
hanced the importance of the issue of reunification for the two 
governments. How the issue will be resolved will have a significant 
effect on the peoples of each country, extending beyond these two 
countries to the political climate in the world. 
Analyzing how each country approaches the issue and uses its 
official party press may reveal how reunification will be achieved and 
how the issue will be managed. 
The findings of this study demonstrate the significant trends of 
each newspaper in reporting on the same issues and in reporting about 
9. Ibid., p. 243. 
10. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., p. 41. 
II. Ibid., pp. 418-419 and 432-433. 
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the opposite side. These trend data can be important for an under-
standing of China's national integration. 
The study may also be of value as a reference of how the two 
governments have used their media, how they express their views on 
national integration, why they reject views of the opposite side, how 
they influence their own people, and how they maintain a propaganda 
dialog with the opponent. 
Writers on integration share an interest in studying communica-
tions within the units to be integrated. According to theorists Karl 
Deutsch and Amitai Etzioni, people learn to consider themselves as 
members of a community. This membership results from human com-
munications patterns. In general, integration theorists hold that peo-
ple adopt integrative behavior because of expectations developed 
among elite groups in government and private sectors; therefore, suc-
cessful integration depends upon a people's ability to "internalize" the 
integrative process. 12 
The news media of the PRC and the ROC give evidence of the 
changing positions of PRC and ROC leaders regarding reunification. 
To the extent these leaders voice the desires of the PRC and ROC 
populations, the news media also give evidence of the changing posi-
tions of the respective populations. 
This study may also be useful as a reference for the peoples of 
these two nations, who may have difficulty finding objective analyses 
of issues, views and strategies of either country on the reunification 
issue. 
In light of the delicate diplomatic balance that the United States 
maintains between the PRC and the ROC, this study might also pro-
mote U.S. understanding of an issue that could have international 
significance. 
Organization of the Study 
The present chapter identifies the purpose and the importance of 
the study and discusses the direction of the work. 
Chapter II briefly reviews the history of China's national integra-
tion, focusing on more than 50 years of fierce struggle between the 
PRC Chinese Communist Party and the ROC Chinese Nationalist 
Party. A summary of theories of integration and the communications 
approach to national integration are also included in this chapter. 
Chapter III covers the methodology of the thematic content anal-
12. Ibid., p. 424. 
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ysis and factor analysis that were used for conducting the survey. For 
the study, a scientific survey of the two party newspapers between De-
cember 1978 and May 1985 was conducted to analyze the approach of 
each to China's national integration. 
The criteria for selecting thematic categories for factor analyses 
were based on concepts used in theories of integration and in a com-
munications approach. 
The thematic categories were used as a basis for developing hy-
potheses, which are also presented in this chapter. These categories 
are also used to test the five hypotheses. 
Chapter IV develops an analysis of the data using a computerized 
quantitative research design and a qualitative research interpretation 
of five factors that were found through factor analysis. 
The five factors supporting the hypotheses are categorized, la-
beled and interpreted according to events in the PRC and the ROC 
relating to reunification that occurred between December 1978 and 
May 1985. 
The factors reveal the policies of both parties regarding national 
integration and identify the key variables in the future of the issue. 
Chapter V provides conclusions and assessments and makes rec-
ommendations on how all parties can not only understand these fac-
tors but also use their understanding to determine future policies that 
will shape China's national integration. 
Because of the politically sensitive issues of recognition and gov-
ernmental legitimacy, this study uses a neutral approach in data col-
lection, reference selection and terminology. Politically biased terms 
are avoided. "The People's Republic of China" is used instead of 
"Red China" or "Communist China" and "The Republic of China" 
instead of "Free China" or "Chinese Taipei." 
Romanization of Chinese names and terms is determined by con-
text. Discussions involving the People's Daily use the Pinyin system, 
which is officially accepted in the PRC; discussions involving the Cen-
tral Daily News use the Wade-Giles system, which is accepted in the 
ROC. 
An appendix of relevant historical documents, events and data 
statements is added at the end of the study to assist scholars and to 
assist the reader in drawing personal conclusions. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
History of China's National Integration Within the Mainland 
The study of China's long history of national integration is a pre-
requisite to understand the issue of China's reunification. 
In its more than 3,000 years of recorded history, China has gone 
through many repetitive but cyclical periods of unity and disunity. 
Dynasties have emerged, empires have prospered, and kingdoms have 
degenerated and disintegrated; nevertheless, the Chinese nation has al-
ways survived because its people have held a unified political philoso-
phy that there is and always has been only "one China." 
Three thousand years ago, Confucius failed to unite the country's 
six kingdoms. Since then, millions of Chinese have perished in battles 
over unification. Some perished in defeat, others in victory. War min-
imizes progress, and the misadventures of that conflict presage China's 
plunge into the modem world. 
Division, struggle and turmoil have disrupted the history of 
China in periods of unity as well as in periods of division. Of the 3, 107 
years of history, 1,963, or 63.18 percent, were periods of unity; 1,144 
years, or 36.82 percent, were years of division. There were, thus, 819 
years more of unity than of division. 1 Moreover, during years of divi-
sion, a multi-state rather than an actual unified China was often the 
case, as in the East Chou period (770-249 B.C.), the Ch'un-chiu period 
(722-481 B.C.), the Warring States period (403-211 B.C.), the Later 
Han Dynasty (9-220 A.D.), the Three Kingdoms (220-280), the East 
Tsin Dynasty (317-420), the South and North Dynasties (420-590), 
the Five Dynasties (907-960), the South Sung Dynasty (1127-1279) 
and the Republic (1912-1986). 2 
To both ancient and modem Chinese people, the existence of 
multiple, political systems has not meant the discontinuity of "one 
China"; these multiple states still exist within the same cultural sphere 
of the Chinese civilization. 
A far more serious threat to the "Chung-Kuo" (Middle King-
dom) China has been the invasion of foreigners who might destroy 
Chinese culture. Perpetuation of culture and ideological unification 
have always take priority over territorial unification, the assumption 
I. Dun Li, The Ageless Chinese, A History, 2nd ed. (New York: Charles Scibner's 
Sons, 1965), pp. 562-568. 
2. Ibid. 
(7) 
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being that, with a common cultural basis, a multi-system China would 
sooner or later be reunified. 3 
"The world of the Chinese" to the Chinese quiets itself in the 
center of the universe, while the "world of the non-Chinese" prattles 
in the other regions. Until Western powers reached China, Chinese 
leaders considered the sphere of influence of their civilization "Tien-
Hsia" (under the sky), the entire world.4 
Nations rise and fall, people are unified and divided; the Chinese 
understand this cyclical principle of history. Historically, the Chinese 
demonstrate patience during division, nurturing a belief that their na-
tion will eventually be reunited. 5 
"One China" is the ideal of the oldest Chinese issue, unification; 
this unification is of paramount importance in the dispute between the 
contending governments of the PRC on the mainland and the ROC on 
Taiwan. From an historical perspective, the present division of China 
into two hostile political systems is parallel to the competition between 
elite groups in the early years of China's dynastic history. 
The Chinese Communists of the PRC and the Chinese National-
ists of the ROC agree wholeheartedly on the old political philosophy 
of "one China," despite the more than 50 years of fierce struggle be-
tween them. 
History of China's National Integration Between the Mainland and 
Taiwan: Ancient Times to 1949 
It is intriguing to examine the two Chinese governments from a 
historical perspective. Although both Chinese states insist on the ideal 
of one China, Taiwan has never been more than an outlying region of 
the Chinese mainland. The term "China" (Chung-Kuo, Middle King-
dom) itself came into use before the birth of Christ. But it only re-
ferred to various states in the central Yellow River valley. Chung-
Kuo was gradually heralded as all of mainland China; nevertheless, 
Taiwan, like Outer Mongolia, was not framed within the mainland 
government until the late 17th century.6 
3. Yung Wei, "The Unification and Division of Multi-System Nations: A Compara-
tive Analysis of Basic Concepts, Issues, and Approaches," in Hungdah Chiu and Robert L. 
Downen, eds., Multi-System Nations and International Law: The International Status of 
Germany, Korea and China (Baltimore: Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contempo-
rary Asian Studies, Inc., 1981), No. 8 (45), p. 66. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ramon H. Myers, "A United States Policy," in Ramon H. Myers, ed., Two Chinese 
States (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover International Studies, 1979), p. 68. 
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The earliest inhabitants of Taiwan were of Malay stock, not Chi-
nese. Third-century Chinese historical records make reference to Tai-
wan as "1-chou," Barbarian Island, and "Liu-chiu" (the same name 
now used for Japan's Ryukyu Islands) and give no indication that Tai-
wan was part of China; rather, Taiwan was regarded as a tributary 
state in the same category as Thailand, Nepal, Burma, Vietnam, Laos 
and Korea. 7 
Chinese conquest of the island has been argued. Some historians 
have cited Shang-shu, a Chinese history book that was probably fin-
ished in the early third century B.C., to prove that Taiwan had been a 
tributary to a Chinese state in ancient times. But this is probably more 
legend than history. Other historians have said that a Chinese mili-
tary expedition against 1-chou in the third century A.D., by forces of 
the Wu ruler Sun Chuan (reign 222-252) and an expedition against 
Liu-chiu in the seventh century by forces of Emperor Yang of the Sui 
dynasty (589-618) were all in actuality against Taiwan. Therefore, 
they argue, Taiwan was conquered during these early periods. 8 These, 
however, were only temporary victories and did not result in Chinese 
settlement of the island. 
To understand that political boundaries are not part of Chinese 
tradition and thought is to understand the status and potential future 
of Taiwan with respect to the government on the mainland. More-
over, China has always been a land-based and land-directed society. 
Until recently, the sea and coastal mountain ranges formed both natu-
ral boundaries and barriers for China.9 The Chinese of the early em-
pires did not view those people living on the seaward side of the 
coastal slope as Chinese. The Chinese people lived along the coasts of 
the Yell ow and Yangtze River valleys. China's expansion was inland; 
its trade routes westward, across India and Asia Minor, to Europe. 
The Great Wall itself is more than a linear frontier; it is the most 
important delimitation of a zonal frontier, where there are minor de-
limitations. What could not be included in the Empires was 
excluded. 10 
7. William R. Kintner and John F. Copper, A Matter of Two Chinas (Philadelphia: 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1979), p. 41. 
8. Yu-ming Shaw, "Modem History of Taiwan: An Interpretative Account," in 
China and the Taiwan Issue, edited by Hungdah Chiu (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 8. 
9. Ray E. Johnson, "Assessing the International Status of Partitioned Nations: Theo-
ries and Findings," in Hungdah Chiu and Robert Downen, eds., op. cit., p. 20. 
10. Owen Lattimore as cited in S. Whittimore Boggs, International Boundaries-A 
Study of Boundary Functions and Problems (Morningside Heights, N.Y.: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1940), p. 136. 
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China's organization was also unsuitable for both these regions: 
neither could be conquered without drastic changes in the Chinese 
way of life. Even today, Taiwan can be viewed as a frontier area that 
China has never properly incorporated. 11 
The government waited for several centuries before sending Chi-
nese immigrants and a Chinese administration to Taiwan and the adja-
cent Peng-hu Islands (Pescadores). There is documentary evidence 
indicating that by 1171 Peng-hu had become a Chinese military out-
post. By 1225, it was administratively incorporated into the Chinese 
Empire and placed under the jurisdiction of Tsin-kiang County of 
Chuan-chou Prefecture, Fukien Province. 12 
In 1517, the Portuguese discovered Taiwan and named it For-
mosa. China made no protest when Taiwan came under foreign con-
trol. Until the mid-1600s, there were few contacts between the 
mainland and Taiwan. Taiwan and Peng-hu were under the seige of 
foreign traders and adventurers as well as Chinese pirates. In 1602, 
1609, 1616 and in the late 1620s, several raids by Japanese pirates or 
by the Tokugawa Shogunate forces were made against Peng-hu and 
Taiwan. None of these invasions, however, brought much benefit to 
Japan. 13 
In the late 16th century the Dutch first appeared in the Far East. 
In 1602 the Dutch East India Company was established to coordinate 
all Dutch colonial activities in East and Southeast Asia, including Tai-
wan. The first Dutch occupation of the island came in 1622. The 
Ming Court agreed to let the Dutch live on Taiwan, and to set up 
trading posts, even though the Ming Court kept control of Peng-hu 
Islands. For 37 years (1624-1662) Taiwan remained a Dutch colony, 
with temporary Spanish rule over its northern part between 1626 and 
1642. 14 After the Ming dynasty rulers were conquered by the Manchu 
leaders in 1661, a Chinese loyalist of the Ming Court, Gen. Cheng 
Cheng-kung (Koxinga), fled to Taiwan with a small force and a 
number of followers, driving the Dutch from Taiwan and formally es-
tablishing a Chinese government in exile. Although his government 
never regained power on the mainland, the Chinese gained de facto 
rule over Taiwan for the first time in history. During this period a 
massive Chinese immigration to Taiwan occurred. 15 
From 1662 to 1683, Gen. Cheng, his son and his grandson ruled 
1 I. Johnson, op. cit., p. 21. 
12. Shaw, op. cit., p. 8. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid. 
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Taiwan. In 1683, Gen. Cheng's grandson surrendered Taiwan to the 
Ching (Manchu) Empire (1644-1911), which administered Taiwan as 
a prefecture of the mainland Fukien Province for 202 years. In 1886, 
the Ching Empire made Taiwan a separate province of China. 16 
The desire to bring about this political extension thus did not 
come from the Chinese themselves, but from their Manchu conquer-
ors, even though although Chinese settlers from Fukien and Kwang-
tung provinces had brought Taiwan well within the Chinese cultural 
sphere by the late 18th century. 17 
In the 1800s, the United States government asked China if Tai-
wan was a part of China. China replied no. Commodore Perry then 
recommended that the United States establish protectorate status over 
Taiwan. Because of reasons relating to domestic politics, the U.S. 
president decided against this. 18 
In 1874, an Okinawan ship ran aground on Taiwan, and its crew 
was murdered by aborigines. Japan protested the incident in Peking, 
but China disclaimed any responsibility on the grounds that the crime 
had not been committed "in its jurisdiction." 19 
Nine years later, Taiwan was declared a separate province; it was 
yielded to Japan in 1895 by the Treaty of Simonoseki, which signified 
China's defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), ending the 
longest period of Chinese administration on Taiwan-the 212 years 
between 1683 and 1895.20 
Before Japan was able to establish jurisdiction over the island, the 
Chinese on Taiwan revolted, refusing to accept Japan. They declared 
their independence and established the "Republic of Taiwan." The 
Republican government of 1895 was dominated by the Chinese and 
ignored by the rest of the world; its existence has been conveniently 
long since forgotten. Nevertheless, within months, the Japanese paci-
fied the island. For the next 50 years, Taiwan was a Japanese 
colony.21 
On November 26, 1943, at the Cairo Conference, ROC President 
Chiang Kai-shek, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued a joint communique. The 
16. Ibid., and Myers, op. cit., pp. 68-69. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Kintner and Copper, op. cit., p. 42. 
19. E. House, "The Japanese Expedition to Formosa," cited in Lung-chu Chen and W. 
M. Reisman, "Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title," in Yung-hwan Jo, 
ed., Taiwan's Future (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1974), p. 174. 
20. Myers, op. cit., p. 69. 
21. Kintner and Copper, op. cit., p. 43. 
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Cairo Declaration declared that "all the territories Japan has stolen 
from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, 
shall be returned to the Republic of China." 
On July 26, 1945, the heads of governments of the United States, 
the ROC and the United Kingdom further declared in the Potsdam 
Proclamation, "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried 
out." This was accepted by Japan in its surrender of September 2, 
1945.22 
The ROC government took over Taiwan from the Japanese on 
October 26, 1945. The next day, it announced that Taiwan was a 
province of China. The ROC has governed Taiwan ever since. 23 
In the following four years, the mainland and Taiwan were inte-
grated as "one China" for the second time. The first had been the 
period between 1683 and 1895. This single Chinese nation, however, 
was dismantled for the second time on October 1, 1949, when the Chi-
nese Communist Party conquered the mainland and established the 
PRC government. The proclamation establishing the PRC marked 
the end of a 22-year civil war between the Communists and the Na-
tionalists on the mainland. The defeated Chinese Nationalist Party 
moved the ROC government from Nanking to Taipei in December 
1949,24 making the Taiwan Strait a natural boundary of disintegration 
between the PRC and the ROC. 
Two Chinese governments have been actively participating on the 
international stage since 1949, although neither government has recog-
nized the legitimacy of the other. Officially, both have maintained de 
facto recognition by most countries of the world. In reality, there are 
two Chinas. 25 
History of China's National Integration Between the PRC and the 
ROC, 1949-1985 
The PRC and the ROC have existed as independent political enti-
ties with separate international personalities for 36 years; however, 
both have continued to engage in the struggle for national integration. 
Though not primarily a military struggle, the problem has had a mili-
tary aspect, although it has largely been waged with political, diplo-
matic and economic weapons. 
22. Hungdah Chiu, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations," in China 
and the Taiwan Issue, edited by Hungdah Chiu, (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 148. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Myers, op. cit., p. 69. 
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The PRC has sought to undermine the ROC's international sta-
tus, sought to influence the rest of the world to view Taiwan as a legal 
part of the PRC, and sought to convince the people of Taiwan that 
they cannot avoid ultimately accepting the sovereignty of the PRC 
over the island. Throughout this struggle, the governments in Peking 
and Taipei have maintained that China is one nation and that Taiwan 
is a province of China; furthermore, the peoples of both nations have 
been denied the right of self-determination in deciding their interna-
tional status. 
The nations of the world thus have not been asked to recognize 
Taiwan as an independent state, a state separate from China, but have 
been forced into a position of officially recognizing one or the other. 
The inability of the ROC to extend its governmental authority beyond 
Taiwan and its associated islands has made it difficult for most nations 
to refuse indefinitely to recognize the government in Peking as the le-
gitimate government of China. Most nations realize that the Peking 
government has governed the vast majority of the Chinese people for 
more than 30 years. 26 
1. The Struggle for International Position 
During the first 20 years after 1949, the rivalry between the PRC 
and the ROC centered on membership in the United Nations. The 
China seat, first occupied by the ROC and later claimed by the PRC, 
was the symbol of legitimacy determined by the international commu-
nity. Many nations, as well as international organizations, tended to 
follow the lead of the United Nations in their own policies toward the 
two claimants. 
The ROC was a charter member of the United Nations, and one 
of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In January 
1950, three months after the founding of the PRC, the PRC's premier 
and foreign minister, Chou En-lai, cabled U.N. Secretary General 
Trygve Lie demanding that the ROC be ousted from the United Na-
tions and that the PRC seated in its place. When a Soviet-sponsored 
resolution supporting the PRC was voted down, the Soviets walked 
out of the Security Council. They vowed neither to return nor to ac-
cept any Security Council decision as long as the ROC representative 
remained. In August, the PRC again cabled the United Nations, 
charging that President Harry S. Truman's positioning of the U.S. 
Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland at the outbreak of the 
26. Ralph N. Clough, "Taiwan's International Status," in Hungdah Chiu and Robert 
Downen, eds., op. cit., p. 141. 
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Korean war was an act of armed aggression against the PRC. 27 
In November 1950, Gen. Wu Hsiuchuan, presenting the PRC 
case before the Security Council, argued that the island of Taiwan was 
an integral part of China, supported by the Cairo and Potsdam decla-
rations, which had been returned to the Chinese government in 1945 
after the Japanese surrender. Consequently, Gen. Wu said the inter-
vention by the Seventh Fleet to prevent the "liberation" of the island 
by the PRC was "open and direct aggression against Chinese terri-
tory," calling on the Security Council to condemn the United States 
for the act, demanding the complete withdrawal of its armed forces 
from Taiwan. A resolution presented by the Soviet representative was 
voted down. By this time, large-scale PRC forces had intervened in 
Korea, and the Soviet Union had vetoed a six-power resolution calling 
for the withdrawal of these forces. 28 
By 1951, the United States was able to get a resolution passed in 
the General Assembly condemning the PRC as an aggressor for hav-
ing attacked U.N. forces defending South Korea.29 
Thus, the PRC's early efforts to replace the ROC in the United 
Nations, and efforts to force the United States to abandon Taiwan, 
failed. President Truman's reversal of a U.S. hands-off policy toward 
Taiwan made a successful PRC invasion impossible. The PRC's inter-
vention in Korea, where a U.N. force representing 16 nations was re-
sisting North Korea, placed a large stumbling block in the way of the 
PRC's early acceptance.30 Because the Korean War set in motion pro-
grams of U.S. military and economic aid to Taiwan, relations steadily 
grew closer, culminating in the signing of a mutual defense treaty in 
December 1954. The PRC denounced the treaty as an attempt by the 
United States to legitimize its occupation of Taiwan. When the PRC 
launched a successful assault on the minor offshore island of Tachen in 
January 1955, the United States came to the ROC's assistance. Subse-
quently, a congressional resolution was passed authorizing the presi-
dent to deploy U.S. forces to offshore islands if necessary to ensure the 
defense of Taiwan. This sent a sharp warning to the PRC.31 
Recognizing that it lacked the military force with which to chal-
lenge the United States, the PRC shifted to a conciliatory policy in 
27. Ralph N. Clough, "The Republic of China and the World, 1949-1981," in 
Hungdah Chiu and Shao-chuan Leng, eds., China: Seventy Years After the 1911 Hsin-Hai 
Revolution (Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1984), pp. 525·526. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid., p. 527. 
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1955. At the conference of nonaligned nations in Bandung, Indonesia 
in April 1955, Premier Chou En-lai declared that the Chinese people 
did not want war with the United States; he offered to negotiate on the 
question of relaxing tensions in the Taiwan area. 32 
As a result, talks between ambassadors from the United States 
and the PRC with some European countries opened in Geneva in Au-
gust 1955. The two sides did reach an agreement on the repatriation 
of citizens of the countries, but no progress was made on the Taiwan 
issue. 33 
The United States suggested that the PRC renounce the use of 
force against Taiwan. The PRC maintained that the "liberation" of 
Taiwan was a domestic issue. The PRC attempted to resolve the issue 
peacefully, but reserved the "sovereign right" to use force if necessary 
on Chinese territory. According to the PRC, the only issue between 
the United States and the PRC concerning Taiwan was the "occupa-
tion" of Taiwan by U.S. forces. This international issue, it said, 
should not be confused with the domestic question of asserting PRC 
control over Taiwan. 34 
The United States made it clear that negotiations with the PRC 
did not constitute diplomatic recognition. It continued to regard the 
ROC as the legitimate government of China, and it continued to allo-
cate large amounts of U.S. military and economic aid to Taiwan. Still, 
the ROC authorities expressed concern at U.S. willingness to negotiate 
with the PRC, and they continued to assert their determination to re-
cover the mainland. 35 
Disappointed that the Geneva talks had failed to produce results 
either in gaining diplomatic recognition from the United States or in 
weakening Washington's links with Taipei, the PRC changed its tac-
tics again in 1958. In his famous Moscow statement of 1957 that "the 
East wind was prevailing over the West wind," Chairman Mao Tse-
tung declared his belief that the alignment of forces in the world was 
shifting against the United States. 36 
Mao went further in testing the U.S. commitment to the defense 
of Taiwan, deploying a massive bombing of the ROC's principal off-
shore island, Quemoy. There were serious doubts among the Ameri-
can people and U.S. allies regarding the wisdom of risking war over 
the offshore islands. Nonetheless, the U.S. government moved large 
32. Ibid. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid., pp. 527-528. 
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forces into the area and firmly supported the ROC's efforts to break a 
blockade of the island. 37 
Ambassadorial talks resumed in Warsaw, providing a channel of 
communication during the heat of the crisis. The deadlock between 
Washington and Peking concerning the Taiwan issue remained unbro-
ken; although a direct clash between U.S. and PRC forces was 
avoided, Quemoy remained in the hands of the ROC. The PRC soon 
reduced its bombardment to a token shelling on odd days to demon-
strate its rejection of the cease-fire sought by the United States.38 
The military clash over Quemoy strained the relations of the two 
Chinese governments with their big-power supporters. Neither the 
United States nor the Soviet Union wished to be drawn into a military 
confrontation. Opinions around the world strongly favored a with-
drawal of ROC forces from the offshore islands. 39 
Both the PRC and the ROC, however, viewed these islands as a 
lasting link between Taiwan and the mainland, a symbol of their inten-
tions to reunite China on their own terms. The longer the United 
States suggested that the ROC reduce its forces, the more the ROC 
resisted. PRC Foreign Minister Chen Yi told foreign diplomats in Pe-
king that the PRC's policy was "Liberation" of the offshore islands 
and Taiwan together. The PRC, however, never again resorted to mil-
itary action to sever the offshore islands from Taiwan.40 
Neither the use of military force nor bilateral negotiations had 
caused the United States to withdraw its support from Taiwan. With 
its control over the Chinese mainland and the vast majority of Chinese 
people secured, the PRC gained confidence. The United States found 
it increasingly difficult to mobilize majority support in the United Na-
tions for an annual resolution "not to consider" the Chinese represen-
tation issue. Memories of the Korean War faded, the United Nations 
admitted many new members, and many nations considered the 
ROC's claim to represent the Chinese people to be unrealistic. Conse-
quently, from 1961 the United States and its allies adopted a different 
approach, defeating resolutions to seat the PRC by mobilizing major-
ity support for a resolution, which required a two-thirds majority vote. 
By 1971, however, even this tactic had worn thin; it became increas-
ingly difficult to persuade member nations to exclude the PRC. In 
1971, for the first time in 20 years, the U.S. Congress did not pass a 
37. Ibid., p. 528. 
38. Ibid. 
39. Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1978), p. 21. 
40. Clough, "The Republic of China and the World, 1949-1981," op. cit., p. 528. 
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resolution opposing the seating of the PRC in the United Nations. 
American opinion favored the PRC admittance, provided a place be 
made for the ROC also; however, the PRC repeated that it would not 
enter the United Nations as long as the ROC remained there.41 
President Richard M. Nixon's announcement of his upcoming 
visit to Peking in July 1971 came as a surprise. He announced that he 
would seek to normalize relations between the PRC and the United 
States, signalling a radical change in U.S. policy. This change broke 
down barriers which kept the PRC out of the United Nations: by 
October 1971, the PRC was voted in and the ROC expelled.42 Their 
expulsion from the United Nations started a multi-national shift of 
diplomatic relations from Taipei to Peking, further fueled by President 
Nixon's trip to the PRC in February 1972 and the Shanghai 
Communique.43 
Even though the language of the Shanghai Communique was 
carefully drawn, the United States did not accept the PRC's view that 
Taiwan was a part of the PRC; however, the United States did accept 
the views held on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that Taiwan was a 
part of China, virtually ruling out U.S. support for an independent 
Taiwan. Moreover, the United States declared that the Taiwan issue 
should be resolved peacefully by the Chinese themselves by announc-
ing the U.S. intention eventually to withdraw all forces and military 
installations from Taiwan.44 
The communique and other aspects of Nixon trip to the PRC 
were widely interpreted as the beginning of a U.S. disengagement from 
Taiwan; this influence spread quickly to other countries. The number 
of countries maintaining relations with the PRC and the ROC had 
been about equal in 1971. By February 1973 countries recognizing the 
PRC rose to 85, while those recognizing the ROC fell to 39. By 1985, 
159 nations had diplomatic relations with the PRC and only 22 with 
the ROC.45 
The PRC began to take advantage of its new position, replacing 
the ROC in the organs of the United Nations. The PRC replaced the 
ROC in the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic 
and Social Council, and many affiliates such as UNESCO, WHO, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization, the Intergovernmental Civil Avi-
ation Organization, and the International Maritime Consultative Or-
41. Ibid., pp. 528-529. 
42. Ibid., p. 529. 
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ganization. The PRC also forced the ROC out of a large number of 
intergovernmental financial organizations. In 1980, after changes in 
foreign economic policy brought about by Deng Xiaoping, the PRC 
applied to join the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
The ROC was forced to withdraw. In 1986 PRC was admitted to the 
Asian Development Bank, of which the ROC has long been a member 
with U.S. support.46 
Demanding the expulsion of private organizations in Taiwan 
from international bodies, the PRC concentrated on the 300 or more 
international nongovernmental organizations affiliated with 
UNESCO. At the 18th general conference of UNESCO in Paris in 
1974, the PRC succeeded in passing a resolution urging all these orga-
nizations to exclude the ROC and to break off all relations with "bod-
ies or elements linked with Chiang Kai-shek." Some organizations 
complied; others refused. Peking wanted similar resolutions passed at 
the following biennial UNESCO conferences. The resolution of the 
21st session at Belgrade in 1980 "noted with concern that certain in-
ternational nongovernmental organizations maintaining relations with 
UNESCO retain among their members bodies or persons linked with 
the Taiwan authorities, purporting to represent China and conducting 
activities in that capacity." The resolution requested all the organiza-
tions "take immediate steps to debar bodies or persons linked with the 
Taiwan authorities from membership and from carrying out activities 
either in the name of the 'Republic of China' or China in the name of 
Taiwan as a region distinct from China."47 
The International Council of Science Unions has resisted PRC 
pressure to expel Taiwan on the grounds that science is a nonpolitical 
activity and that any legitimate scientific organization should be enti-
tled to belong regardless of nationality. In May 1980 the ICSU 
adopted a resolution agreeing to accept separate organizations from 
Taiwan and the PRC as full members representing Chinese scientists. 
But the PRC declined to participate in a September 1980 meeting be-
cause it could not regard Taiwan as a full voting member of the 
organization. 48 
The PRC also has worked hard to squeeze Taiwan out of interna-
tional sports. The hardest-fought and lengthiest battle was the 
Olympic Games. Until the summer of 1976, teams from Taiwan com-
peted and PRC teams did not. At the Olympic Games in Montreal in 
46. Clough, "The Republic of China and the World, 1949-1981," op. cit., p. 530. 
47. UNESCO, Conference Document 21 C/PRG, V/DR. I, September 1980. 
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1976, however, the Canadian government ruled that Taiwan could not 
compete under the name Republic of China. Therefore, the ROC with-
drew. The struggle continued within the International Olympic Com-
mittee, which recognized Taiwan, not the PRC. In November 1979, 
after a postal ballot of all members, the IOC announced its decision to 
recognize the Chinese Olympic Committee in Peking as the national 
committee of China. Taiwan would be allowed to compete under the 
name "Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee" and must use a flag and 
anthem other than those of the ROC. After an unsuccessful attempt 
to fight the IOC decision, the Olympic committee in Taiwan agreed in 
March 1981 to accept its new status. Both the PRC and the ROC 
competed in the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles. 49 
2. The Unfinished Civil War and Propaganda Battles 
In addition to undercutting the ROC's international status, the 
PRC has taken a variety of other measures to gain final victory in the 
unfinished civil war and to achieve China's national integration. 
To keep alive its hope of recovering the mainland, up to 1969, the 
ROC launched occasional small-scale reconnaissance teams against 
the mainland. It also sent high-flying aircraft to gather intelligence. It 
maintained regular air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait. 50 
In early 1962, Chiang Kai-shek readied his forces to take advan-
tage of possible revolt on the mainland triggered by several successive 
years of severe economic hardship. In response, the PRC reinforced 
its troops in Fukien. But no rebellion occurred. The United States 
informed the PRC that it had no intention of backing an ROC attempt 
to invade the mainland. The crisis subsided. 51 
In recent years, military operations have taken on a routine qual-
ity, the PRC not challenging sea and air domination of the Taiwan 
Strait by the ROC navy and air force, the ROC not taking any actions 
against the mainland. A tacit understanding has developed as to the 
boundaries for normal sea and air operations by each side. Neither 
encroaches upon the other. In the early 1960s, the odd-day shelling of 
Quemoy and Matsu took the form of shells containing propaganda 
leaflets rather than high explosives. Even the propaganda shelling was 
halted after the United States established diplomatic relations with the 
PRC on January 1, 1979.52 
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Except for the short-lived use of large-scale military forces 
against the offshore islands in 1958, the civil war has been conducted 
primarily by political rather than military means. At the National 
People's Congress of 1956, PRC Premier Chou En-lai outlined a pol-
icy toward Taiwan. Chou pledged that "the Chinese people would 
seek to liberate Taiwan by peaceful means so far as it is possible ... the 
possibility of peaceful liberation is increasing."53 
Chou declared that the PRC was willing to negotiate with the 
ROC on specific steps and terms for a peaceful "liberation." He urged 
that representatives be sent to Peking to negotiate, assuring the Na-
tionalist military and political personnel on Taiwan that they would 
not be punished for past deeds. On the contrary, Chou said, if they 
worked for a peaceful "liberation," they would be rewarded by partici-
pating in the socialist development of the motherland. He invited 
them to visit the mainland to see for themselves conditions there. He 
guaranteed their safe entry and departure. 54 
The PRC followed up its declaration on peaceful "liberation" 
with propaganda broadcasts to Taiwan, encouraging appeals from 
friends and relatives on the mainland to prominent individuals on Tai-
wan. Peking's appeals, which stressed the love for the mainland, 
urged the leaders of the ROC not to allow themselves to be controlled 
by the United States. 55 
ROC President Chiang Kai-shek flatly rejected the proposals for 
negotiation, declaring that there was "absolutely no possibility of any 
compromise" with Peking. "The ROC government has already had 
too many painful experiences in negotiating with the Chinese 
Communists. " 56 
Throughout the 1960s, the PRC and the ROC fought a propa-
ganda war, filling the airwaves with denunciations of each other. 
When monsoon winds blew toward the mainland, ROC psychological 
warfare units sent balloons carrying messages and gifts of food; how-
ever, there is little evidence that the population on either side was sig-
nificantly impressed. 57 
After President Nixon's shift in policy toward the PRC in 1971, 
the Peking authorities redoubled their efforts to convince the people of 
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Taiwan that they could not depend on the United States and that "lib-
eration" was inevitable. Instead of directing their appeals exclusively 
to the mainlander-Chinese ruling group on Taiwan as they had in the 
past, they began to cultivate the Taiwanese-Chinese. The PRC recog-
nized that family and other personal ties with the mainland were erod-
ing with the passage of time, and recognized that the political 
influence of the Taiwanese-Chinese was growing. The Taiwanese-Chi-
nese made up 85 percent of the population and owned most of the 
farmland, commercial and industrial enterprises in Taiwan. Assuming 
that the Taiwanese-Chinese would gain control of decision making at 
the national level, the PRC needed to ensure that the Taiwanese-Chi-
nese as well as the mainlander-Chinese on Taiwan would continue to 
adhere to the one-China concept. 58 
The PRC cultivation of the Taiwanese-Chinese took a variety of 
forms. The Taiwan Self-Government League, the chief political organ 
for promoting the "liberation" of Taiwan, assumed a more prominent 
role. The PRC even softened its hostility toward the Taiwan Indepen-
dence Movement, which it had previously labeled as a tool of the 
United States. It continued to oppose their advocacy of Taiwan's in-
dependence, but supported their attacks on the ROC. 59 
High officials, including Premier Chou En-lai, met with visitors 
from abroad, including some of Taiwan origin, to subdue fears of what 
might happen to Taiwan after liberation. In a lengthy conversation 
with overseas Chinese from North America in August 1972, Chou 
stressed the complexity of the Taiwan problem. He asked for patience 
and the avoidance of a military solution, denying that the integration 
of Taiwan into the PRC would lower living standards there. Shang-
hai, he pointed out, had continued to enjoy a living standard higher 
than the rest of the mainland after its "liberation." Chou emphasized 
the important role that the Taiwanese-Chinese would play in the 
peaceful "liberation" of Taiwan. 60 
In a similar conversation with a group of overseas Chinese in Oc-
tober 1974, PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping warned that although 
priority was being given to a peaceful "liberation," non-peaceful 
means could not be ruled out if Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang 
Ching-kuo continued to reject negotiations. He expressed the hope 
that "patriotic" forces could gradually develop in Taiwan that could 
58. Ibid., pp. 534-535. 
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play a part in either a peaceful or non-peaceful solution.61 
The ruling Nationalist Party in Taiwan was not persuaded. It re-
peatedly rejected any form of negotiations with the Communist Party 
in Peking. 62 
The heaviest blow to the people of the ROC was still to come. On 
January 1, 1979, the United States severed diplomatic relations with 
the ROC to recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China, 
notifying the ROC that it was terminating the US-ROC Mutual De-
fense Treaty at the end of 1979. These actions, long sought by the 
PRC, appeared to remove the principal obstacles to the incorporation 
of Taiwan into the PRC; nevertheless, the ROC held out firmly 
against submitting to the PRC's control. 63 
The PRC was not in a position to force submission because it 
lacked the military capability to succeed in a naval attack across the 
Taiwan Strait. To build such a force would require large resources, 
which were urgently needed for modernizing the country. The Tai-
wan Relations Act passed the U.S. Congress and became effective on 
April10, 1979. The statute is central to the future of the United States 
relationship with Taiwan, 64 emphasizing that the United States would 
be gravely concerned by any attempt to subdue Taiwan by force. 
Meanwhile, the United States continued to supply substantial amounts 
of weapons to Taiwan. The use of force against Taiwan thus could 
shatter potential PRC relations with the United States as well as with 
Japan. The PRC has relied heavily on both the United States and 
Japan for modernization and for political support against the Soviet 
Union.65 
The PRC thus adopted a conciliatory policy toward the ROC fol-
lowing the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United 
States. On January 1, 1979, the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress issued "A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," 
which halted the odd-day propaganda shelling to the offshore islands 
of Quemoy and Matsu, and called for peace talks between the PRC 
and the ROC, attempting to end the military confrontation along the 
Taiwan Strait. This statement assured that reunification would "not 
cause the people of Taiwan any losses," and called for the establish-
ment of "Three Links"-postal, transportation services and trade-
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between the mainland and Taiwan.66 
In early January 1979, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping told a group 
of visiting U.S. senators that an integrated Taiwan would be allowed 
to maintain its own political and economic systems, and even its 
armed forces. It would, however, have to acknowledge PRC sover-
eignty over the island and take down the ROC flag. Deng said that 
force would be used against Taiwan only if the Soviet Union interfered 
there or if the ROC refused indefinitely to negotiate.67 
The PRC has continued to maintain this basic position. Their me-
dia has issued a steady stream of articles and statements encouraging 
unification sentiment among the people of Taiwan and describing the 
growing indirect trade between the mainland and Taiwan through 
Hong Kong. The PRC media play up the popularity of Taiwan-made 
TV sets, tape recorders and electric fans among the people of mainland 
China; they report cordial conversations between scientists, writers 
and university professors from Taiwan and the mainland meeting 
abroad; and they publicize the special treatment given in the PRC to 
athletes of Taiwan origin from Japan and the United States. Mainland 
television broadcast a documentary on life in Taiwan. According to 
Radio Beijing, special reception centers have been established in main-
land ports for fishermen from Taiwan who seek shelter from typhoon 
or need vessel repair. The PRC media continually urged personal con-
tact between people from Taiwan and the mainland.68 
The ROC has regarded the PRC's conciliatory attitude as a 
"united front tactic" aimed at undermining resistance on Taiwan, 
making it vulnerable to a takeover by the PRC. The ROC has contin-
ued to flatly reject PRC proposals to negotiate, to open direct trade, or 
to establish postal, shipping or airline connections. The manifesto of 
the Twelfth National Congress of the Nationalist Party in March-
April 1981 reiterated the party's unyielding anti-Communist position 
by declaring its determination to unify China under Sun Yat-sen's 
Three Principles of the People. The manifesto said: "We know that to 
talk peace with the enemy amounts to inviting our own collapse and 
that to compromise with the enemy is the same as destroying our-
selves."69 By 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act, continued sales of U.S. 
defense equipment to the ROC, and the election of Ronald Reagan as 
president of the United States had combined to frustrate any hopes for 
concession by the ROC. Two years after the ROC was diplomatically 
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isolated from the United States, there was still no change m its 
attitude. 70 
The PRC leadership decided that it needed a dramatic new initia-
tive. This took the form of the "Nine-Point Peace Proposal" of Sep-
tember 30, 1981, which was presented by Marshall Ye Jiangying, the 
chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Con-
gress. While much of its content repeated earlier public proposals 
made to Taiwan, the document emphasized the theme seeking to re-
store attention to the integration issue. The major points were: Peace 
talks between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party 
could be held on a "reciprocal basis" after an initial "exhaustive ex-
change of views" by party representatives; the Taiwan province could 
become a "special administrative region" of the PRC with "a high 
degree of autonomy"; the central PRC government would "not inter-
fere with local affairs on Taiwan"; Taipei authorities would be wel-
come to "take up posts of leadership ... and participate in running the 
(unified) state"; and both the "freedom of entry and exit" and com-
mercial investments and profits could be "guaranteed" for people of 
Taiwan. The PRC also offered to "subsidize" Taiwan's budget when-
ever its "local finance was in difficulty."71 
Y e's 1981 peace proposal also included a personal appeal to the 
Nationalist Party: 
We hope that the Nationalist authorities will stick to their 
one-China position and their opposition to "two Chinas" 
and that they will put national interests above everything 
else, forget previous ill-will and join hands with us in accom-
plishing the great cause of national reunification and the 
great goal of making China prosperous and strong, so as to 
win glory for our ancestors, bring benefit to our posterity and 
write a new and glorious page in the history of the Chinese 
nation.72 
The ROC issued a swift and specific response to the proposal. 
President Chiang Ching-kuo suggested that the proposal was "primar-
ily intended to stop U.S. arms sales to our country." From an histori-
cal perspective, he added, "The Chinese Communists consistently 
follow the strategy of seeking their goals through peace talks when 
70. Robert L. Downen, To Bridge the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.: The Council 
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these cannot be attained by military means.'m And Premier Sun Yun-
suan on June 10, 1982, observed that all of the PRC's offers contained 
two pre-conditions or assumptions: that the ROC would become a 
"provincial government" under PRC jurisdiction and that forceful in-
vasion of the island could not be ruled out if preliminary peace talks 
should fail. "If the political, economic, social and cultural gaps be-
tween the Chinese mainland and free China continue to narrow, the 
conditions for peaceful reunification can gradually mature," Sun said. 
"The obstacles to reunification will be reduced naturally with the pas-
sage of time. "74 
While publicly supporting the PRC's approach, the United States 
declined to become involved in the Chinese integration issue. The 
U.S. Department of State responded in support of Sun's statement: 
We are very interested in the import of [Sun's] speech, which 
appears to be consistent with the concept of peaceful settle-
ment of the [Communist-Nationalist] differences .... We wel-
come any moves in this direction. We reiterate, however, our 
firm policy that the resolution of those differences is a mat-
ter for the Chinese people themselves, and our only interest 
is that any resolution be peaceful. We do not see a role for 
the United States in promoting or arranging such a 
settlement. 75 
On July 25, 1982, the People's Daily reported that Liao Chengzhi, 
the PRC official in charge of Taiwan relations, sent a letter to his for-
mer friend and schoolmate, ROC President Chiang. Liao offered to 
come to Taiwan to discuss reunification. On August 17, 1982, Soong 
Mei-ling, widow of the late ROC President Chiang Kai-shek, replied 
to Liao in a public letter on behalf of President Chiang, rejecting 
reunification talks. 
On the same day, the United States and the PRC announced their 
joint communique to limit U.S. arms sales to the ROC, to ultimately 
phase them out altogether. Also on the same day, the ROC publicized 
U.S. assurances not to play a mediation role, nor to exert pressure on 
the ROC to enter into negotiations with the PRC. The PRC reiterated 
its "fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification"; and the 
United States announced that it understood and appreciated this 
policy.76 
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Renewing its military threat against the ROC, the PRC also 
hardened its terms for unification. On the date of the communique, 
Chai Zemin, the PRC Ambassador to the United States, said in a 
television interview with CBS, "We [will not] make any commitment 
to any country on the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem. We 
consider the Taiwan problem to be China's internal affair. It is up to 
us to decide how to solve this problem."77 
On October 27, 1982, the PRC tested its submarine-based rockets 
in the sea area north of Taiwan. Presumably it wanted to show off its 
military might. On December 28, 1982, the PRC denied that the test 
was intended as a threat; nevertheless, the threat of using force against 
the ROC on Taiwan had already reached the people of Taiwan.78 
The PRC terms for unification were hardened by its adoption of 
Article 31 of its constitution on December 4, 1982. The preamble 
states, "Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic 
of China. To accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland 
is a lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots 
in Taiwan." Unspecified is the time or manner of achieving this goal, 
but Article 31 declares, "The state may, when necessary, establish spe-
cial administrative regions. The systems to be instituted in special ad-
ministrative regions shall be prescribed by law by the National 
People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions."79 
This new article, absent from previous constitutions, differentiates 
"administrative" from "autonomous" regions, which are defined in 
Article 30 as comprising "nationality areas. " 80 
The terminology "special administrative region" of Article 31 is 
identical with the nine-point peace proposal, which offers Taiwan "a 
high degree of autonomy." This suggests that the provision was delib-
erately designed to cover Taiwan, and possibly Hong Kong and Ma-
cao as well.s' 
On December 17, 1982, ROC President Chiang rejected the 
PRC's offer of a "special administrative region" for Taiwan because he 
saw a lesson in what had happened to Tibet, which was taken by PRC 
force in 1959.82 
In January 1983, the PRC demanded the ROC's expulsion from 
the Asian Development Bank. In May 1983, Liao Chengzhi of the 
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PRC said that Taiwan could continue to buy U.S. weapons and par-
ticipate in the bank after unification with the PRC. 83 
On July 26, 1983, PRC leader Deng Xiaoping, in an interview 
with Taiwan-raised professor Winston Yang of Seton Hall University, 
said that Taiwan would not have "complete autonomy" after unifica-
tion, but would enjoy the "right to follow internal policy."84 Deng 
offered a number of new proposals to open a dialogue with the ROC 
government on reunification. "[The PRC] will not send troops or offi-
cials to Taiwan to take over, to manage, to supervise or to interfere 
with Taiwan's internal affairs," Deng announced. "Taiwan will retain 
its own armed forces and also the right to acquire weapons to maintain 
defense capabilities, and Taiwan may use its own flag and use the 
name 'China, Taiwan.' " 85 
Until now, the PRC had insisted that reunification would require 
the ROC to fly the PRC flag and would require a name change from 
ROC to "Taiwan, People's Republic of China." Deng said the plan 
would "essentially maintain the status quo and only give the appear-
ance of reunification."86 
The ROC rejected the proposal as a trick to open the way for 
communist control. The ROC would only consider reunifying if the 
PRC abandoned communism to embrace the ROC's political ideology, 
the Three Principles of the People. 87 
Deng, the PRC's foremost political figure, responded, "We mean 
what we say. We play no tricks." Calling the ROC's demands "un-
realistic," Deng offered the plan for turning the island into a special 
administrative region with "exclusive rights" to administer its legisla-
tive, judicial and military systems without interference from the PRC 
government. 88 
Deng said that the ROC on Taiwan could retain its indepen-
dence, and a system different from that of the mainland. "It may exer-
cise independent jurisdiction, and the right of final judgment need not 
reside in Peking. Peaceful reunification does not mean the mainland 
swallowing up Taiwan, of course, nor vice versa."89 
Although he offered the most far-reaching assurance to the ROC 
on Taiwan, promising a free hand in running the island, Deng empha-
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sized that any autonomy would be limited and conditional. "Complete 
autonomy is simply out of the question," Deng said, "Complete auton-
omy means 'Two Chinas,' not 'One China.' " 90 
Though all of the PRC's peace proposals have been rejected by 
the ROC on Taiwan, the PRC has not given up its strategies or goals 
for eventual integration. Furthermore, the PRC has tried to involve 
the United States in China's integration, although it has often claimed 
it to be an internal affair. 
On January 1, 1984, Deng Yingchao, the widow of former PRC 
Premier Chou En-lai, said at a New Year's Day party that "foreign 
interference in China's internal affairs would not end" until reunifica-
tion takes place. At the same time, she also denounced the Taiwanese 
Independence Movement. 91 
In January 1984, during a visit to the United States, PRC Premier 
Zhao Ziyang said, "The Taiwan issue is the major difference between 
China and the United States.'' He declared that reunification of China 
is one of "two great historical tasks" facing the current generation.92 
The United States, however, still retains its policy of non-involvement. 
Returning to attempts to directly persuade the ROC, Deng 
Yingchao of the PRC, on January 16, 1984, in a speech at the 60th 
anniversary commemoration of the First National Congress of the Na-
tionalist Party, issued a "third united front" for peace talks.93 In an-
other public letter on February 17, 1984, Soong Mei-ling, Chiang Kai-
shek's widow, rejected the proposal.94 
On February 22, 1984, Deng Xiaoping, in a meeting with former 
White House national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, said that 
following unification Taiwan would be allowed to continue to practice 
capitalism under a "One Nation, Two Systems" model. The concept 
suggested that the PRC was softening its position, nevertheless, the 
ROC still rejected the new integration model publicized as "One Na-
tion, Two Systems. " 95 
Whether there be any integration model or satisfactory solution 
for both the PRC and the ROC remains unanswered. But it is still 
possible that both governments could agree on the formation of one 
China of which Taiwan is a part and that mutual understanding could 
avoid renewed warfare. 
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Despite firm opposition by the ROC to open and direct links with 
the PRC, the ROC has tolerated growing indirect trade, mostly 
through Hong Kong, which exceeded $500 million in 1984, and had 
already reached this amount in the first half of 1985.96 
In an interview with PRC journalists before Zhao's visit to Wash-
ington in January 1984, President Reagan reiterated the U.S. position 
of remaining uninvolved: "We are not going to turn our backs on old 
friends in order to strengthen or make new friends. . . . The problem 
between the People's Republic and the people on Taiwan is one for the 
Chinese to settle between themselves. We will do nothing to 
intervene. . . . " 97 
However, the United States has continued to be the principal tar-
get of PRC and ROC foreign policy. The rivalry has intensified since 
the beginning of the Reagan administration. Encouraged by President 
Reagan's campaign statements, the ROC has argued for a greater de-
gree of "officiality" in relations with the United States and has sought 
more advanced arms for its defense. The PRC has repeated its view 
that the Taiwan Relations Act conflicts with the joint communique on 
establishment of relations and has reminded Americans that it never 
agreed to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The Reagan administration has 
responded cautiously. It has sought to develop further relations with 
the PRC, which it regards as important for geopolitical reasons. At 
the same time, it has adopted a more cordial style than the Carter 
administration in its unofficial relations with the ROC.98 Neverthe-
less, the United States has retained its policy of allowing the PRC and 
the ROC to solve the integration problem between themselves. 
The Theoretical Framework of A Communications Approach to 
National Integration 
As with many contemporary theories of international relations, 
integration theory is a relatively new and more precise way of looking 
at an old problem. The problem considers the merger of two or more 
states to form a new, larger state, a phenomenon that has long been of 
interest not only to students but also to those more directly involved in 
world politics.99 
Integration theory is full of controversies. Integration involves 
the merger of all institutions, separate communities, usually within a 
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specific geographic area, into a larger unit. Different institutions play 
different roles, however; elite and popular attitudes differ, and as do 
economic, political and social transactions. Does integration occurs 
passively and mutually? Or is it brought about by the conscious inter-
vention and manipulation of an integrating elite?100 Furthermore, 
there is even little agreement as to how integration itself should be 
defined. Some say it is a process; others a condition. With controver-
sial implications of integration, can states become integrated without 
losing their individual identities?101 
Transactionalists and neofunctionalists take contrasting views to 
integration theory. The transactionalists emphasize transactions be-
tween people. Transactions indicate attitudes toward others as a re-
flection of their interdependence. The transactionalists concentrate on 
the volume and rate of these transactions. They monitor changes in 
public opinion. 102 
The neofunctionalists stress how supranational institutions 
emerge as various self-interest groups merge to be integrated. 103 
Although the two approaches differ in style and emphasis, they 
do share some common broad elements to be used as the basic theoret-
ical framework of this study. 
1. Integration is a multidimensional phenomenon 
Many integration scholars note the importance of a theory based 
on a recognition of integration as a multidimensional phenomenon. 104 
These scholars develop theories and establish links among that encom-
pass the major dimensions. Leon Linberg identifies these dimensions 
as the "multiple properties of collective decision-making systems" and 
defines integration as an "interactive multidimensional process" that 
must be identified, compared, measured and analyzed. 105 
According to Philippe C. Schmitter, "Understanding and expla-
nation in this field are best served not by the dominance of a single 
accepted grand model, but by the simultaneous presence of antithetic 
and conflictive ones, which, while they may converge in certain as-
pects, diverge in many others." 106 
According to Joseph Nye, distinctions should be made among 
100. Ibid., p. 242. 
101. Ibid. 
102. Ibid., pp. 242-243. 
103. Ibid., p. 243. 
104. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., pp. 438 and 443. 
105. Ibid., p. 444. 
106. Ibid., p. 438. 
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categories of catalysts, the external environment, and the interruptions 
that occur in integration. Integration should be broken down into its 
economic, political and legal aspects, which in tum should be divided 
into measurable subtypes. 107 
2. Integration is directed by the elites of the units 
Successful integration depends on a people's ability to internalize 
the process, which turns on the ability of internal elites, not external 
elites, to direct the process. 
Expectations of integration are developed among elite groups in 
government and in private sectors. Joseph Nye cites many historical 
examples of integration resulting from choices made by elites or na-
tional bureaucrats. The extent to which elites become participants in 
regional integration determines the extent of integration. Elites are 
said to be wary of integration because it may threaten their level of 
control. 108 
The extent to which elite groups of integrating units think alike is 
important. Nye says that the higher the level of elite consensus, the 
more likely that steps will continue to be made toward integration. If 
elites share consensus only to a certain point, then integration will not 
go beyond that point. 109 
Neofunctionalists stress the role of self-interest in influencing atti-
tudes toward integration, emphasizing the individual motives of elite 
groups. "Neofunctionalists," Haas says, "rely on the primacy of in-
cremental decision-making over grand designs." Haas assumes here 
that most political actors stumble from one decision to the next with-
out considering the consequences of earlier decisions. They are "inca-
pable of long-range purposive behavior." 110 
3. Integration is based on a consensus among the people of the 
units to be integrated 
Consensus sustains legitimacy. Political systems develop and are 
maintained because their members share consensus on the basic struc-
ture of the system. Such systems are based on procedural consensus-
general agreement on the political framework and the legal 
processes-and substantive consensus-general agreement on the so-
lutions to problems. The greater the procedural and substantive con-
107. Taylor, op. cit., p. 252. 
108. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., p. 440. 
109. Ibid., p. 441. 
110. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 246-247. 
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sensus, the greater the integration of the political system. 111 
Two related questions are fundamental to the study of integra-
tion: (1) How are procedural and substantive consensus achieved and 
maintained? (2) Why do or do not citizens defer to the controlling 
unit?112 
4. Integration can be achieved with or without use of violence 
One of the founding fathers of modem integration theory, Karl 
Deutsch, says that integration is "the attainment within a territory, of 
a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough 
and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expecta-
tions of peaceful change among its population." 113 
This emphasis upon peaceful change or reorientation of attitudes 
is reflected in a slightly different way by integration theorist Ernest 
Haas. Haas has defined integration as "the tendency toward the vol-
untary creation of larger political units, each of which self-consciously 
eschews the use of force in the relations between the participating 
units and groups." 114 Joseph Nye carries this theme further, stating 
that regional political organizations "have made modest contributions 
to the creation of islands of peace in international systems." 115 
Regional integration has even been seen as a means of promoting 
peaceful cooperation and reducing conflict. 116 
Other theorists have argued that political systems become or re-
main intact because of the presence or threat of force. Amitai Etzioni 
says that a political community's control over the use of violence is 
one criterion affecting its level of integration. This community has a 
center of decision-making that allocates resources and rewards, and 
forms the main source of political identification for the majority of 
citizens. 117 
5. Integration can be achieved through a communications 
approach, or through persuasion, i.e., through media 
persuasion 
One integration theory is based on the hypothesis that national-
Ill. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., pp. 417-418. 
112. Ibid., p. 417. 
113. Taylor, op. cit., p. 237. 
114. Ibid. 
II 5. Ibid., p. 238. 
116. Ibid. 
117. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., p. 421. 
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ism can be redirected into a framework for international cooperation 
in place of national competition and war. 118 
Ernest Haas defines integration as a process "whereby political 
actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, 
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing 
national state." 119 
Writers on integration hold several ideas in common. All are 
concerned with the process by which loyalty shifts from one center to 
another. They also share an interest in communications within the 
units to be integrated. According to Deutsch and Etzioni, people 
learn to consider themselves members of a community as a result of 
human communications patterns. 120 
To a greater extent than other writers on integration, Deutsch 
uses both a communications and a system theory. Deutsch states: 
The existence of social science is based on the ability to treat 
a social group as an organization and not as an agglomera-
tion. Communication is the cement that makes organiza-
tions. Communication alone enables a group to think 
together, to see together and to act together. All require the 
understanding of communication. 121 
Communication among people can produce either friendship or 
hostility. Deutsch says that political systems endure as a result of 
their ability to abstract and code incoming information into appropri-
ate symbols, to store coded symbols, to disassociate certain important 
information from the rest, to recall stored information when needed, 
and to recombine stored information entered as input into the 
systems. 122 
The development of a political unit depends on the flow of com-
munications. Countries are "clusters of population, united by grids of 
communication flows and transport systems, and separated by thinly 
settled or nearly empty territories." People are groups of persons 
joined together by an ability to communicate on many topics. Bound-
aries are generally areas in which populations and communications 
decline sharply. 123 
118. Ibid., p. 419. 
119. Ibid., p. 421. 
120. Ibid., p. 424. 
121. Ibid. 
122. Ibid. 
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Integration is accompanied by an increase in transactions, trade, 
capital movement, and communications, and in the exchange of people 
and ideas. 124 Deutsch assumes that the mutual identification neces-
sary for integration is brought about by a growth in transactions. 125 
Deutsch and the transactionalists argue that the variables for integra-
tion can be identified from community-building efforts in the past; by 
measuring changes in transactions between groups, transactionalists 
can assess the growth of a community in a given region. 126 
Deutsch hypothesizes that the more one state interacts with an-
other, the more relevant they become to each other. Such an increase 
in mutual relevance, however, does not necessarily lead to integration. 
It must be accompanied by mutual responsiveness, or the ability to 
respond to the demands of the transactions. 127 
The transactionalists contend that as communications increase, 
so will the development of a sense of community. The transactional-
ists use transaction flows among people as indicators of "mutual rele-
vance" or interdependence, and to determine changes in the levels of 
transaction flows to determine if people are receiving favorable re-
sponses to the demands. Favorable responses may lead to extended 
communications. 128 
Increases in transactions can therefore be seen as part of a learn-
ing process. People become accustomed to using new procedures for 
making demands and settling disputes. They become accustomed to a 
developing mutual recognition. In this way common values emerge. 
Transaction flows thus create a "social-psychological community." 129 
The methodology used by the transactionalists causes them to 
look for two main patterns of communications: a high volume of 
transactions within the region over a wide range of economic, political 
and social activities, and an increasing divergence between the volume 
and range of transactions between the region and the outside world. 130 
Transaction flows can thus be used to determine the degree of 
interdependence within a region and to determine if the people in the 
region are becoming more dependent on each other than they are on 
people outside of the region. 131 
124. Ibid., p. 439. 
125. Taylor, op. cit., p. 243. 
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127. Ibid. 
128. Ibid., p. 244. 
129. Ibid., p. 245. 
130. Ibid. 
131. Ibid. 
CHINA REUNIFICATION ISSUE 35 
6. Integration may be affected by external elements 
Externalization is the extent to which members of an integrating 
unit must develop common positions to deal with nonmembers. This 
has happened with the European Community in its various negotia-
tions with outside parties, including the United States. 132 
To a greater extent than earlier neofunctionalist theory, Nye as-
sumes the importance of external actors. Their active involvement is 
part of the process in which the importance of outside governments 
and international organizations, as well as nongovernmental actors, 
act as catalysts in regional integration. 133 
Elites cannot help but take into consideration external problems, 
such as dependence on exports, threats from larger powers, or the loss 
of status in a changing international system. 134 
Nye hypothesizes that "the further integration proceeds, the 
more likely third parties will be to react to it, either in support or with 
hostility."135 
7. Integration can be achieved through economic or other non-
political factors 
The neofunctionalists see integration as a process in which actors 
collaborate at the international level to further their individual and 
collective interests in some technical, relatively non-controversial area. 
These national actors feel that their interests are best served by dele-
gating decision-making powers to a new supranational body. 136 
This gradual development of integration is not a result of an 
emerging ideological commitment to supranationalism, nor is it a re-
sult of a consensus on more immediate goals; rather, integration 
evolves because its best serves the individual interests. 137 Central to 
Haas's work is the concept of spill-over. Mitrany calls it the doctrine 
of ramification, which is integration through non-political factors. 138 
The major assumption of the spill-over concept is that initial at-
tempts to integrate along relatively non-controversial economic lines 
will eventually spill over into controversial, political areas. Political 
132. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., p. 437. 
133. Ibid., p. 441. 
134. Ibid., p. 442. 
135. Ibid. 
136. Taylor, op. cit., p. 246. 
137. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., p. 432. 
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integration will follow economic integration. 139 In David Mitrany's 
doctrine of "ramification," collaboration in one technical field leads to 
collaboration in other technical fields. This is an essential difference 
between ideological and technical collaboration. 140 Eventually such 
collaboration will encroach upon and absorb the political sector. In 
particular, "economic unification would build up the foundation for 
political agreement, even if it did not make it superfluous." 141 Haas 
agrees that there is a tendency for persons who gain from interaction 
in one sector to favor integration in other sectors. 142 "Earlier deci-
sions," Haas says, "spill-over into new functional contexts, involve 
more and more people, call for more and more interbureaucratic con-
tact and consultations, meeting the new problems which grow out of 
the earlier compromises." 143 There is an "expansive logic" contribut-
ing to spill-over from one sector to another. The process is one by 
which the nations "upgrade" their common interests. 144 Haas contin-
ues to say that economic issues in a democratic, industrial setting are 
most likely to spill-over into political integration 145; however, Haas 
acknowledges that spill-over is not automatic. It will occur only if 
"actors, on the basis of their interest-inspired perception, desire to 
adapt integrative lessons learned in one context to a new situation." 146 
To lead to spill-over, Haas says, "decisions must relate directly to ex-
perienced needs and demands of important national elites." Some spe-
cific issues, such as human rights are more likely to lead to spill-over 
than others, such as trade union issues. 147 
Previous Studies on National Integration 
Studies which have compared the media of divided nations have 
been a late development in political communications science. The 
study of divided nations from a social, rather than a political, perspec-
tive did not emerge until the 1960s. Previous studies of the unification 
of various states into a larger unit were focused on Western Europe 
and the emerging nations. Using concepts such as "social communica-
tion," "political integration," "security community," "overlapping 
139. Ibid. 
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membership," "multiple loyalty," and "nation-building," scholars like 
Karl Deutsch, Ernest Haas and Lucian Pye have made many contri-
butions to the understanding of the processes involved in 
integration. 148 
The divisions of China, Korea, Vietnam and Germany into Com-
munist and non-Communist political systems have been major polit-
ical developments since the end of World War II. In 1975, Vietnam 
became the only one of these divided nations to be reunified by force. 
The divided states of China, Korea and Germany have not given up 
their goals of achieving one integrated nation, still resenting terms 
such as "two Chinas," "two Koreas" and "two Germanies." 149 
China's reunification situation is unique. It differs from that of 
Korea or Germany, which were divided by international agreements 
among outside powers: China was divided by civil war. 
The greatest difference from the other divided countries lies in the 
small size of Taiwan compared to the mainland (1:3,000). Each of the 
smaller parts of the divided states has about the same population, 
around 18 million. Each has long operated as an independent state; 
each is larger than two-thirds of all states belonging to the United Na-
tions. East Germany has nearly one-third the population of West Ger-
many; North Korea has almost one-half the population of South 
Korea. By contrast, the ROC on Taiwan has less than one-fiftieth the 
population of the PRC on the mainland. 150 
Among the divided countries, only the PRC has had enough 
political clout to prevent other nations from establishing diplomatic 
relations with both parts of the divided states. Long ago, West Ger-
many and South Korea abandoned efforts to force other nations to 
choose between Bonn and East Berlin, Seoul and Pyongyang. Many 
countries now have established diplomatic relations with both parts of 
Germany and Korea. Because of the PRC's enormous size, its impor-
tance in world affairs, and its control of the vast majority of the Chi-
nese people, the PRC has been able to demand that countries wanting 
diplomatic relations with it cannot maintain such relations with the 
ROC on Taiwan. Forced to choose, most countries, many reluctantly, 
have chosen Peking over Taipei; likewise, Taipei refuses to maintain 
official relations with any country recognizing Peking. 151 
A survey of the literature on the media of divided nations on na-
148. Yung Wei, op. cit., p. 60. 
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tional integration reveals three basic problems: first, there is no com-
mon term that is neutral and precise enough to be an effective 
operational concept for empirical research on the media of divided na-
tions; second, there is a failure in obtaining unbiased, complete and 
first-hand data on the media of the divided nations on the subject of 
national integration; third, there is much subjectivity in analyzing and 
interpreting both quantitative and qualitative data. 152 
152. Review of some previous studies on related subjects is omitted in this edition. 
Available upon request. 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN: METHODOLOGY AND 
HYPOTHESES 
By reviewing the literature on China's national integration, one 
discovers that most studies use historical not communications re-
search, methods to analyze the issue; few focus on the nature or func-
tion of the media's role in the China reunification issue. This study 
compares the two Chinese party newspapers on the issue of China's 
reunification, within the analytic framework of integration theory. 
Thematic content analysis and factor analysis are the most suita-
ble methodologies for this research design. The reasons for choosing 
these two newspapers as the basic media samples, and for using these 
methodologies as well as the proposed hypotheses drawn from the the-
oretical framework, are as follows: 
Media Sample: the People's Daily of the PRC and the Central 
Daily News of the ROC 
Both official party newspapers, the People's Daily of the PRC and 
the Central Daily News of the ROC have been the major political prop-
aganda organs for their parties since the newspapers started; they are 
the most appropriate media sample to test party views, to determine 
strategies, and to analyze proposals affecting the China reunification 
issue. 
The design uses a sample of each newspaper from the period from 
December 1978 to May 1985, commencing in the same month when 
President Jimmy Carter announced the establishment of U.S.-PRC 
diplomatic relations and the termination of U.S.-ROC diplomatic rela-
tions. This event marked the beginning of the dramatic change in cov-
erage on China's national integration in the two newspapers. 
The sample newspapers were coded and analyzed at the Library 
of Congress in Washington, D.C., the Library of the Chinese Main-
land Research Institute of the Chinese Culture University, the Infor-
mation and Reference Divisions of the Central Daily News and the 
Central News Agency in Taipei, Taiwan. 
1. The People's Daily of the PRC 
The People's Daily or Renmin Ribao, as it is referred to in the 
romanization used in the PRC, was founded in Yanan, Shaanxi prov-
(39) 
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ince on June 15, 1948. 1 But that paper was the Liberation Daily, an 
important Chinese Communist Party paper in Shanghai. The People's 
Daily started as the main party paper in Hebei province toward the 
end of the civil war in 1948. On February 2, 1949, following the Red 
Army's march into Peking, the party converted the North China Daily 
News, the former organ of the Nationalist Party Ministry of Informa-
tion, into the People's Daily.2 Operated under the jurisdiction of the 
Central Committee of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, it is the 
official paper, the voice of the party and the PRC government. Its 
influence filters down to even the most remote villages. 3 Although it is 
not the country's largest newspaper, the People's Daily probably comes 
as close to being a national newspaper as can be found in the PRC. 
Exact official circulation figures are unpublished, but it is known to 
sell well over six million copies each day; however, because of the 
great distances between cities, poor transportation and high illiteracy, 
the paper does not penetrate the provinces extensively. Its influence is 
felt throughout the land, and copies are read by opinion leaders on a 
national scale.4 The paper started publishing eight pages daily in Jan-
uary 1980. Before that, it published six pages on weekdays and four 
pages on Sundays and holidays. It contained no advertisements until 
January 1979. It sells for the equivalent of 2.5 cents. 
If one judges by the usual standards of quality journalism, the 
People's Daily is one of the world's most unusual dailies. It buries 
world-shaking events in back-page briefs, and it contributes little to "a 
world community of reason"; nevertheless, it ranks as one of the 
world's most widely read serious journals, serving as the ultimate 
voice of authority for the PRC's one billion people.5 
In many respects, the People's Daily is more a governmental bul-
letin board or propaganda organ than a newspaper. It is a classic ex-
ample of the restricted paper in a restricted society: it does not 
represent the state, but serves party interests; it provides "must" read-
ing for officials, party leaders, diplomats or interested "China-watch-
ers" inside and outside the PRC who keep up with party matters. 6 
I. Derk Bodde, Peking Diary (New York: Henry Schuman, 1950), pp. 102-108. 
2. Shuhfarn Ning, Peirding, Chiitai Tan and Jiahorng Yu, eds., A Concised Journal-
ism Dictionary (Hangzhou, Zhejiang: Zhejiang People's Press, 1984), p. 297. 
3. John Hawkins, Mass Communication in China (New York and London: Longman, 
1984), pp. 85-86. 
4. John C. Merrill and Harold A. Fisher, The World's Great Dailies (New York: Has-
tings, 1980), pp. 266-267. 
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To understand why the People's Daily plays the role that it does is 
to understand those elements in Communist ideology that affect the 
press. The Leninist and the Maoist conceptions of mass persuasion 
determine the nature of Chinese Communist press. Lenin sought a 
press fully integrated in the structure of the Communist Party and its 
government, depending on and supportive of the party, and reflecting 
the political or economic tasks of the party in each stage of national 
development. 7 
Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Chinese Communist Party built 
on these concepts: A journalists' first duties were to carry out revolu-
tion in the name of the party. He opposed a professional role for 
them.8 
In the Soviet Union, reporters and editors are politicians first, 
journalists second; in the PRC they are almost entirely political repre-
sentatives for the party. In the PRC, journalism exists to educate, to 
mobilize the masses, and to achieve party objectives. Achievement of 
these goals places objective and factual reporting-so important to 
Western journalism-in a secondary role; therefore, "negative news" 
about the party, stories about sex, or articles about crime seldom ap-
pear in PRC papers. Whenever the party or government makes a new 
move or an alteration on a international issue, the People's Daily is the 
first to defend the act. In that role, it has dealt almost exclusively with 
the major national and international issues. It gives about 60 percent 
of its space to the former and 40 percent to the latter. Local news is 
left to the provincial newspapers. Domestically, the main news in the 
People's Daily is largely concerned with national progress. Interna-
tionally, it focuses on unfavorable aspects of events related to its ideo-
logical foes, either the West or other Communist nations. For 
example, during the 1960s it lashed out repeatedly against "U.S. impe-
rialism in Vietnam." Since 1965, its attacks on the Soviet Union have 
become increasingly vitriolic.9 
Despite the People's Daily's large circulation and its nationwide 
influence on behalf of the party, it is not the PRC's largest circulation 
daily, being second in readership to the daily tabloid-size Cankao 
Xiaoxi (Reference News), with circulation in 9 million. Cankao Xiaoxi 
comes closest in the PRC to being a daily newspaper in the normal 
usage of the term. 10 However, the People's Daily clearly makes a 
strong impact on PRC society, lucidly provides outsiders insights into 
7. Ibid., pp. 264-265. 
8. Ibid., p. 266. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Howkins, op. cit., p. 86. 
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thought and change in the PRC, and remains unfailingly loyal to the 
Chinese Communist Party, to its central committee, skillfully using 
information to support party views and central committee causes. 
The People's Daily started to publish an overseas edition July 1, 
1985. It is edited in Hong Kong and printed in Hong Kong, Paris, 
San Francisco, New York, Tokyo and Sydney. Aimed at creating a 
favorable image of the PRC, it contains a daily page of Taiwan and 
Hong Kong stories. 11 
2. The Central Daily News of the ROC 
The Central Daily News, or Chung Yang Jih Pao under the Wade-
Giles Chinese translation system, was founded on March 21, 1927, in 
Hankow, central China. It stopped publication in September of that 
year and resumed on February 1, .1928, in Shanghai. Due to wars, the 
paper moved five times: February 1, 1929, to Nanking; March 1927 to 
Changsha; September 1, 1929, to Chungking; September 10, 1945, to 
Nanking; and March 12, 1949, to Taipei. 12 The paper is the official 
voice of the Nationalist Party, or "Kuomingtang" under the Wade-
Giles Chinese translation system, of the ROC. It claims to be the van-
guard and rear guard of party policies. Its stated publishing goal is to 
promote party policy not profits. ROC President and Party Chairman 
Chiang Ching-kuo has instructed the paper "to provide greater service 
for the goal of China's reunification under the Three Principles of the 
People."13 
The paper· clearly proclaims itself a propaganda organ for the 
party. It is not an ordinary objective newspaper by Western journal-
ism standards, though most of its editorial staff received Western-style 
journalism education; one of its former chairmen of the board, Holl-
ington Tong, and one of its former publishers, Ma Hsin-yeh, were 
Missouri journalism graduates in 1911 and 1935 and Missouri journal-
ism medalists in 1957 and 1984. The mission of the Central Daily 
News is similar to that of the People's Daily. 14 
The paper publishes 12 pages daily, averaging 40 percent of its 
space for news and averages 60 percent for advertisements. It pub-
lishes 16 pages on special holidays and has published an airmailed edi-
tion for overseas Chinese reade.rs since June 1950. 15 Though the 
II. People's Daily, overseas edition, July I, 1985. 
12. Central Daily News, February I, 1984. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. 
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Central Daily News is the authoritative paper for promoting the party 
line, it is not the country's largest paper by circulation standards. It 
shares this characteristic with the People's Daily. Although some pub-
lishing experts in Taiwan estimate circulation to be 250,000, ROC cir-
culation figures are inaccurate; the paper itself claims 600,000. The 
China Times, by comparison, is estimated to have a circulation of 
650,000, while claiming 1.2 million. Estimates for the United Daily 
News are 550,000, with a claim of 1 million. 16 Since August 1979, the 
Central Daily News has printed pictures in color17; the People's Daily 
still prints pictures in black and white except for the edition: on Feb-
ruary 4, 1979, the People's Daily printed a full page of color pictures of 
Taiwan. 
The editorial policy of the Central Daily News is regarded by 
some scholars to be as uncompromising as they consider the National-
ist Party. The paper's format is Western-style, but its content lacks 
the Western tendency toward critical reporting, while criticism of the 
president or any high-ranking officials does not appear in print. 
On April 26, 1983, a bomb was set off in the Central Daily News 
building in Taipei by the Taiwanese Independence Movement, and a 
protest was lodged against the paper's owner, the Nationalist Party. 
Twelve people were injured in the explosion. 18 
Thematic Content Analysis 
This study examines the news output of the two Chinese party 
newspapers as they have covered the China reunification issue. The-
matic content analysis and factor analysis are the most appropriate 
methods to conduct this study. Content analysis, Benard Berelson 
says, is "a systematic technique for analyzing message content and 
message handling; content analysis is a tool for observing and analyz-
ing overt communication of selected communicators."19 Berelson 
characterizes content analysis as "a research technique for the objec-
tive, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content 
of communication."20 
Berelson says that content analysis has been used in three ways 
16. Interview with Tung-chen Lin, director of advertising department, Central Daily 
News, Taipei, July 1, 1985. 
17. Central Daily News, ibid. 
18. Ibid., December 13, 1983, p. 3. 
19. Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research (Glencoe, Ill.: 
Free Press, 1952), p. 18. 
20. Ole R. Hoslti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading, 
Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), p. 3. 
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for evaluating communication: (1) evaluation of performance against 
standards; (2) evaluation of performance of one body of content 
against another; (3) evaluation of performance of content against a 
non-content source. Content analysis, however, has a wide range of 
uses in the understanding of relationships that can lead to predictions 
of behavior.21 
After the outbreak of World War II, H.D. Lasswell suggested 
that a "world attention survey" be conducted by an ongoing analysis 
of the world's press. The purpose of such a survey, he said, would be 
to increase understanding of the international environment by describ-
ing changes and continuities in press coverage. Content analysis of 
newspapers would reveal the relative prominence (frequency) and 
evaluation (pro or con) of selected political symbols, including the 
names of leaders, nations, policies and institutions.22 The choice of 
newspapers was based on theoretical and practical considerations: 
In many countries the head of state makes few public state-
ments, and these may be almost purely ceremonial. Party 
platforms often go unrevised year by year. So far as pressure 
groups are concerned, there are great differences in impor-
tance from state to state, and the task of gathering such fugi-
tive material is a vast research project. The published 
proceedings of legislative bodies are often scanty, or alto-
gether lacking. All states are modern enough to publish 
newspapers, however, so that comparable channels can be 
used for comparative purposes. Further, we can be relatively 
sure of who controls and who reads the news. In nearly all 
states some papers are understood to be leading organs of the 
party in office and of the government. Where the party sys-
tem is competitive, the principle organ of parties and factions 
can be identified. Even with the coming of radio and televi-
sion, the daily paper continues to occupy an important posi-
tion in the media (and newspaper content is more accessible 
to study than are broadcasts). 23 
Content analysis allows for the examination of manifest content 
by using statistical analysis. The resulting data measure probabilities 
of chance occurrence, reveal implications about the sources of the con-
21. Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Throp and Lewis Donohew, Analysis in Communica-
tion Research (New York: Macmillian, 1967), p. 2. 
22. Hoslti, op. cit., p. 44. 
23. H. D. Lasswell, D. Lerner and I. de S. Pool, The Comparative Study of Symbols 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 17. 
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tent, and reveal behavior that is likely to be the result of the content. 24 
The quantitative/qualitative debate is an old one in social science 
research; nevertheless, the two approaches both aim at the same goal. 
Critics such as Siegfried Kracauer and A.L. George support a qualita-
tive approach and object to quantification as a requirement. 25 In this 
study, both approaches are used in gathering and analyzing most of 
the data and interpreting the results. 
On the matter of manifest versus latent content, Berelson says 
that content analysis is limited to the "description of the manifest con-
tent of communication." This limitation only applies to the coding 
stage of data collection. In systematically collecting the data, manifest 
attributes are used to code the contents. These include previously de-
fined categories, words, paragraphs, etc. At the interpretation stage, 
latent meanings can be extracted. 26 
This study draws on Ole R. Holsti's definition of content analysis 
as any technique for making inferences by systematically identifying 
specified characteristics of messages. The assumption underlying this 
definition is that, by systematically identifying the rules and analyzing 
the data, the researcher works from a scientific basis which gives valid-
ity to the results. 
Thematic content analysis constitutes the core of the quantitative 
segment of the study. Themes help to provide a sense of the direction 
of the content regarding China's reunification. A central element of 
any thematic content analysis is the set of categorical themes which 
identify the coded content. "In the absence of standard schemes of 
classification," Holsti says, "the analyst is usually faced with the task 
of constructing appropriate themes by trial and error methods. This 
process consists of moving back and forth from theory to data; of test-
ing usefulness of tentative themes; of then modifying them in the light 
of the data. " 27 
Common requirements in defining themes for content analysis are 
that the themes "reflect the purpose of the research; they must be ex-
haustive; be mutually exclusive; be independent; and be derived from a 
single classification principle."28 These requirements meet the need 
24. Hoslti, op. cit., p. 13. 
25. Siegfried Kracauer, "The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis," Public Opin-
ion Quarterly 16 (Winter 1953-54): 631-43; and A. L. George, "Quantitative and Qualita-
tive Approaches to Content Analysis," in Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., Trends in Content 
Analysis (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1959), pp. 7-32. 
26. Hoslti, op. cit., p. 12-14. 
27. Hoslti, op. cit., p. 104. 
28. Ibid., p. 95. 
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for objective measurement. But, as Proeben Sepstrup says, "Category 
formation (theme formation too) should not-as is often the case in 
positivistic content analysis-be seen as a neutral-value-free phase pre-
ceding the actual content analysis. This is the decisive phase of con-
tent analysis and it is imperative that category formation is determined 
by the purposes and hypotheses, and solely by these. "29 The theme 
category is one special kind of content category; the theme itself is 
considered a unit of analysis, each theme being placed in a large com-
partment known as a theme category. A variety of different themes 
with essentially the same basic meaning can be classified under a single 
theme category. "A theme is an assertion about a subject matter; the 
subject must be present or implied in the assertion."30 
1. Theme Selection 
To ensure that the selected themes of this study were exhaustive, 
mutually exclusive, independent and not overlapping, five political 
communications scholars specializing in the China reunification issue 
and integration theory were consulted. They are Dr. Tao-tai Hsia, 
chief of the Far Eastern Law Division of the Library of Congress; Dr. 
Hungdah Chiu, School of Law, University of Maryland; Mr. Robert 
L. Downen, director of special projects, Bureau of East Asian and Pa-
cific Affairs, the U.S. State Department; Dr. Hsing-ti Cheng, professor 
of public policy, National Chengchi University; and Mr. Kai-huang 
Yang, professor of Mainland problems, Chinese Culture University of 
Taipei. Fifty-four thematic categories were decided on. These repre-
sent the most important political events, statements and announce-
ments by all parties related to China's reunification from December 
1978 to May 1985. These 54 categories were used as variables to test 
the performance of the two Chinese party newspapers in covering the 
China reunification issue during the mentioned period. 
The thematic categories used as operational variables for this re-
search design are shown in Table 1. 
29. Proeben Sepstrup, "Methodological Developments in Content Analysis?" in Karl 
Erik Rosengran, ed., Advances in Content Analysis (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 
1981), p. 137. 
30. Budd, Throp and Donohew, op. cit., p. 47. 
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TABLE 1 
THEMATIC CATEGORIES 
Mnemonic Label 
#1 TERRITO 1 
2 
#2 SCENERY 1 
2 
#3 HISTORY 1 
2 
#4 SUNSOON 1 
2 
#5 CNPREVO 1 
2 
#6 ONECHIN 1 
2 
#7 CHINESE 1 
2 
#8 HOMESIC 1 
2 
#9 RELATIV 1 
2 
# 10 REGRDEF 1 
2 
Description of Report 
"One Greater China" territory. For 
example, border disputes between the PRC 
and the Soviet Union, the PRC and India, 
and the PRC and Vietnam; island disputes 
between the PRC and Japan, the PRC and 
Vietnam; and the integration dispute 
between the PRC and the ROC regarding 
Taiwan as a part of China. 
The beautiful scenery in the mainland and 
Taiwan. For example, the great Wall, the 
Silk Road, the Yangtze River, the West 
Lake, and Ali Mountain. 
Chinese history and historical figures. For 
example, Confucius, Lao Tze and Mencius. 
Sun Yat-sen as the revolutionary leader 
who overthrew the Manchu Empire, and 
Soong Ching Ling, Sun's widow and the 
PRC's honorary president. 
The Hsin-hai Revolution in 1911 led by 
Sun Yat-sen and his Nationalist Party. 
The traditional political philosophy of "one 
China." 
The Chinese as one people regardless of 
where they live or what they believe. 
The separation of people from their native 
towns resulting from the political 
separation between the mainland and 
Taiwan. 
The separated relatives divided by the 
Taiwan Strait. 
The visits made by overseas Chinese or 
people from the other side, and defections 
of navy or air force pilots, scholars, artists, 
scientists or politicians to the other side. 
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# 11 FAVCOMO 1 
2 
# 12 UNFCOMO 1 
2 
#13 FAVPOLO 1 
2 
#14 NEUPOLO 1 
2 
#15 UNFPOLO 1 
2 
#16 FAVMILO 1 
2 
# 17 NEUMILO 1 
2 
# 18 UNFMILO 1 
2 
#19 FAVSOCO 1 
2 
#20 NEUSOCO 1 
2 
#21 UNFSOCO 1 
2 
#22 WARMUSA 1 
2 
#23 USCOLDO 1 
2 
#24 DIPLWUS 1 
2 
#25 TAIREAC 1 
2 
Commentary favorable to the other side. 
Commentary unfavorable to the other side. 
Favorable political report about the other 
side. 
Neutral political report about the other 
side. 
Unfavorable political report about the other 
side. 
Favorable military report about the other 
side. 
Neutral military report about the other 
side. 
Unfavorable military report about the other 
side. 
Favorable societal report about the other 
side. 
Neutral societal report about the other side. 
Unfavorable societal report about the other 
side. 
Promoting a warmer relationship with the 
United States. 
Calling on the United States to maintain a 
colder relationship with the other side. 
The PRC's diplomatic relationship with the 
United States. 
The "Taiwan Relations Act" passed in 
March 1979 by the Congress of the United 
States as the guideline for unofficial U.S.-
Taiwan relations, after the severance of an 
official diplomatic relationship between the 
United States and the ROC on January 1, 
1979. 
CHINA REUNIFICATION ISSUE 49 
#26 ARMSALE 1 
2 
#27 HUNACAS 1 
2 
#28 SCIETRA 1 
2 
#29 STRA TEG 1 
2 
#30 HOLLAND 1 
2 
#31 USSR 1 
2 
#32 INTLORG 1 
2 
#33 OLYMPIC 1 
2 
#34 NAT1SY2 1 
2 
#35 TIBETMO 1 
2 
#36 HONGKON1 
2 
Arms sales to Taiwan from the United 
States after severance of U.S.-ROC 
diplomatic relations. 
Defection of PRC tennis player Hu Nato 
the United States in 1983, which caused 
temporary sour relations between the 
United States and the PRC. 
Transfer of American scientific technology 
to either Chinese government. 
Emphasis on PRC's or ROC's strategic 
importance to Asia, the United States or 
the world. 
Dutch submarine sale to the ROC in 
November 1980, which caused temporary 
sour relations between Holland and the 
PRC in March 1981. 
Concerning the USSR's possible 
involvement and influence in relations 
among the PRC and the United States. 
The fight between the PRC and the ROC 
for representation in international 
organizations. 
Representation and participation by the 
PRC and the ROC in the Olympic Games. 
The PRC's "One Nation, Two Systems" 
Model to integrate Hong Kong and Taiwan 
as "one China" under PRC rule. 
The PRC's Tibet Model to integrate 
Taiwan as an autonomous region under 
PRC rule. 
The PRC's Hong Kong Model to integrate 
Taiwan in the same way as Hong Kong 
will be when its sovereignty is returned to 
the PRC in 1997 from Britain. 
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#37 INSIST4 1 
2 
#38 SPEADMR 1 
2 
# 39 FORCINT 1 
2 
#40 PRINCB 1 
2 
#41 POINTS9 1 
2 
#42 LIN3EX4 1 
2 
#43 PEACETK 1 
2 
#44 MULTISY 1 
2 
#45 CCPNATC 1 
2 
PRC's political insistence on the "Four 
Fundamental Principles": 1. Always stick 
to the socialist road; 2. Always retain 
Communist Party leadership; 3. Follow 
through with the dictatorship of the 
proletariat; and 4. Follow the thoughts of 
Marx, Lenin and Mao. 
PRC "Special Administrative Region" 
adopted on December 4, 1982, in Article 31 
of the PRC's new constitution, as an 
alternative for integrating Hong Kong and 
Taiwan under PRC rule. 
Threats by the PRC to integrate Taiwan by 
force. 
ROC's proposal to integrate under its 
political philosophy of "The Three 
Principles of the People": (1) Nationalism, 
(2) Democracy, and (3) The People's 
Livelihood. 
The PRC's 1981 "Nine-Point Peace 
Proposal" to integrate Taiwan. 
The PRC's 1979 "Three-Link, Four-
Exchange Peace Proposal" to begin to 
integrate the ROC: 1. Three links: mail, 
transportation services and trade. 2. Four 
exchanges: relatives and tourists, academic 
groups, cultural groups and sports 
representatives. 
The PRC's peace-talks proposal to the 
ROC for China's national integration. 
The "Multi-System Nations Model" 
suggested by ROC scholar Yung Wei, 
recognizing the other Chinese government 
and co-existing. 
The PRC's peace proposal for cooperation 
between the Chinese Communist Party and 
the Nationalist Party to achieve China's 
national integration. 
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#46 TAINDPN 1 
2 
#47 TWOCHIN 1 
2 
#48 INDTRAD 1 
2 
#49 ADVECOS 1 
2 
#50 UNFECOT 1 
2 
#51 SPECOZN 1 
2 
#52 OPENCIT 1 
2 
#53 FAVECOT 1 
2 
#54 NEUECOT 1 
2 
The "Taiwanese Independence Movement" 
organized by the Taiwanese overseas to 
promote a Taiwan independent from rule 
by either the PRC or the ROC. 
The "Two Chinas Model" advocated by 
some scholars and denounced by both the 
PRC and the ROC. 
Indirect trade between the PRC and the 
ROC through Hong Kong or Singapore. 
Advocacy of its own economic system. 
Unfavorable economic report about the 
other side. 
PRC's "Special Economic Zones" in 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou of 
Guangdong Province, and Xiamen of 
Fujian Province, announced in 1979 and 
approved by the government on August 26, 
1980. 
PRC's 1984 opening of 14 coastal cities for 
foreign trade and investment. 
Favorable economic report about the other 
side. 
Neutral economic report about the other 
side. 
*"1" represents the People's Daily and "2" represents the Central 
Daily News. 
2. Trend and Direction Analysis 
Among the 54 thematic categories, 14 are designed for specific 
trend and direction analysis of the two newspapers' reports about the 
other side. These 14 thematic categories are political, military, socie-
tal and economic reports about the other side in three directions: 
favorable, neutral and unfavorable; and commentary to the other side 
in two directions: favorable and unfavorable. Seldom is commentary 
neutral. 
To statistically determine intensity through frequency, the trends 
of directions computed from the samples are examined. Trend analysis 
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has been used most effectively in the area of direction analysis. A 
trend refers to the increase or decrease of the frequency of given con-
tent over a period of time. Trend analysis is done after the basic quan-
tification of the material; its analysis for this sample also comes after 
the basic data are computed. 31 
The direction method was derived by Richard W. Budd. He de-
fined three directions as criteria for judging news as favorable, neutral 
or unfavorable: 
Favorable: Those items reflecting social cohesion and coop-
eration and political and economic stability and/or strength. 
Favorability will be judged on the basis of international co-
operation (political, social and economic) in which the coun-
try or any group or individual representing that country is 
depicted as strong, right or cooperative. In internal affairs, 
favorability will be judged on the basis of persons cooperat-
ing in political, social and economic affairs. For example, 
events and incidents which depict the country or any group 
or individual within the country as progressive, successful, 
peace-loving, moral, intelligent, lawful, unified or as exercis-
ing leadership will be considered favorable. This classifica-
tion will not be assigned where the country, or any group or 
individual thereof, is depicted as exploiting its strength upon 
weaker nations, groups or individuals. 
Neutral: Those items which reflect neither favorable nor un-
favorable conditions either through balance of content or a 
lack of controversial material. 
Unfavorable: Those items which report social conflict and 
disorganization and political and economic instability and/ 
or weakness. Unfavorability will be judged on the basis of 
international tensions (political, social and economic) in 
which the country, or any group or individual representing 
the country, is depicted as weak, wrong or uncooperative. In 
internal affairs, unfavorability will be judged on the basis of 
civil disruption in which there is conflict between persons or 
groups of persons within the country in political, economic 
or social affairs. For example, events and incidents which 
depict the country, or any group or individual immoral, im-
practical, unlawful, disunified or lacking in leadership will be 
classified unfavorable. 32 
31. Ibid., p. 60. 
32. Ibid., p. 53. 
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Content analysis, Budd says, is most useful when it is able to 
show direction, or the lack thereof. 33 
Besides direction itself, the intensity of direction is also studied 
measured by the coding offrequency. A scale of intensity is also given 
to compare the two newspapers in each of the reporting areas about 
the other side. 
3. Units of Measurement 
(1) Coding Sample Newspapers 
The sample newspapers used for this study were the domestic edi-
tions of the People's Daily of the PRC and the Central Daily News of 
the ROC. Samples were gathered between December 1978 and May 
1985. 
It is most appropriate for this study to use the domestic editions 
of the papers. The People's Daily only started its overseas edition on 
July 1, 1985, and the Central Daily News only publishes a condensed 
four-page daily for its airmailed edition for overseas Chinese readers. 
The domestic editions of the two papers are aimed at reporting and 
promoting party ideologies and policies for domestic readers. It is on 
an equal comparative level to use the domestic editions of the two 
papers for this study. 
The original domestic editions of the People's Daily of December 
1978 to May 1985 were found and coded at the Library of Congress in 
Washington, D.C., and at the Chinese Mainland Research Institute of 
the Chinese Culture University in Taipei, Taiwan, in December 1984 
to March 1985. 
The original domestic editions of the Central Daily News of De-
cember 1978 to May 1985 were found and coded at the Reference and 
Information Divisions of the Central Daily News and the Central 
News Agency in Taipei, Taiwan, in March 1985 to June 1985. 
The People's Daily published six pages daily from December 1978 
to December 1979, except for four pages on January 1, on the Chinese 
lunar-new-year holiday (January 28-31), on Labor Day (May 1), on 
the PRC's National Independence Day (October 1-2,) and on Sun-
days; it published eight pages daily from January 1980 to June 1981, 
except for four pages on January 1, on the Chinese lunar-new-year 
holidays (March 16-18, 1980, and March 5-7, 1981), on Labor Day 
(May 1), and on National Independence Day (October 1-2); it pub-
lished eight pages daily from July 1981 to May 1985, except for four 
33. Ibid., p. 50. 
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pages on January 1, on the Chinese lunar-new-year holidays (January 
25-27, 1982, February 13-15, 1983, February 2-4, 1984, and February 
20-22, 1985), on Labor Day (May 1), and on National Independence 
Day (October 1-2). 
The subtotals of the coded pages of the People's Daily were 186 
for December 1978; 2,166 for 1979; 2,696 for 1980; 2,764 for 1981; 
2,892 for 1982; 2,892 for 1983; 2,900 for 1984; and 1,188 for January 
to May 1985. 
The total of the coded pages of the People's Daily for December 
1978 to May 1985 was 17,502. 
The Central Daily News published 12 pages daily from December 
1978 to May 1985, except for four pages for the first three days of the 
Chinese lunar-new-year holidays (January 28-30, 1979, February 16-
18, 1980, February 5-7, 1981, January 25-27, 1982, February 13-15, 
1983, February 2-4, 1984, and February 20-22, 1985), eight pages for 
the fourth and the fifth days of the Chinese lunar-new-year holidays 
(January 31-February 1, 1979, February 19-20, 1980, February 8-9, 
1981, January 28-29, 1982, February 16-17, 1983, February 5-6, 1984, 
and February 23-24, 1985), and 16 pages for other holidays (January 
1; March 29, Youth Day; April 5, Tombsweeping for Ancestors' Day; 
September 28, Teachers' Day and Confucius' Birthday; October 10, 
the ROC's National Independence Day; October 25, Taiwan Restora-
tion Day; November 12, Sun Yat-sen's Birthday; and December 25, 
Constitution Day, and on special occasions: February 1, anniversary 
of the Central Daily News; September 3, Soldiers Day; and other irreg-
ular special days of celebrations or events. 
The subtotals of the coded pages of the Central Daily News were 
372 for December 1978; 5,158 for 1979; 4,408 for 1980; 4,408 for 1981; 
4,404 for 1982; 4,404 for 1983; 4,432 for 1984; and 1,780 for January 
to May 1985. 
The total of the coded pages of the Central Daily News for De-
cember 1978 to May 1985 was 29,366. 
Combined with the 17,502 pages of the People's Daily, 46,868 
pages of the two Chinese party newspapers were coded for this study. 
Since an average of 5 percent of its space was for advertisement 
and an average 95 percent for news and editorials, the People's Daily 
actually offered an equivalent of 16,627 pages of news and editorials. 
With an average of 40 percent of its space for advertisements and 
an average of 60 percent for news and editorials, the Central Daily 
News actually offered an equivalent of 17,617 pages of news and edito-
rials for this study. But the Central Daily News published four more 
extra pages than the People's Daily in the form of celebration or pub-
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lie-bulletin non-news articles on 85 special-occasion days. Subtracting 
the 340 pages of these extra non-news pages, the Central Daily News 
finally offered an equivalent 17,277 pages of news and editorials. 
The two newspapers offered a very similar amount of space de-
voted to news and editorial; there is was than a 3.5 percent difference. 
(2) Coding Units 
The smallest segment of content counted and scored in content 
analysis is the coding unit. The most common units are a word; a 
theme or assertion; a paragraph; an item; a character, group, object, or 
institution; and space or time. Using the entire article as the coding 
unit is acceptable when the goals of the study and the category system 
used are of a general nature. The measures may even be as large as 
pages or whole issues of publications, depending on the statement of 
the problem. 34 
Counting themes rather than words can yield more information. 
Thematic analysis is linked to direction categories. A theme is a single 
idea or single item of information extracted from a segment of 
content.35 
This study, being founded on the specific problem of China's na-
tional integration, uses the theme unit. 
(3) The Context Unit 
The context unit is the body of material surrounding the coding 
unit. As much of the material as is required to characterize the coding 
unit is considered. If the coding unit is the word, the context unit may 
be the sentence in which the word appears. It might also be the para-
graph or the entire article. The context unit must be large enough to 
provide the background necessary to permit accurate judging, but not 
so large to cause confusion. In some instances, there may be both 
implicit and explicit context units. The explicit context unit may be 
the article in which the coding unit appears, the implicit coding unit 
the publication or publications analyzed. 36 
The entire article was chosen as the context unit for this study 
since the entire article in the two Chinese party newspapers provided 
appropriate enough background information to make coding 
decisions. 
For each theme, all 46,868 pages of the two sample newspapers, 
34. Ibid., pp. 33-35. 
35. Ibid., p. 34. 
36. Ibid., p. 36. 
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including any of the 54 thematic categories, were examined, and their 
frequency was recorded. A frequency of "1" was coded for each 
theme in an article. An article might have no theme, one theme or 
more than one theme related to the subject of the study. 
Frequencies were then transferred to tables and charts as trends 
and directions. In this way unmanageable data was transformed into 
manageable information. 
4. Reliability and Validity 
Reliability, in measurement, means that investigators using the 
same techniques on the same material will get substantially the same 
results. 37 
In content analysis, reliability depends in part on how well the 
researcher describes the coding instructions. For example, simply 
counting the number of times a key word or symbol appears presents 
no problem. Assigning direction to statements, detecting propaganda 
themes, or judging the strength of words may be more difficult to de-
scribe. Some of the standard tests of reliability, test-retest, equivalent-
forms, and split-halves, are adaptable to content analysis. For content 
analysis, the test-retest method requires more than one coder using the 
same instructions to classify the same material. 38 
For this research, a reliability test was given to two coders. Both 
were Chinese journalism graduate students. Both frequently read the 
two Chinese newspapers in their regular studies. They were asked to 
code 78 randomly selected sample newspapers with the set of 54 the-
matic categories prepared for the study. To determine the reliability 
of the two coders, Holsti's formula was used. 39 
The test was made before the analysis of the results of coding and 
counting; it received a reliability coefficient of .91. This level of relia-
bility was considered satisfactory for this study.40 
To determine the validity of this research, the analyst asked if the 
methods produced the desired information. He also asked how well 
his concepts or variables fit his measurements of them. Validity may 
be determined by one or more methods: jury, known-group, in-
dependent-criterion, and construct-validity.41 
37. Ibid., p. 66. 
38. Ibid., p. 67. 
39. Ibid., p. 68, and Hoshi, op. cit., p. 140. 
40. Budd, Throp and Donohew, op. cit., p. 69. 
41. Norman H. Nie, C. Hadlai Hull, Jean G. Jenkins, Karin Steinbrenner and Dale H. 
Bent, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), p. 469. 
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Experts were asked to judge relevant parts of the methodology, 
and to define of variables or measuring techniques. The four expert-
scholars of political communications familiar with the issue of China's 
national integration were asked to examine and modify the 54 the-
matic categories. 
The coders read the two Chinese party newspapers without any 
language barrier and with no comprehension difficulty in identifying 
the 54 themes in the two newspapers. These themes are almost self-
evident; words or sentences themselves indicate what themes they 
represent. 
Factor Analysis 
The most distinctive characteristics of factor analysis are data re-
duction and concept development. Using factor analytic techniques, 
this research revealed whether some underlying patterns of relation-
ships exist; if so, the variables could be "rearranged" or "reduced" to a 
smaller set of factors or components. 
Factor analysis of social characteristics was used in this study to 
test whether there are indeed five separate factors as determined by the 
hypotheses which constitute the concept of China's national integra-
tion. Factor analysis was also used to determine loadings on factors 
corresponding with the variables that were theoretically associated 
with the five assumptions discussed in the section on the theoretical 
framework of national integration. 
Hypothesis 
The theoretical framework of national integration is defined for 
this study as a multidimensional phenomenon. It can be achieved 
either through peaceful means with a basis of consensus or by forceful 
means, directed and decided by elites; it may be achieved sooner if 
there is a solid basis of mutual understanding built between the two 
sides; and it may be affected by external economic or other non-polit-
ical factors. 
1. Hypothesis I: China's National Integration Is A 
Multidimensional Phenomenon 
A factor analysis of the survey of the two Chinese party newspa-
pers by 54 thematic categories could produce five to six factors, which 
could account for most of the variance of the theoretical framework of 
national integration. This could show that China's national integra-
tion is a multidimensional phenomenon. 
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2. Hypothesis II: An Integrative Consensus on Nationalism 
Will Be One of the Found Factors Which Leads to Either 
Peaceful or Forceful Integrative Means; However, No 
Consensus on Integrative Methods or Models Will Be 
One of the Found Factors 
Thematic categories #2 "Scenery," #3 "History," #4 "Sun-
Soong," #5 "1911 Hsin-hai Revolution," #6 "One China," #7 
"Chinese," #8 "Homesick," #9 "Relatives," # 10 "Regressions and 
Defectors," #39 "PRC's Forceful Integration with the ROC," #40 
"ROC's Integration Model of the Three Principles of the People," 
#41 "PRC's Nine-Point Peace Proposal," #42 PRC's Three-Link, 
Four-Exchange Peace Proposal," #43 "PRC's Peace-Talk Proposal," 
and #45 "PRC's Peace Proposal for Cooperation Between the Com-
munist and the Nationalist Parties" could all correlate with and load 
substantially on one factor defined as "nationalism consensus" because 
these thematic categories are mainly nationalism-oriented. These cate-
gories could also lead to a peaceful integration based on a nationalism 
consensus, except # 39 "PRC's Forceful Integration with the ROC" 
as an alternative integrative means if none of the peaceful integrative 
means are accepted by both sides. There could be no integrative-
model factor correlated by #34 "PRC's One Nation, Two Systems 
Model," #35 "PRC's Tibet Model for the ROC," #36 "PRC's Hong 
Kong Model for the ROC," #37 "PRC's Four Insists," #38 "PRC's 
Special Administrative Region for the ROC," #44 "Multi-System 
Nations Model," #46 "Taiwanese Independence Movement," and 
#47 "Two Chinas Model" since none of these are accepted by both 
the PRC and the ROC. There could be no factor on integrative-
method-or-model consensus. 
These could meet the assumption of integration theory, which 
states that national integration can be achieved on a basis of consensus 
by either peaceful or forceful means. The greater consensus that exists 
between the integrative units, the better the chance they could be 
integrated. 
3. Hypothesis IlL· A Factor of Diverse Mutual Understanding 
Will Be One of the Found Factors Which Reveals A 
Tendency of Unfavorable Reporting About 
the Other Side by Both Papers 
Thematic categories # 11 "Commentary Favorable to the Other 
Side," # 12 "Commentary Unfavorable to the Other Side," # 13 
"Favorable Political Report About the Other Side," # 14 "Neutral 
Political Report About the Other Side," # 15 "Unfavorable Political 
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Report About the Other Side," # 16 "Favorable Military Report 
About the Other Side," # 17 "Neutral Military Report About the 
Other Side," # 18 "Unfavorable Military Report About the Other 
Side," # 19 "Favorable Societal Report About the Other Side," # 20 
"Neutral Societal Report About the Other Side," #21 "Unfavorable 
Societal Report About the Other Side," #53 "Favorable Economic 
Report About the Other Side," #54 "Neutral Economic Report 
About the Other Side," and #50 "Unfavorable Economic Report 
About the Other Side" could all correlate with and load substantially 
on one factor defined as "Diverse Mutual Understanding." 
This consensus on "Diverse Mutual Understanding" could reveal 
a tendency of unfavorable reporting about the other side by both pa-
pers. The two papers are directed and managed by the elites of the 
two parties or countries; their consensus could further reveal that 
these elites, as integration theory says, direct China's national integra-
tion by promoting unfavorable reports about the other side for the 
masses. This promotion could not speed up, but could slow down, the 
pace of China's national integration. 
4. Hypothesis IV: A Factor of U.S. China Policy Will Be One 
of the Found Factors Which Proves that China's 
National Integration Has An External or 
Foreign Factor 
Thematic categories #22 "A Warmer Relationship with the 
United States," #23 "U.S. Colder Relationship with the Other Side," 
#24 "Diplomatic Relationship With the United States," #25 "U.S. 
Taiwan Relations Act," #26 "U.S. Arms Sales," #27 "Hu Na Case," 
#28 "Transfer of American Scientific Technology," #29 "Strategic 
Importance," #32 "Representation in International Organizations," 
and # 1 "Territory: Taiwan Is Part of China" could all correlate with 
and load substantially on one factor defined as "U.S. China Policy." 
This could correspond with the assumption of integration theory 
that national integration may be affected by external elements. 
Other foreign-oriented thematic categories #30 "Holland," #31 
"USSR," and #33 "Olympics" could not correlate with and load on 
the "U.S. China Policy" factor or the "Foreign" factor by themselves 
because they are unrelated by the nature of the events among them. 
5. Hypothesis V: A Factor of Economic Function Will Be One 
of the Found Factors Which Might Lead to Eventual 
National Integration 
Thematic categories # 34 "PRC's One Nation, Two Systems 
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Model for the ROC," #36 "PRC's Hong Kong Model for the ROC," 
#48 "Indirect Trade Between the PRC and the ROC," #49 "Advo-
cacy of Its Own Economic System," #51 "PRC's Special Economic 
Zones," and #52 "PRC's Opening of 14 Coastal Cities" might corre-
late with and load substantially on one factor defined as "Economic-
Function Factor." 
All these might encounter the assumption of integration theory 
which states that national integration can be eventually and indirectly 
achieved through economic or other non-political factors. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: ANALYSES AND 
INTERPRETATIONS 
Results of Factor Analysis 
To measure the correspondence between the hypotheses and the 
data, a principal factor solution with iterations and varimax rotation 
was performed. The factor solution groups thematic categories into 
factors, and varimax rotation makes factor loadings for the variables 
of the thematic categories less complex by giving the simplest factor 
structure. The data from the 54 thematic categories were used to cal-
culate a 54 by 54 correlation matrix that related pairs of themes. This 
correlation matrix was factor analyzed using the principal factor solu-
tion with iterations, then submitted to a varimax rotation. 
Two criteria were used to determine the number of factors to be 
used for rotation. The first chose the numbers having eigenvalues in 
excess of 1.00, while the second chose those having at least 5 percent 
of the variance. Five factors were chosen for rotation. The results of 
the factor loadings after varimax rotation are shown in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
VARIMAX ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX FOR 54 
THEMATIC CATEGORIES 
Thematic Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Communality 
Categories I II III IV v h2=SMC 
#1 TERRITOR .157 -.125 .271 .566* -.111 .447 
#2 SCENERY .429 -.042 -.006 -.168 .057 .217 
#3 HISTORY .079 -.024 .107 .028 .483 .253 
#4 SUNSOONG .585* -.116 .030 -.033 .195 .397 
#5 CNPREVOL .682* -.053 .372 -.010 -.067 .611 
#6 ONECHINA .887* .207 .201 .051 .191 .910 
#7 CHINESE .218 .032 .342 .170 .393 .349 
#8 HOMESICK .578* .172 -.271 -.115 -.181 .484 
#9 RELATIVE .663* -.248 -.277 .074 .026 .584 
# 10 REGRDEFE .065 .375 .215 -.040 -.103 .203 
#11 FAVCOMOT -.137 .646* .112 -.142 .044 .472 
# 12 UNFCOMOT .054 -.278 .219 .405 -.035 .294 
#13 FAVPOLOT -.129 .593* .177 -.009 .091 .408 
#14 NEUPOLOT -.164 .022 -.172 -.274 .047 .134 
#15 UNFPOLOT -.060 -.346 -.054 -.005 .160 .152 
#16 FAVMILOT -.132 .037 .174 .023 .001 .049 
# 17 NEUMILOT -.113 -.164 .089 .239 .040 .107 
#18 UNFMILOT .073 .322 .091 .330 .074 .232 
(61) 
62 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
#19 FAVSOCOT .160 .580* .089 -.089 -.031 .380 
#20 NEUSOCOT .074 .712* .012 .053 -.050 .518 
#21 UNFSOCOT .236 .059 -.256 -.358 .436 .444 
#22 WARMUSA -.096 .309 .094 .793* .144 .764 
#23 USCOLDOT -.043 .142 -.278 .791* .065 .731 
#24 DIPLWUSA -.053 -.086 -.201 .635* -.040 .455 
#25 TAIREACT .011 .171 .113 .102 .842* .763 
#26 ARMSALES .073 .074 -.002 .086 .859* .756 
#27 HUNACASE -.061 .354 -.070 .049 .085 .144 
#28 SCIETRAN -.069 .736* -.002 -.028 .102 .557 
#29 STRATEGY .048 .355 -.198 .625* .152 .582 
#30 HOLLAND .031 -.090 -.109 -.119 .109 .047 
#31 USSR .011 .391 -.063 .205 .174 .230 
#32 INTLORGA -.048 .366 .094 .047 .236 .204 
#33 OLYMPICS -.045 .051 .120 -.014 .253 .083 
#34 NATISY2 -.027 .045 .881* .041 -.149 .804 
# 35 TIBETMOD -.000 .057 .427 .079 -.055 .195 
#36 HONGKONG -.032 .369 .750* .088 -.116 .721 
#37 INSIST4 .241 .131 .469 -.037 .168 .326 
#38 SPEADMRN .386 .215 .403 .055 .149 .384 
# 39 FORCINTE .680* .070 .194 -.143 .246 .587 
#40 PRINCI3 .512* .210 .332 .029 .163 .445 
#41 POINTS9 .907* -.021 -.009 .024 -.044 .826 
#42 LIN3EX4 .864* -.112 -.103 .116 -.105 .795 
#43 PEACETKS .592* -.116 .068 .403 .318 .633 
#44 MULTISYS -.053 .156 .216 -.031 .012 .075 
#45 CCPCNPCO .913* .002 -.030 .159 .037 .862 
#46 TAINDPNM -.039 .009 -.214 -.035 -.143 .069 
#47 TWOCHINA .081 -.003 -.061 -.001 .334 .122 
#48 INDTRADE -.010 .047 .090 .220 .149 .081 
#49 ADVECOSY .177 -.047 .439 -.030 -.088 .235 
#50 UNFECOT .054 -.453 -.052 -.067 .026 .217 
#51 SPECOZNS -.026 .252 .538* .012 .143 .375 
#52 OPENCITY -.009 .002 .423 -.087 -.085 .194 
#53 FAVECOT -.126 .731* .193 -.017 -.128 .605 
#54 NEUECOT .008 -.047 .632* .056 -.034 .406 
PERCENTAGE OF 13.5% 11.6% 7.6% 7% 5.3% 45% 
TOTAL VARIANCE 
PERCENTAGE OF 31.6% 26.1% 16.7% 14.9% 10.7% 100% 
COMMON VARIANCE 
EIGENVALUE 6.941 5.719 3.660 3.263 2.356 
*These thematic categories have loadings above .50 cutoff point. 
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TRANSFORMATION MATRIX 
FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR 
I II III IV v 
FACTOR I .949 .018 .234 .123 .169 
FACTOR II -.186 .774 .592 .096 .071 
FACTOR III -.017 .346 -.599 .459 .555 
FACTOR IV -.135 -.331 .275 .865 -.216 
FACTOR V -.214 -.412 .397 -.123 .781 
The 54 by 54 matrix of correlations revealed that the five factors 
account for 45 percent of the total variance. Factor I represents 13.5 
percent of the total variance; Factor II, 11.6 percent; Factor Ill, 7.6 
percent; Factor IV, 7 percent; and Factor V, 5.3 percent. 
Within the five-factor solution, Factor I accounts for 31.6 percent 
of the total variance; Factor II, 26.1 percent; Factor III, 16.7 percent; 
Factor IV, 14.9 percent; and Factor IV, 10.7 percent. All five factors 
have eigenvalues in excess of 2.35. 
As predicted, the tests yielded five important factors. For a load-
ing to be significant at the .01level, a moderately conservative loading 
of .50 was chosen for the cutoff point, which was based on the overall 
interrelationships between thematic categories. In the varimax rotated 
factor matrix, Factor I accounted for 31.6 percent of the variance and 
had moderately high loadings in 11 thematic categories, as shown in 
Table 3. 
THEMATIC 
CATEGORY 
#45 CCPCNPCO 
#41 POINTS9 
#6 ONECHINA 
TABLE 3 
FACTOR I 
LOADING DESCRIPTION 
POINT 
.913 PRC's peace proposal for cooperation 
between the Chinese Communist and 
Chinese Nationalist Parties to achieve 
China's national integration. 
.907 PRC's 1981 "Nine-Point Peace Proposal" 
to the ROC for a peaceful national 
integration. 
.887 The traditional political philosophy of "one 
China." 
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#42 LIN3EX4 
#5 CNPREVOL 
#39 FORCINTE 
#9 RELATIVE 
#43 PEACETKS 
#4 SUNSOONG 
#8 HOMESICK 
#40 PRINCI3 
.864 PRC's 1979 "Three-Link and Four-
Exchange Peace Proposal" to the ROC: l. 
Three Links: postal, transportation services 
and trade; 2. Four Exchanges: relatives and 
tourists, academic groups, cultural groups, 
and sports representatives . 
. 681 The Hsin-hai Revolution in 1911 led by 
Sun Yat-sen and his Nationalist Party . 
. 680 Threats by the PRC to integrate Taiwan by 
force . 
. 663 The separated relatives divided by the 
Taiwan Strait . 
. 592 PRC's peace-talk proposal to the ROC. 
.585 Sun Yat-sen as the revolutionary leader 
who overthrew the Manchu empire, and 
Soong Ching Ling, Sun's widow and the 
PRC's honorary president . 
. 578 The separation of people from their native 
towns resulting from the political separation 
between the mainland and Taiwan . 
. 512 ROC's proposal of "China Reunification 
under the Three Principles of the People": 
(1) Nationalism, (2) Democracy and (3) 
The People's Livelihood. 
Factor I has 11 significant loadings on thematic categories related 
to nationalism consensus and its strategies. This was predicted by Hy-
pothesis II; therefore, Factor I is labeled as the "Nationalism Consen-
sus" factor. No consensus on integrative methods or models is found 
in this or any other factor. 
Factor II accounts for 26.1 percent of the variance and has mod-
erate loadings on six thematic categories shown in Table 4. 
THEMATIC 
CATEGORY 
#28 SCIETRAN 
#53 FAVECOT 
#20 NEUSOCOT 
#11 FAVCOMOT 
TABLE 4 
FACfOR II 
LOADING DESCRIPTION 
POINT 
. 736 Transfer of American scientific technology 
to either Chinese government. 
. 731 Favorable economic report about the other 
side. 
.712 Neutral societal report about the other side. 
.646 Favorable commentary to the other side. 
#13 FAVPOLOT 
#19 FAVSOCOT 
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.593 Favorable political report about the other 
side . 
. 580 Favorable societal report about the other 
side. 
65 
Factor II is characterized by moderate loadings on the thematic 
categories concerning reports about the other side. This is as Hypothe-
sis III predicted. Factor II is identified as the "Mutual Understand-
ing" factor. 
Factor III accounts for 16.7 percent of the variance and has load-
ings on five thematic categories shown in Table 5. 
THEMATIC 
CATEGORY 
#34 NAT1SY2 
TABLE 5 
FACI'OR III 
LOADING DESCRIPTION 
POINT 
.881 PRC's "One Nation, Two Systems" model 
to integrate Hong Kong and the ROC 
under PRC rule. 
#36 HONGKONG .750 PRC's Hong Kong model to integrate the 
ROC under PRC rule, and the return of 
the sovereignty of Hong Kong to the PRC 
in 1997 from Britain. 
#51 SPECOZNS .538 "PRC's Special Economic Zones" in 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou of 
Guangdong Province, and Xiamen of 
Fujian Province, announced in 1979 and 
approved by the government on August 
26, 1980. 
Factor III shows substantial loadings on the thematic categories 
related to integration through PRC's economic reforms and indirect 
economic means. This is as predicted in Hypothesis V; therefore, Fac-
tor III is called the "Economic Function" factor. 
Factor IV accounts for 14.9 percent of the variance and has load-
ings on five thematic categories shown in Table 6. 
THEMATIC 
CATEGORY 
TABLE 6 
FACI'OR IV 
LOADING 
POINT 
DESCRIPTION 
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#22 WARMUSA 
#23 USCOLDOT 
#24 DIPLWUSA 
#29 STRATEGY 
#1 TERRITORY 
. 793 Report on promoting a warmer relationship 
with the United States . 
. 791 Report calling on the United States to 
maintain a colder relationship with the 
other side . 
. 635 Report on the official diplomatic 
relationship with the United States . 
. 625 Emphasis of its strategic importance to 
Asia, the United States or the world . 
. 566 "One Greater China" territory. For 
example, border disputes between the PRC 
and the Soviet Union, the PRC and India, 
and the PRC and Vietnam; island disputes 
between the PRC and Japan, the PRC and 
Vietnam; and the integration dispute 
between the PRC and the ROC regarding 
Taiwan as a part of China. 
Factor IV in the rotated factor matrix is marked by moderate 
loadings on the thematic categories related to U.S. relations with both 
sides; and related to the U.S. position regarding Taiwan as a part of 
China. This was predicted in Hypothesis IV, therefore, Factor IV is 
called the "U.S.-China Policy" factor. 
Factor V accounts for 10.7 percent of the variance and has a load-
ing on two thematic categories shown in Table 7. 
THEMATIC 
CATEGORY 
#26 ARMSALES 
#25TAIREACT 
TABLE 7 
FACfOR V 
LOADING DESCRIPTION 
POINT 
.859 U.S. arms sales to the ROC to protect 
Taiwan from PRC's forceful integration. 
.842 The "Taiwan Relations Act" passed on 
March 13 and 14, 1979 by the Congress 
and signed by the president of the United 
States, and effective on April 10, 1979. The 
Act is a guideline for unofficial U.S.-Taiwan 
relations, after the severance of an official 
diplomatic relationship between the U.S. 
and the ROC on January 1, 1979. 
Factor V is marked by loadings on the thematic categories related 
to U.S. protection of Taiwan. Factor Vis named the "U.S. Protecting-
Taiwan Policy" factor. 
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Hypothesis IV predicted that Factor IV and Factor V would be 
categorized as the "U.S.-China Policy" factor; however, the result 
shows Factor IV to be a category related to the U.S.-China policy and 
offers in Factor V a category related specifically to the U.S. Protecting-
Taiwan policy. Factor V separates a particular U.S. policy on Taiwan 
from Factor IV of general U.S.-China policy on the China national 
integration issue. Factor V, therefore, also confirmed Hypothesis IV. 
Overall, the results of the factor analysis support five of the hy-
potheses, confirming Hypothesis I, which states that China's national 
integration is a multidimensional phenomenon with five factors that 
account for most of the variance of a theoretical framework of na-
tional integration. The findings of five factors are consistent with Hy-
potheses II, III, IV and V when 28 of the 54 thematic categories are 
used. 
After discussions of trend analysis and directional analysis, the 
descriptions of the five factors are interpreted. 
Trend Analysis 
The survey coded a reporting frequency total of 35,708 in 54 the-
matic categories from the two newspapers over the six-and-a-half year 
period. The People's Daily showed a reporting frequency total of 7,570 
or 21.2 percent compared to the Central Daily News' 28,138 or 78.8 
percent. 
The Central Daily News showed frequencies about three times 
more than the People's Daily when reporting on China's national inte-
gration; therefore, the Central Daily News, more than the People's 
Daily, considered integration an important challenge to the legitimacy 
of its government and considered integration to be a pressing problem 
to the security of its people both internally and externally. 
The reporting trend by the two newspapers, as shown in Figure 1, 
and the observations made during the data collection, reveal that the 
People's Daily took more of an offensive initiating position. For exam-
ple, it offered peace proposals and other integrative methods and mod-
els called on the United States to assist in achieving China's national 
integration. On the other hand. the Central Daily News was more de-
fensive and reactive. 
Many of the reporting trends, as also shown in Figure 1, corre-
sponded with each other by a similar increase or decrease of frequency 
in reporting on integration-related issues. The most significant in-
crease was during October 1981, the highest peak in the trends of the 
two newspapers. During this month, the People's Daily often reported 
on the PRC's nine-point peace proposal and the Central Daily News 
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immediately reported a rejection. As a result, Figure 1 shows corre-
sponding increases and decreases in reporting frequencies by the two 
newspapers on this issue. 
Figure 2 illustrates that the Central Daily News showed more dra-
matic increases and decreases in reporting frequency in most of the 
thematic categories. This is particularly true on thematic categories, 
# 15 "Unfavorable Political Report About the Other Side," with a 
frequency total of 3,244; # 10 "Regression and Defectors," with 
2,545; #39 "PRC's Forceful Integration With The ROC," with 1,989; 
# 12 "Commentary Unfavorable on The Other side," with 1,958; #21 
"Unfavorable Societal Report About the Other Side," with 1,790; 
#22 "Promote A Warmer Relationship with the United States," with 
1,795; #50 "Unfavorable Economic Report About the Other Side," 
with 1,546; #7 "Chinese," with 1,519; and #6 "One China," with 
1,386. 
Among these categories, # 10 "Regressions and Defectors," 
shown in Figures 2 and 3, had a more dramatic increase in reporting 
frequency in the Central Daily News than the other categories. 
When PRC air force pilot Sun Tienchin defected to the ROC 
through South Korea in August 1983, the greatest increase in report-
ing frequency in the trend of Figure 3 occurred. The second greatest 
increase came during October 1982, when a flux of invited overseas 
Chinese visited Taiwan. These dramatic increases indicate that the 
Central Daily News intended to use these events as publicity to pro-
mote a favorable image toward the ROC, and to promote an unfavora-
ble image toward the PRC. 
Thematic category # 10 appeared in both newspapers as an obvi-
ous propaganda and consensus strategy against the other side. 
"Regressions" were the visits made by overseas Chinese or Chi-
nese from the other side; such visits are encouraged by both Chinese 
governments. 
The well-known overseas Chinese who have visited both the PRC 
and the ROC include two Nobel-prize-winning scientists Cheng-tao Li 
and Samuel Chao-chung Ting, Columbia University professors Chien-
hsiung Wu and Chia-liu Yuan, the first Chinese American astronaut 
Taylor Kan-chun Wang, architect I.M. Pei, pianist Fu Cong, violinist 
Chao-len Lin, computer enterprising billionaire An Wang, Olympic 
ice-skating medal winner Tiffany Ting-ting Chen, writer Rao-si Chen, 
politician Anna Chennault, and political science professors James 
Chien Hsiung and Parris Hsu-chen Chang. Most were received per-
sonally by leaders of both sides; their visits highly publicized by the 
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China they were visiting, but they were seldom mentioned in the news-
paper of the other side. 
Shanghai-born and Taipei-raised astronaut Taylor Kan-chun 
Wang presented a PRC flag to PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang in Peking 
on July 7, 1985. Four weeks later, on August 5, Wang presented an 
ROC flag to ROC Premier Yu Kuo-hua in Taipei. Wang claimed that 
each of the flags had accompanied him on his space trip in May 1985 
aboard the space shuttle Challenger: the ROC flag was taken up with-
out the consent of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. 1 
The defectors most played up by the People's Daily were ROC air 
force pilots Ta-wei Li and Chi-cheng Huang, ROC political theorist Bi 
Ma, ROC television variety show producer Ah-yuan Huang, and ROC 
singer Te-chien Hou. Those most played up by the Central Daily 
News were PRC air force pilots Sun Tienchin, Wu Ruoken, Wang 
Hsuanchen and Fan Yuanyen, PRC civilian aircraft hijacker Cho 
Changjen and his five colleagues, and PRC cellist Li Tienhui. 
The Central Daily News took advantage of the propaganda oppor-
tunity of the former PRC tennis player Hu Na's visit to Taiwan in 
June 1985. Hu defected to the United States in 1982, causing a tempo-
rary rift in PRC-U.S. relations. The 19-year-old female tennis star had 
won many international tennis tournaments for the PRC and her ac-
tion therefore greatly embarrassed the PRC, causing it temporarily to 
cancel cultural exchange programs with the United States. The PRC 
made numerous acrimonious statements, and even a personal attack 
on President Reagan after the United States refused to send Hu Na 
back to the PRC. Hu was granted political asylum in 1983.2 
More obvious differences in reporting frequency by the two news-
papers can be seen in Figures 4-17, which graph frequencies of the 14 
thematic categories of political, military, societal and economic re-
ports and commentaries about the other side. 
Both newspapers show a much higher frequency of unfavorable 
reports and commentaries than favorable or neutral ones. As shown 
in Figures 6, 9, 12, 15 and 17, the Central Daily News had a considera-
bly higher frequency of unfavorable reports about the PRC than the 
People's Daily had about the ROC. Both newspapers had a very low 
frequency on favorable and neutral reports and commentaries. 
I. People's Daily, July 10, 1985, and Central Daily News, August 6, 1985. 
2. James A.R. Nafziger, "The Cultural Dimension: Cultural Relations Between 
American and Chinese on Either Side of the Taiwan Strait," in Frederick Tse-shyang Chen, 
ed., China Policy and National Security (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational, 1984), pp. 120-
121. 
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The trends revealed in Figures 4-17 indicate that the two newspa-
pers and parties have a great problem in building mutual understand-
ing, which integration theory regards as essential for achieving 
integration. 
The trends of reporting frequency in the thematic categories of 
Factors I-V, other than those categories of reporting about the other 
side, are shown in Figures 18-39. 
1. Reporting Trends for Factor I: Nationalism Consensus 
Among the trends of Factor I (Figures 18-28), thematic category 
# 39 "PRC's Forceful Integration with the ROC" (Figure 23) shows a 
trend of dramatic increases and decreases in reporting by the Central 
Daily News. This suggests that the Central Daily News or the Nation-
alist Party felt a constant military threat from the PRC to forcefully 
integrate the ROC. 
For thematic category #6 "The Traditional Political Philosophy 
of 'One China' " (Figure 20) there have generally been corresponding 
increases and decreases in frequency between the two newspapers; 
however, the Central Daily News shows a higher amount of reporting 
frequencies, suggesting that both newspapers or parties have respected 
the traditional political philosophy of "one China." The highest peak 
in reporting frequencies on this theme came during October 1981, af-
ter the PRC's Nine-Point Peace Proposal was initiated on September 
30, 1981. 
There are also peaks during the same month for related catego-
ries: #45 "The PRC's Peace Proposal for Cooperation Between the 
Two Parties" (Figure 18), #41 "The PRC's 1981 Nine-Point Peace 
Proposal" (Figure 19), and #42 "The PRC's Three-Link, Four-Ex-
change Peace Proposal" (Figure 21). These peaks suggest that the 
"PRC's Nine-Point Peace Proposal" has been a very important issue. 
The reporting trends of thematic category # 5 "The Hsin-hai 
Revolution in 1911 led by Sun Yat-sen and his Nationalist Party" 
(Figure 22) show high peaks for the Central Daily News during its 
regular memorial months of October (the Nationalist Revolution oc-
curred in October 1911). The People's Daily shows a sudden peak in 
October 1981. Reports at this time focused on the "PRC's Nine-Point 
Peace Proposal." 
A similar situation occurs for thematic category #4 "Sun Yat-
sen as the Revolutionary Leader, and Soong Ching Ling, Sun's 
Widow" (Figure 20). Here, the Central Daily News shows regular 
higher peaks of reporting frequencies on Sun's birthday, Sun's death, 
and revolution-success day. The People's Daily shows a sudden peak 
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in June 1981 after the death of Soong Ching Ling on May 29, 1981. 
At this time, the People's Daily called on the Nationalist Party to join 
in peace talks and to work for peaceful integration inspired by a com-
mon loyalty to Sun Yat-sen. This difference suggests that the Central 
Daily News regularly reported on this event every October, while the 
People's Daily used this theme for the more specific purpose of peace 
talks. 
For thematic category #43 "The PRC's Peace-Talk Proposal to 
the ROC" (Figure 25), the highest peak for the People's Daily came 
during January 1979, shortly after the PRC established diplomatic re-
lations with the United States, subsequently calling on the ROC to 
join in peace talks. This suggests that the PRC quickly took the op-
portunity to offer peace talks to the diplomatically isolated ROC. The 
peak decreased after the ROC rejected the PRC's offer in the same 
month. 
In the trends of thematic categories #9 "The Separated Rela-
tives" (Figure 24) and #8 "The Separation of People from Native 
Towns" (Figure 27), the People's Daily shows the higher peaks in re-
porting frequency; the Central Daily shows a very flat trend-line. 
These trends suggest that the PRC has used more sentimental appeals 
than the ROC toward the integration issue. 
The trends of thematic category #40 "ROC's Proposal to Inte-
grate Under the Three Principles of the People" (Figure 28) also re-
vealed a significant difference between the two newspapers. The 
Central Daily News shows an increase in reporting frequency in Janu-
ary 1981; the People's Daily shows a nearly flat trend-line at the zero 
frequency level. The People's Daily did not mention this theme. 
2. Reporting Trends for Factor 11· Mutual Understanding 
For Factor II, Figures 4, 10, 11, 13 and 16 were analyzed previ-
ously; they show the trends in reports and commentaries on the other 
side. 
In thematic category #28 "Transfer of American Scientific Tech-
nology" (Figure 29), the People's Daily shows a higher and more irreg-
ular trend than the Central Daily News. This suggests that the PRC 
wished to acquire more American transfer of scientific technology 
from the United States after the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries in January 1979. The Central Daily News 
shows a noticeable increase in this category in January 1984. The two 
trends suggest that the PRC and the ROC agree that the transfer of 
American technology is essential. 
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3. Reporting Trends for Factor III: Economic Function 
The trends of thematic category # 36 "The PRC's Hong Kong 
Integrative Model" (Figure 31) show peaks in September 1982, when 
the PRC started negotiations with Britain to return the sovereignty of 
Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997. Both newspapers show the highest 
peak of reporting frequency in September 1984 when the PRC and 
Britain signed an agreement regarding Hong Kong. The People's Daily 
reported the event with a tone of celebration. The Central Daily News 
reported it with a condemning attitude. 
In thematic category # 34 "The PRC's One Nation, Two Systems 
Integrative Model" (Figure 30) there are dramatic peaks in September 
and October of 1984. This suggests that this model did not become a 
subject of serious debate between the PRC and the ROC until then. 
The trends for thematic category #51 "PRC's Special Economic 
Zones" (Figure 32) show that the People's Daily started to report 
about this theme in May 1981; it began to emphasize it more in No-
vember and December of 1984. The Central Daily News started re-
porting on this theme at about the same time; it increased its reporting 
frequencies in 1982 and 1983 with an unfavorable tone. 
4 . . Reporting Trends for Factor IV: U.S.-China Policy 
There are both dramatic increases and dramatic decreases in the 
reporting frequencies of the thematic categories of Factor IV. This is 
shown in the trends of thematic categories # 22 "Promoting a 
Warmer Relationship with the United States" (Figure 33), #23 "Call-
ing on the United States to Maintain a Colder Relationship with the 
Other Side" (Figure 34), #24 "The PRC's Diplomatic Relationship 
with the United States" (Figure 35), #29 "Emphasis on PRC's or 
ROC's Strategic Importance to Asia, the United States and the 
World" (Figure 36), and # 1 "One Greater China Territory" (Figure 
37). 
The figures show peaks of reporting frequencies during the peri-
ods of new establishment of PRC-U.S. diplomatic relations in January 
1979 and President Reagan's visit to the PRC in April 1984. These 
trends indicate that both newspapers and both parties tried to influ-
ence U.S. China policy by arguing that Taiwan is a part of China. 
The Central Daily News hit peaks of reporting frequencies on 
these themes more often than the People's Daily, suggesting that the 
Central Daily News expressed a stronger concern than the People's 
Daily over U.S.-China policy. 
For thematic category #35 (Figure 35), both newspapers show a 
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high peak in December 1978 when PRC-U.S. diplomatic relations 
were announced on December 15, 1978. The frequencies suddenly 
drop in the months following January 1979. The figure then shows a 
moderately flat line for both newspapers. These trends suggest the ac-
ceptance of the new diplomatic reality by both the PRC and the ROC. 
For thematic category #29 (Figure 36), both newspapers show 
mild increases and decreases of reporting frequencies. This suggests 
that both newspapers have regularly emphasized their country's stra-
tegic importance to the United States. 
5. Reporting Trends for Factor V.· U.S. Protecting-Taiwan 
Policy 
For Factor V, thematic categories #26 "U.S. Arms Sales to Tai-
wan" (Figure 38) and #25 "U.S. Taiwan Relations Act" (Figure 39) 
show peaks in reporting frequency for both newspapers in June 1981 
and August 1982, when the PRC started to put pressure on the United 
States to abolish Taiwan Relations Act and to stop arms sales to Tai-
wan. On August 17, 1982, the PRC announced the signing of a joint 
communique with the United States, which agreed to reduce arms 
sales to Taiwan. 
The Central Daily News shows higher peaks on these two events 
in these months than the People's Daily. This suggests that the ROC 
cares more about the U.S. policy of protecting Taiwan with its arms 
sales and the Taiwan Relations Act than does the PRC; it also reflects 
that Taiwan's security and peaceful or forceful integration with the 
mainland are influenced by and dependent on the U.S. protecting-Tai-
wan policy. 
Directional Analysis 
1. Directional Analysis in Reporting About the Other Side 
To obtain a complete overview of the direction of each newspaper 
as it reports about the other side, the following 14 thematic categories 
were grouped together for the T -test: 
# 13 "Favorable Political Report About the Other Side." 
# 14 "Neutral Political Report About the Other Side." 
# 15 "Unfavorable Political Report About the Other Side." 
# 16 "Favorable Military Report About the Other Side." 
# 17 "Neutral Military Report About the Other Side." 
# 18 "Unfavorable Military Report About the Other Side." 
# 19 "Favorable Societal Report About the Other Side." 
#20 "Neutral Societal Report About the Other Side." 
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#21 "Unfavorable Societal Report About the Other Side." 
#50 "Unfavorable Economic Report About the Other Side." 
#53 "Favorable Economic Report About the Other Side." 
#54 "Neutral Economic Report About the Other Side." 
# 11 "Commentary Favorable to the Other Side." 
# 12 "Commentary Unfavorable to the Other Side." 
The percentages of the total reporting frequencies in this group 
should be previewed for an overall picture to analyze the T -test re-
sults. The three directions are favorable, neutral and unfavorable. 
Since commentary usually is not neutral, and no thematic cate-
gory is designed for neutral commentary to the other side, the break-
down did not include thematic categories # 11 and # 12. 
Table 8 shows that during six and a half years, or 78 months, the 
two newspapers together had a frequency of 9,093 in reporting about 
the other side. The People's Daily had a frequency of 1,485, or 16.33 
percent, and the Central Daily News, 7,608, or 83.66 percent. 
TABLE 8 
PERCENTAGES OF REPORTING FREQUENCIES 
IN DIRECTIONAL CATEGORIES 
Favorable Neutral Unfavorable 
p M s E P M S E P M S E 
PD 32 2 191 107 53 4 139 18 291 13 384 251 
Subtotal 332 
3.65% 
214 
2.35% 
939 
10.33% 
CDN 124 53 14 22 331 102 14 13 3244 355 1790 1546 
Subtotal 
PD& Total 
CDN 
213 
2.34% 
545 
5.99% 
460 
5.06% 
674 
7.41% 
*PD: the People's Daily; CND: the Central Daily. 
P: Political Report About The Other Side, Themes # 13, 14 and 15. 
M: Military Report About The Other Side, Themes # 16, 17 and 18. 
S: Societal Report About The Other Side, Themes #19, 20 and 21. 
E: Economic Report About The Other Side, Themes #53, 54 and 50. 
6935 
76.27% 
7874 
86.59% 
Total 
1485 
16.33% 
7608 
83.665% 
9093 
100% 
The Central Daily News showed four times more reporting fre-
quencies than the People's Daily in reporting about the other side. 
This suggests that the Central Daily News considered it more impor-
tant to inform its readers about the other side for the sake of China's 
national integration. It can be interpreted that the Central Daily News 
felt more threatened about the other side's ideas on integration and 
therefore was more defensive. 
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Table 8 also shows that the two newspapers had a total reporting 
frequency of 7,874, or 80.59 percent, for unfavorable reports about the 
other side; 674, or 7.41 percent, for neutral reports; and 545, or 5.99 
percent, for favorable reports. 
Individually, the People's Daily had a reporting frequency of 939, 
or 10.33 percent, for unfavorable reports about the other side; 214, or 
2.35 percent, for neutral reports; and 332, or 3.65 percent, for 
favorable reports. 
The Central Daily News showed a frequency of 6,935, or 76.27 
percent, for unfavorable reports about the other side; 460, or 5.06 per-
cent for neutral reports and 213, or 2.34 percent, for favorable reports. 
Both newspapers showed a higher frequency of unfavorable than 
of neutral or favorable reports about the other side. The Central Daily 
News showed 14 times more unfavorable than neutral reporting fre-
quencies and 31 times more unfavorable than favorable reporting fre-
quencies about the other side. The People's Daily showed three times 
more unfavorable than neutral reporting frequencies and two times 
more unfavorable than favorable reporting frequencies about the other 
side. The Central Daily News showed almost seven times more unfa-
vorable reporting frequencies about the other side. This breakdown 
suggests that objective reporting, fair and balanced objectivity about 
the other side, was not to be found in either newspaper. 
Table 9 shows a breakdown of reporting frequencies about the 
other side in political, military, societal and economic categories. The 
two newspapers together showed a frequency of 4,075, or 44.81 per-
cent, in political reporting about the other side; 2,532, or 27.85 per-
cent, in societal reporting; 1,957, or 21.52 percent, in economic 
reporting; and 529, or 5.82 percent, in military reporting. 
Individually, the People's Daily showed a frequency of 714, or 
7.85 percent in societal reporting; 371, or 4.14 percent, in political re-
porting; 376, or 4.14 percent, in economic reporting; and 19, or 0.2 
percent, in military reporting. 
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TABLE 9 
PERCENTAGES OF REPORTING FREQUENCIES 
IN DIRECfiONAL CATEGORIES 
Political Military Societal Economic Total 
F N u F N u F N u F N u 
PO 32 53 291 2 4 13 191 139 384 107 18 251 
Subtotal 376 19 714 376 1485 
4.14% 0.2% 7.85% 4.14% 16.33% 
CON 124 331 3244 53 102 355 14 14 1790 22 13 1546 
3699 510 1818 1581 7608 
40.68% 5.6% 19.99% 17.39% 83.66% 
PO& Total 4075 529 2532 1957 9093 
CON 44.81% 5.82% 27.85% 21.52% 100% 
*PO: the People's Daily; CON: the Central Daily News. 
F: Favorable Report About The Other Side, Themes # 13, 16, 19 and 53. 
N: Neutral Report About The Other Side, Themes #14, 17, 20 and 54. 
U: Unfavorable Report About The Other Side, Themes #15, 18, 21 and 50. 
The Central Daily News showed a frequency of 3,699, or 40.68 
percent, in political reporting; 1,818, or 19.99 percent, in societal re-
porting; 1,581, or 17.39 percent, in economic reporting; and 510, or 
5.6 percent, in military reporting. These figures indicate that the Peo-
ple's Daily paid more attention to the ROC's societal affairs than to 
political, economic or military affairs. The Central Daily News paid 
more attention to the PRC's political affairs than to societal, economic 
or military affairs. 
Both newspapers showed very high frequencies or percentages of 
unfavorable reports about the other side in all four thematic catego-
ries. In economic reporting, the People's Daily showed a frequency of 
251 out of 376, or 66.76 percent, for unfavorable reports about the 
other side; the Central Daily News, 1,546 out of 1,581, or 97.78 per-
cent. In political reporting, the People's Daily showed a frequency of 
291 out of 376, or 77.39 percent, for unfavorable reports about the 
other side; the Central Daily News, 3,244 out of 3,699, or 87.7 percent. 
In societal reporting, the People's Daily showed a frequency of 384 out 
of 714, or 53.78 percent, for unfavorable reports about the other side. 
The Central Daily News, 1,790 out of 1,818, or 98.45 percent. In mili-
tary reporting, the People's Daily showed a frequency of 13 out of 19, 
or 68.42 percent, for unfavorable reports about the other side; the Cen-
tral Daily News, 355 out of 510, or 69.6 percent. 
The small frequencies or percentages in military reporting about 
the other side could either show that neither side has really felt much 
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of a military threat from the other side, or else neither side intention-
ally wants its readers to know about or to fear a military threat. 
The results3 of the T-test show the People's Daily and the Central 
Daily News were significantly different in political, military, societal 
and economic reporting about the other side, regardless of whether the 
reports were favorable, neutral or unfavorable. Neutral economic re-
ports were the only exception. Both newspapers show small and simi-
lar frequencies of neutral economic reports about the other side. The 
People's Daily showed a frequency of 18, and the Central Daily News, 
13. The results of the T-test demonstrate neutral economic reports 
were not significantly different between the two newspapers, nor were 
they significant when compared with the other thematic categories of 
reporting the other side. This suggests that neither newspaper re-
ported about the other side's economic situation neutrally enough. 
The sharpest difference between the two newspapers occurred in 
thematic categories # 15 "Unfavorable Political Report About the 
Other Side", #21 "Unfavorable Societal Report About the Other 
Side", #50 "Unfavorable Economic Report About the Other Side." 
For # 15 "Unfavorable Political Report About the Other Side," 
the People's Daily shows a frequency of 291, the Central Daily News, 
3,244. 
For #21 "Unfavorable Societal Report About the Other Side, the 
People's Daily shows a frequency of 384, the Central Daily News, 
1,790. 
For #50 "Unfavorable Economic Report About the Other Side," 
the People's Daily shows a frequency of 251, the Central Daily News, 
1,546. 
These findings suggest that the readers of the Central Daily News 
have received more unfavorable reports and therefore have likely de-
veloped an unfavorable image about the PRC's political, societal and 
economic situation. 
Unfavorable economic and societal reporting in the Central Daily 
News mostly compared the living standard in the PRC with the higher 
living standard in the ROC. No attention was given to the contrasting 
sizes in population or land of the two countries. The content probably 
has persuaded the readers of the Central Daily News since they do 
enjoy a higher living standard. It has likely driven readers away from 
any interest in integrating with the PRC, most of the reporting being 
in a cynical, unsympathetic tone. 
The sharp differences between these three thematic categories, 
3. Detailed results of the T-Test are omitted in this edition; available upon request. 
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and the significant difference between the two newspapers in most of 
their reporting about the other side, strengthens the argument of Hy-
pothesis III. This also shows that the corresponding "Mutual Under-
standing" factor (Factor II) is an important but weak factor in China's 
national integration; both newspapers have reported about the other 
side without trying to achieve any mutual understanding, required by 
integration theory as a basis for integration. 
The results of the T-test show a significant difference between the 
two newspapers in thematic categories # 11 "Commentary Favorable 
on the Other Side" and# 12 "Commentary Unfavorable on the Other 
Side." The People's Daily offered more commentary favorable to the 
other side; the Central Daily News shows an eight times greater fre-
quency of commentary unfavorable to the other side than the People's 
Daily, suggesting a hard-line editorial policy by the Central Daily 
News, a policy unfavorable to the PRC on the China national integra-
tion issue. The People's Daily used a reconciliatory approach with 
more commentary favorable to the ROC, causing the Central Daily 
News to call this approach a "trick with smiles" and a "sugar-coated 
poison." 
This finding further suggests that there is a large gap between the 
two newspapers or parties in building mutual trust and understanding 
for integration. 
Results of the T-Test on Five Factors 
The results of the T-test on the 22 thematic categories, other than 
those reports about the other side, show that the two newspapers used 
significantly different approaches of reporting in 15 thematic 
categories. 
The results reveal that the two newspapers only agreed on the 
aim of "nationalism consensus." They disagreed on any particular in-
tegrative methods or models, on "mutual understanding," on "eco-
nomic function," on "U.S.-China Policy," and on "U.S. Protecting 
Taiwan Policy." 
The sharpest differences are seen in thematic categories # 39 
"PRC's Forceful Integration with the ROC," #25 "U.S. Taiwan Re-
lations Act," #26 "U.S. Arms Sales," #22 "Promoting a Warmer 
Relationship with the United States," #23 "Calling On the United 
States to Maintain a Colder Relationship with the Other Side," and 
#6 "One China." 
In #39 "PRC's Forceful Integration with the ROC," the People's 
Daily shows a frequency of 38, the Central Daily News, 1,989. It could 
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be interpreted that the Central Daily News felt threatened that the 
PRC might use forceful means to achieve integration. 
In #25 "U.S. Taiwan Relations Act," the People's Daily shows a 
frequency of 50, the Central Daily News, 410. This difference suggests 
that the ROC felt a great need for the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act to 
protect it from forced integration. 
In #26 "U.S. Arms Sales," the People's Daily shows a frequency 
of 94, the Central Daily News, 815. The Central Daily News showed a 
greater play for U.S. attention. The strategy was likely based on the 
desire to gain more defensive arms sales from the United States. 
In #22 "Promoting a Warmer Relationship with the United 
States," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 356, the Central Daily 
News, 1,795. This shows that the Central Daily News has been more 
concerned about promoting the ROC's unofficial relationship with the 
United States than the People's Daily has been in promoting its official 
relationship with the United States. 
In #23 "Calling on the United States to Maintain a colder Rela-
tionship with the Other Side," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 
181, the Central Daily News, 716. This suggests that the Central Daily 
News has tried harder to persuade the United States to restrain its 
relationship with the PRC than the People's Daily has for the U.S. 
relationship with the ROC. 
Along with #22, these two categories show that the Central 
Daily News expressed more of a need for U.S. interests in China's na-
tional integration than did the People's Daily. 
In #6 "One China," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 560, 
the Central Daily News, 1,386. The Central Daily News shows almost 
three times the frequency as the People's Daily. This could be inter-
preted to mean that the Central Daily News felt "one China" integra-
tion was more important than the People's Daily did. It also could be 
said that by maintaining a "one China" policy, the ROC has the ad-
vantage of decreasing, or at least not increasing, any immediate threat 
by the PRC to integrate by forceful means. This is probably true be-
cause there is a consensus on the "one China" policy. 
The PRC seems to be willing to tolerate the status quo of Taiwan 
until integration is completed if the ROC maintains a "one China" 
policy and maintains a common intention to unify with the mainland. 
A "one China" policy helps the ROC to maintain the legitimacy of its 
central government; the ROC maintains that it will eventually return 
to the mainland and is only temporarily in Taiwan. 
For thematic categories # 5, 4, 40, 43, 36, 28, 29, 1 and 24, the 
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Central Daily News also shows significantly higher totals of reporting 
frequency than the People's Daily. 
In # 5 "The Hsin-hai Revolution in 1911 Led by Sun Yat-Sen 
and his Nationalist Party," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 
201, the Central Daily News, 798. The high frequency for the Central 
Daily News is a result of its tradition of reporting on the revolution as 
an annual memorial event. The People's Daily began reporting more 
about the revolution in 1981, using reporting as part of its peace 
overture. 
In #4 "Sun Yat-Sen as the Revolutionary Leader who Over-
threw the Manchu Empire, and Soong Ching Ling, Sun's Widow and 
the PRC's Honorary President," the People's Daily shows a frequency 
of 440, the Central Daily News, 707. The People's Daily has used this 
theme of Sun and his widow as part of its attempt to appeal to the 
ROC to join in peace talks. The Central Daily News has had more 
regular reports on Sun's birthday and Sun's death, and has mentioned 
Sun in most reports concerning governmental speeches or 
announcements. 
In #40 "ROC's Proposal to Integrate Under the Three Princi-
ples of the People," the People's Daily shows a frequency of two, the 
Central Daily News, 124. This suggests that the People's Daily has 
tried to ignore this proposal from the ROC, while the Central Daily 
News has promoted it. 
In #43 "The PRC's Peace-Talk Proposal to the ROC," the Peo-
ple's Daily shows a frequency of 163, the Central Daily News, 453. 
This reveals the ROC's continuous resistance of the PRC's proposals 
for peace talks. 
In #36 "The PRC's Hong Kong Model to Integrate the ROC," 
the People's Daily shows a frequency of 183, the Central Daily News, 
436. This reveals that the Central Daily News has used almost twice 
the frequency as the People's Daily in discussing and rejecting the 
PRC's Hong Kong Model to integrate the ROC. 
In thematic categories #28, 29, 1 and 24, the Central Daily News 
reveals a strong need by the ROC for U.S. support to fight against 
pressures and threats from the PRC. The need for U.S. support was 
especially crucial after official ties were cut between the ROC and the 
United States. 
In #28 "Transfer of American Scientific Technology," the Peo-
ple's Daily shows a frequency of 46, the Central Daily News, 223. 
In #29 "Emphasis of its Strategic Importance to Asia, the 
United States and the World," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 
72, the Central Daily News, 149. 
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In # 1 "One Greater China Territory," the People's Daily shows a 
frequency of 323, the Central Daily News, 442. 
In #24 "The PRC's Diplomatic Relationship with the United 
States," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 167, the Central Daily 
News, 327. 
On the other hand, in thematic categories #45, 41, 42, 9, 8 and 
51, the People's Daily shows significantly higher totals of reporting fre-
quency than the Central Daily News. 
All six of these categories were related to the PRC's peace pro-
posals and strategies to integrate the ROC under its rule; these strate-
gies were rejected by the Central Daily News. 
In #45 "The PRC's Peace Proposal for Cooperation Between the 
Two Parties," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 175, the Central 
Daily News, 69. 
In #41 "The PRC's 1981 Nine-Point Peace Proposal," the Peo-
ple's Daily shows a frequency of 118, the Central Daily News, 90. 
In #42 "The PRC's 1979 Three-Link and Four-Exchange Peace 
Proposal," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 183, the Central 
Daily News, 88. 
In #9 "The Separation of Relatives Divided by the Taiwan 
States," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 180, the Central Daily 
News, 14. 
In #8 "The Separation of People from their Native Towns," the 
People's Daily shows a frequency of 106, the Central Daily News, 49. 
In #9 and #8, the data reveal that the People's Daily wanted 
these sentimental appeals transmitted or relayed to the people on Tai-
wan even though they usually do not have access to the newspaper. 
The Central Daily News reported on these two categories for sentimen-
tal appeal; they presented them as an expression by the people from 
the mainland residing in Taiwan, not necessarily for the purpose of 
transmitting them to the PRC. 
In #51 "The PRC's Special Economic Zones," the People's Daily 
shows a frequency of 51, the Central Daily News, 39. The two newspa-
pers have a very close total reporting frequency but with an opposite 
attitude in this category. The People's Daily tried to promote its new 
special economic zones with eventual economic function of integration 
with the ROC in mind; however, the Central Daily News rejected this 
idea firmly. 
In #34 "The PRC's One Nation and Two Systems Model," the 
two newspapers show the same total reporting frequency of 75 but 
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with completely opposite opinions on the theme. The People's Daily 
promoted it, the Central Daily News rejected it. 
All of the PRC's integrative methods or models promoted by the 
People's Daily were rejected by the Central Daily News; both sides, 
however, did agree on the policy of "One-China Nationalism." The 
above results of the T -test on the 22 thematic categories show that the 
two newspapers did have sharp differences in reporting on integrative 
methods and models. 
Descriptions of Five Factors 
The descriptions of the five factors and their 28 thematic catego-
ries focused on the major issues of consensus or disagreement that the 
two newspapers or parties have argued. The major issues of consensus 
and disagreement are pinpointed in an analysis of the initial announce-
ments, historical events, and fundamental ideologies that the two 
newspapers or parties have used in their propaganda struggle on 
China's national integration. This approach avoids tedious, details 
and confusing items by presenting every article of reporting frequency. 
This approach should give a full comprehension of the overall issue of 
China's national integration as the two newspapers reported on it dur-
ing the December 1978 to May 1985 time period. 
1. Factor 1· Nationalism Consensus 
Factor I with 11 thematic categories manifests the properties of 
the dimension of nationalism consensus as postulated in Hypothesis 
II. All 11 thematic categories have a common appeal: nationalism. 
Both newspapers used the appeal of nationalism in their bid for 
China's national integration, each side offered its integrative method 
or model and rejected any integrative method or model offered by the 
other side on the basis of nationalism. 
In Factor I, the most dramatic evidence of using nationalism-con-
sensus appeal were reports in the two newspapers on the open letters 
and announcements made by the leaders of the PRC and the ROC 
addressed directly to the people and the leaders of the other side. For 
example, in the People's Daily on December 18, 1978, peace talks were 
first proposed by PRC leader Deng Xiaoping, two days after the PRC 
and the United States announced the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions. The PRC, trying to express its peaceful intentions, announced 
that it would immediately stop bombardments of the ROC-controlled 
offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. 
On page one of the People's Daily on January 1, 1979, a report 
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announced a message to compatriots in Taiwan calling for reunifica-
tion. The "PRC's Three-Link, Four-Exchange Peace Proposal" was 
first mentioned in this message. The "three links"-postal, transpor-
tation services and trade-and "four exchanges"-relatives and tour-
ists, academic groups, cultural groups and sports representatives-
were considered by the PRC as the first step toward peace talks with 
the ROC. The message's nationalism appeal was clear: 
We place our hope on the 17 million people in Taiwan, in-
cluding the Taiwan authorities. The Taiwan authorities 
have always firmly stood for one China and opposed an in-
dependent Taiwan. We take the same stand and it is the ba-
sis for our cooperation. Our position has always been that 
all patriots belong to one family. The responsibility of reuni-
fying the motherland rests with each of us. We hope the Tai-
wan authorities will treasure national interests and make 
valuable contributions to the reunification of the mother-
land. . . The reunification of the motherland is the sacred 
mission history has handed to our generation. . . Let us join 
hands and work together for this glorious goal! 
The People's Daily on January 6, 1979, first called on "Mr. Chi-
ang Ching-kuo" to join in peace talks for reunification. The People's 
Daily on February 4, 1979, published a full page of color pictures of 
Taiwan's scenery. It was the only color page in the People's Daily 
during the survey period of six and a half years. 
The People's Daily on May 31, 1981, reported another of the 
PRC's sentimental appeals to the ROC's leaders. It invited the rela-
tives of Soong Ching Ling to join in her funeral in Peking. Soong, who 
died on May 29, 1981, was Sun Yat-sen's widow, the sister-in-law of 
Chiang Kai-shek, the aunt of Chiang Ching-kuo, and the honorary 
president of the PRC. The invitation included reimbursement ex-
penses and free landing from ROC airlines. The People's Daily on 
June 4, 1981, also reported Deng Xiaoping's appeal at Soong's memo-
rial services for peace talks with the ROC. The Central Daily News, 
however, ignored both appeals, offering little coverage of Soong's 
death. 
On page one of the People's Daily on October 1, 1981, a report 
announced the "PRC's Nine-Point Peace Proposal." Ye Jiangying, 
chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Con-
gress, also expressed an appeal to nationalism in this proposal: 
We hope that our compatriots in Taiwan will give full play 
to their patriotism and work energetically for the early reali-
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zation of the great unity of our nation and share the honor of 
it. 
The Central Daily News on October 7, 1981, reported a response 
by ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo to the PRC's Nine-Point Peace 
Proposal, also with a sentimental appeal to the people on the 
mainland: 
The Chinese Communists have never ceased to manufacture 
their rumors of peace talks, but we never paid any attention. 
At one time they clamored for "washing Taiwan in blood." 
Then they shifted to the call for "return and identification." 
Now they shout their demands for talks on a "reciprocal" 
basis and joint "leadership." Tomorrow they will coin an-
other slogan and try to effect another deception. 
In solemnly expressing this view, I want to tell our com-
patriots on the Chinese Mainland that we are resolved tore-
move the yoke that the Communists have imposed upon 
them ... We must tell our mainland compatriots of our con-
fidence and determination to deliver them and assure them 
that we shall never talk with the Communists they hate so 
deeply. 
The People's Daily on October 10, 1981, reported that Hu 
Yaobang, secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party, had 
made an extremely sentimental appeal to ROC President Chiang 
Ching-kuo in his speech at the 70th anniversary of the 1911 Hsin-hai 
Revolution: 
Does Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo not love his natal land? Doesn't 
he want to have Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's remains moved back 
and buried in the cemetery of the Chiang family in Fenghua? 
In my capacity as a leading member of the Communist 
Party, I today invite Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo, Mr. Shieh 
Tung-ming, Mr. Sun Yun-suan, Mr. Tsiang Yien-si, Mr. 
Kao Kuei-yuan, Mr. Chiang Wei-kuo and Mr. Lin Yang-
kang, and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Yen Chia-kan, 
Mr. Chang Chun, Mr. Ho Ying-chin, Mr. Chen Li-fu, Mr. 
Huang Chieh, Mr. Chang Hsueh-liang and others, and per-
sonages in all walks of life in Taiwan to visit the mainland 
and their natal places. It would be good if they wanted to 
talk with us, but they are also welcome if they do not want to 
talk with us for the time being. What have Mr. Chiang 
Ching-kuo and the others and the compatriots in all walks of 
life in Taiwan to lose if they do this? Foreign aid is impor-
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tant, but what is most important, most reliable and most 
powerful is the great patriotic unity of one billion people of 
our own country. 
The great cause of reunifying the motherland peacefully 
and making the Chinese nation prosperous and strong de-
pends on no more than taking the decision or a turning of 
the hand. Let us consider Dr. Sun Yat-sen's teaching, 
"agreeing with the trend of world affairs and serving the ur-
gent needs of the community," join hands and work together 
to create a new glorious page in the history of the Chinese 
nation! 
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The Central Daily News never mentioned Hu's appeal; the PRC, 
however, did not give up easily on this personal sentimental appeal to 
Chiang. On page one of the People's Daily on July 25, 1982, Liao 
Chengzhi, the PRC official in charge of Taiwan relations, issued an 
open and warm letter to his former friend and schoolmate, ROC Presi-
dent Chiang, offering to come to Taiwan to initiate "peace talks." In 
the letter, he also made an appeal to nationalism: 
Dear Brother Ching-kuo: 
... From our childhood friendship to our chats in the 
Soviet capital, everything in the past is still alive in my mem-
ory. But it's unfortunate that we haven't heard from each 
other for so many years. Recently I was told that you are 
somewhat indisposed and this has caused me much concern. 
Men in their seventies are often afflicted with illness. I sin-
cerely hope that you will take good care of yourself. 
Over the past three years, our party has repeatedly pro-
posed talks with your party to bury the hatchet and work 
jointly to accomplish the great cause of national reunifica-
tion. But you have time and again announced that there 
should be "no contact, no talks and no compromise," which 
I think is inadvisable. 
. . .Since you are presiding over the administration of 
Taiwan, you have unshirkable responsibility for the realiza-
tion of a third cooperation. It would be easier to talk the 
matter over when leaders on both sides used to be school-
mates and close friends who know one another well. I find it 
really hard to subscribe to those views which describe coop-
eration as surrender, humiliating, suffering losses or being 
duped. . .Such talks as reunifying China under the Three 
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Principles of the People are regarded by all sensible people as 
unrealistic, deceptive and self-deceiving. 
People of our generation know the true meaning of the 
Three Principles of the People quite well and there is no need 
to argue about it. Neither is there any need to dwell on such 
assertions as Taiwan's economic prosperity, democracy and 
easy livelihood, the truth of which the venerable gentlemen 
in Taiwan know clearly. For the sake of your party, I would 
think that if you take up the historical responsibility and res-
olutely take part in peace talks to accomplish national 
reunification. . . 
I recently read one of your writings in which you ex-
pressed "fervent hopes that my father's soul would be able to 
return to the homeland and be reunited with the forefa-
thers." I was overwhelmed with emotion when I read this. 
The remains of your father are still placed temporarily at 
Cihu. After reunification, they should be moved back and 
buried in the native soil-in Fenghua, Najing or Lushan-in 
fulfillment of your filial wishes. You recently said, "Filial 
devotion should be expanded into national devotion, which 
means love of the nation and dedication to the country." 
This is an excellent statement. Why don't you apply it to the 
great cause of national reunification? As far as the country 
and the nation are concerned, this would be an answer of the 
two generations of the Chiangs to history and as far as you 
yourself are concerned, this would be an expression of both 
loyalty and filial piety. Otherwise how could you account 
for yourself after your passing away? It is hoped that you 
would think more about it. 
Dear brother! Your life has been marked by frustra-
tions, which should not be attributed to fate ... I hope you, 
my brother, would be good at making the choice ... What are 
you waiting for, staying away from home? 
The longing for old friends grows with age. If it is con-
venient to you, I would pack and set out for a visit to Taibei 
to seek enlightenment from our elders. For all the disasters 
the brotherhood has remained; a smile at meeting, and en-
mity is banished. When I look towards the distant southern 
sky, my heart is already there. No word is enough to express 
what I wish to say. Hope you will take care of yourself. I 
am waiting impatiently for a reply. 
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Please convey my regards to your mother as well as to 
Fangliang, W eikuo and the children. 
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The Central Daily News did not report about or respond to Liao's 
appeal until three weeks later. It released an open letter by Soong 
Mei-ling in New York on August 17, 1982. Soong, widow of Chiang 
Kai-shek and younger sister of Soong Ching Ling, responded on be-
half of Chiang Ching-kuo with a negative reply to Liao's peace-talks 
proposal. The People's Daily was not discouraged by the ROC's re-
fusal for peace talks; it has kept reporting these nostalgic messages of 
reunification appeal from relatives and old friends of the Chiang 
family. 
The People's Daily on June 5, 1983, reported another personal 
appeal to the ROC people by PRC leader Deng Yingchao. Deng, 
widow of PRC Premier Chou En-lai, said, "Peaceful reunification of 
our motherland is a common desire of the people of all nationalities of 
China and a glorious task history has placed on our generation." 
Deng also called on the people of Taiwan to display patriotism for 
reunification. The Central Daily News did not report about Deng's 
appeal. 
When the People's Daily reported another of Deng's appeals on 
January 17, 1984, the Central Daily News on February 17, 1984 re-
sponded with a public letter from Soong Mei-ling in New York. At 
the Sun Yat-sen Research Association and Nationalist meeting, Deng 
called for cooperation between the two parties for peace talks and 
reunification. Soong rejected Deng's appeal with a personal touch: 
. . .I had on several occasions met with you in Chungking 
during the war of resistance against Japan, inquiring of your 
views on the war and on the prospects of our national future. 
We were impressed with your objectivity and your under-
standing of the multitudinous problems facing our coun-
try ... Since then, I have often wondered why you should be 
obsessed by Marxism authored by an anti-God German Jew, 
who was and continued to be scorned by the God-fearing 
Jewish people? 
Were you a member of the Nationalist Party, I would 
have addressed you as comrade; were you a member of soci-
ety at large, I would address you as Mrs. Chou or Miss Teng. 
All these forms amongst you the practice is to call everyone 
by one's name-surname and all. Being reared in the Chi-
nese tradition, however, it is my wont to greet everyone 
courteously. I hope you would understand whereof I speak. 
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Now that you have passed the proverbial hoary three 
score and ten, it behooves you to be beyond fear of displeas-
ing your confreres. Should you be speaking from your heart, 
persuade those who have been led astray to follow truly the 
examples of Dr. Sun's Three Principles of the People, which 
you exhorted in your own speech at the recent commemora-
tive meeting. Should you and others work for the reunifica-
tion of China, then the mainlanders, like the compatriots in 
Taiwan, will enjoy freedom, peace, prosperity, happiness and 
an upward mobility to a bright future. 
Other sentimental and nationalism-oriented reports in the Peo-
ple's Daily and the Central Daily News were written in a literary style. 
These come under the themes "Homesick" and "Relatives"; some 
were even in the form of poetry. They presumably could have little 
effect since the targeted readers have little chance to read the newspa-
per of the opposite side. 
As for the peace talks for a third cooperation, both newspapers 
reported that both parties had already had two bitter experiences of 
cooperation-from 1922 to 1927, and from 1938 to 1948. Both news-
papers and parties have maintained their own interpretations of the 
two earlier brief periods of cooperation. The respective interpretations 
of those periods have shaped each party's perception of the other, and 
of the best means for reunifying China. 
The Central Daily News asserted that within these two periods of 
interaction are the chief reasons for the Communist Party's victory 
over the Chinese mainland in 1949. 
The incidents were significant during these two periods: One was 
the admission of Communist members into the Nationalist Party in 
1924 by Sun Yat-sen to gain assistance from the Soviet Union to over-
throw the Chinese feudal warlords. Right up to his death in 1925, Sun 
believed cooperation between the two parties was necessary. Chiang 
Kai-shek, on the other hand, hardly showed Sun's tolerance. He de-
nounced the Communists in April 1927 and terminated the first coop-
eration in the same year. The second incident was the creation of the 
second cooperation in 1936 after Chiang was kidnapped in Xian by his 
own generals because he agreed to join forces with the Communists to 
fight Japan.4 
With then unpleasant experiences of cooperation made more un-
pleasant by fundamental political and philosophical disagreements, the 
Communist Party and the Nationalist Party have a deep historical leg-
4. Downen, op. cit., p. 16-19. 
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acy of mistrust; this mistrust provides a weak basis for a third coopera-
tion between the two parties. 5 
In Factor I, the thematic category of "The PRC's Forceful Inte-
gration with the ROC" was also based on "nationalism consensus." 
The PRC has expressed that the use of force to integrate Taiwan is a 
patriotic and nationalistic action, and has never ruled out the possibil-
ity of integrating Taiwan by force. The People's Daily on January 12, 
1984, reported that PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang said during his visit to 
the United States that the PRC "cannot promise any foreign country 
to use only peaceful means to settle the Taiwan issue" and "China will 
never guarantee not to use force to unify China." The People's Daily 
on October 11, 1984, reported that PRC leader Deng Xiaoping told a 
Japanese delegation that the PRC made no promise to Americans that 
it would never use non-peaceful action against Taiwan. Deng told 
U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger on September 28, 1983, 
that while the PRC may not have power enough to occupy Taiwan by 
force, it has strength enough to blockade the Taiwan Strait. 
On October 23, 1984, Deng told former Japanese Prime Minister 
Zenko Suzuki that the PRC "will never accept the United States' de-
mand to promise unifying with Taiwan by peaceful means only." 
Deng reaffirmed: "About peaceful unification with Taiwan, we will 
have patience. We will never give up the use of non-peaceful means." 
So Factor I of "Nationalism Consensus" shows consensus on 
"one China" with nationalism appeals to Sun Yat-sen and his Hsin-hai 
Revolution, to separated relatives on both sides, and to hometowns 
separated by the integration issue. Factor I also shows some integra-
tive methods and models that the two sides do not express consensus 
on. 
2. Factor IL· Mutual Understanding 
Factor II indicates that Hypothesis III was fairly accepted with 
thematic categories #28 "Transfer of American Scientific Technol-
ogy," #53 "Favorable Economic Report About the Other Side," #20 
"Neutral Societal Report About the Other Side," # 11 "Commentary 
Favorable to the Other Side," # 13 "Favorable Political Report About 
the Other Side," and # 19 "Favorable Societal Report About the 
Other Side." 
Reports on these thematic categories reflect that the two newspa-
pers used their pages significantly in reporting and commenting about 
the other side for the last six and a half years. This reporting became a 
5. Ibid., p. 23. 
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factor in China's national integration as Hypothesis III predicted, as a 
factor of "mutual understanding." Most of these reports in the two 
newspapers were in the form of special columns about the other side. 
The People's Daily, from January 1979, reported about the ROC an 
average of once a week in a special one-third page section called "Tai-
wan Today." The Central Daily News had a special weekly column on 
the PRC named "See Through the Mainland." The column occupied 
one-third of a page. The Central Daily News presented this column 
from issue #304 on December 6, 1978, to issue #636 on May 28, 
1985, the last day of this survey. 
The People's Daily used a more sentimental appeal, but filled with 
substantial unfavorable reports about the ROC. The Central Daily 
News generally used a more critical tone, and unfavorable content in 
reporting on the PRC. 
The People's Daily printed a full page of color· photographs of 
Taiwan scenery on February 4, 1979. The Central Daily News never 
printed any scenes of the PRC in color. Both newspapers seldom 
printed photographs of the people of the other side except for defec-
tors. Neither newspapers ever printed photographs of the leaders of 
the other side, with one exception: the Central Daily News printed 
photographs of "The Gang of Four" during their trial in December 
1980. 
The thematic category of "Commentary Favorable to the Other 
Side" was found mostly in the People's Daily in sentimental appeals of 
mainland scenery or hometowns of the people on Taiwan. 
The thematic categories of "Favorable Political and Societal Re-
ports About the Other Side" were also usually carried in the "Taiwan 
Today" column in the People's Daily. The Central Daily News printed 
very few favorable political or societal reports about the PRC. For 
example, the People's Daily on June 18, 1980, reported that a Taiwan 
television station broadcast for the first time in Taiwan a documentary 
that won popular ratings. The documentary showed landscape scenes 
of the mainland. The People's Daily on February 20, 1984, reported 
that ROC Premier Sun Yun-suan announced the relaxation of interac-
tions between Taiwan and the mainland. The People's Daily on March 
13 and 19, 1984, reported that Taiwan had elected Chiang Ching-kuo 
as president and Li Deng-hui as vice president. It was the first time 
that the People's Daily reported them as "president" and "vice presi-
dent" even though it used quotation marks around the words. The 
People's Daily on May 23, 1985 reported that "Taiwan Vice President" 
Li said, "Taiwan is a part of the mainland." Though the People's Daily 
has gradually reported more favorable and neutral stories about the 
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ROC, the Central Daily News has not changed significantly from its 
unfavorable reports about the PRC. 
As the trends and directional analyses on this factor indicate, the 
mutual understanding with favorable reports and commentaries has 
been factored as an important but weak factor in China's national inte-
gration. The higher percentages and frequencies of unfavorable re-
ports and commentaries about the other side compared with the low 
percentages of neutral and favorable reports and commentaries about 
the other side by both newspapers show the factor of mutual under-
standing to be weak; it must be improved if both sides want 
integration. 
Thematic category #28, "Transfer of American Scientific Tech-
nology," could be interpreted as a sample of mutual understanding 
since both the PRC and the ROC want the United States to transfer as 
much scientific technology as possible to them, and not to transfer it to 
the other Chinese side. Each side understood the other on this. 
The United States has understood both the PRC's and the ROC's 
wishes and has taken steps toward enhancing the PRC and the ROC 
simultaneously through technological and security cooperation. 6 The 
United States is interested in preserving its influence in these opera-
tions, in stabilizing the internal modernization process, and in 
strengthening the defensive capability of both Chinas7; however, in at-
tempting to standardize its dual-assistance stabilizing approach, 
Washington has not yet established a workable balance that would 
guarantee Taiwan's security while stimulating progress in the PRC 
and strengthening diplomatic relations with it. 8 
The Carter administration first authorized the transfer of "dual-
purpose" technology and military support equipment to the PRC. 
The Reagan administration further liberalized export licensing regula-
tions for high technology and proposed the sale of defensive weapons 
to Peking; nevertheless, policy reconsiderations and bureaucratic re-
views of export controls have made implementation slow and uncer-
6. James C. Hsiung, "China, Part II: The Conceptual Foundations of U.S. China Pol-
icy," in James C. Hsiung and Winberg Chai, eds., Asia and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: 
Praeger, 1981), p. 128, and Robert L. Downen, "The Diplomatic Dimension: The Shifting 
Foundation," in Chen, ed., op. cit., p. 69. 
7. Christopher Phillips, "Economic and Political Developments in China," in the 
Asian Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation, ed., A Heritage Roundtable: U.S. -China 
Challenge to American Po/icymakers (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1984), p. 
30; and Downen, op. cit. 
8. Robert G. Sutter, "Taiwan: The Emerging Relationship," in U. Alexis Johnson, 
George R. Packard, and Alfred D. Wilhelm, eds., China Policy for the Next Decade (Bos-
ton: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1984), pp. 318-323, and Downen, op. cit. 
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tain. Authorization of U.S. nuclear technology transfers were deferred 
due to concern about Peking's refusal to agree to non-proliferation 
accords.9 
3. Factor III· Economic Function 
Factor III loading with thematic categories # 34 "The PRC's 
One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model," #36 "The PRC's 
Hong Kong Integrative Model," #54 "Neutral Economic Report 
About the Other Side," and #51 "The PRC's Special Economic 
Zones" has strong economic elements that might have an economic 
function as Hypothesis V predicted. 
When the PRC started negotiations with Britain on Hong Kong 
in 1983, it had not yet come out with the "Hong Kong Integrative 
Model" or the "One Nation, Two systems Integrative Model" for the 
ROC. But, as negotiations developed, the PRC began to promote 
these models. It has included the "Hong Kong Model" as an example 
of the "One Nation, Two Systems Model." Both models are political 
proposals with a strong economic appeal. The potential economic 
function, in fact, is aimed at non-political integration. 
The People's Daily on May 16, 1984, reported on the "One Na-
tion, Two Systems Integrative Model" for the first time. The paper 
gave a detailed coverage of this model, which was announced by PRC 
Premier Zhao Ziyang at the Second Session of the Sixth National Peo-
ple's Congress. "In view of historical experience and the present state 
of affairs in Taiwan, we have advanced the idea of 'One Nation, Two 
Systems' to be put into practice after reunification," Zhao announced. 
The People's Daily on July 24, October 4 and 6, November 17 and 
December 19, 1984, reported that Deng Xiaoping confirmed the appli-
cation of the new model by announcing, "Should the system of 'One 
Nation, Two Systems' be successfully carried out in Hong Kong, it 
may provide a solution to similar problems in the international arena 
and Taiwan." In other words, Deng implied that this model may be-
come a new formula for solving the reunification problems of other 
divided countries such as Germany and Korea. 
Chien Chunjui, an advisor to the PRC's Academy of Social Sci-
ences, described the concept of the "One Nation, Two Systems 
Model" as a new socialist formula: 
The principle of the Communist Party Central Committee is 
9. James C. Hsiung, "The Reagan Administration and U.S. Policy Toward the PRC 
and Taiwan," in Hung-mao Tien, ed., Mainland China, Taiwan, and U.S. Policy (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Rain, 1983), p. 25. 
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to maintain socialism on the mainland, but capitalism in 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao, over a long period after the 
reunification of the country so that the two systems will co-
exist and enhance each other through peaceful competition. 
The practical way for achieving this is: We should first es-
tablish special economic zones, then open 14 coastal cities to 
foreign investment so as to absorb and employ the good 
points of capitalism to reform socialism and improve the so-
cialist material civilization on the mainland on a large scale. 
At the same time, we must continue to promote spiritual civ-
ilization on the mainland. In this manner, there will surely 
be no need to worry about China's economy after 60 or 70 
years. 10 
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Chien's description disclosed the "One Nation, Two Systems In-
tegrative Model" to be an advanced application of the "Hong Kong 
Integrative Model," aimed at integrating not only Hong Kong but also 
the ROC and Macao under PRC rule. Moreover, concrete steps have 
already been taken toward establishing "special economic zones" and 
opening 14 coastal cities. 
This disclosure further confirms Factor III and Hypothesis V's 
correspondence values: the "PRC's One Nation, Two Systems In-
tegrative Model," the "PRC's Hong Kong Integrative Model," and 
the "Special Economic Zones" are grouped in the same factor of eco-
nomic function. 
Chien also revealed that the PRC is planning to absorb and em-
ploy the capitalism system in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao to re-
form the socialist system on the mainland. An economic 
interdependence among these four areas can be anticipated if the PRC 
is seriously promoting the new "One Nation, Two Systems Integrative 
Model." 
The People's Daily expressed the PRC's seriousness on September 
27, 1984, after the PRC and Britain signed a joint declaration on Hong 
Kong the previous day. The paper reported that after the transfer of 
Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997, the former British colony would be 
allowed to retain its previous capitalist economic system for 50 years 
in order to maintain peace and prosperity in the region. This was the 
first official announcement the People's Daily reported on the "One 
Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model." The same day, the Central 
Daily News reported the ROC's rejection and its worries over the 
10. Kuo-chiang Hsing, "One Nation, Two Systems," in Issues & Studies (September 
1984), Vol. XX, No. 9, p. 6. 
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"PRC's One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model" for Hong Kong 
and the ROC on Taiwan. 
The paper reported that ROC Premier Yu Kuo-hua reacted, first, 
accusing the British government of "pushing 5.5 million people under 
communist totalitarian enslavement, creating disgrace in human his-
tory"; it then condemned the PRC for creating an illusion: 
To achieve their purpose of swallowing Hong Kong, the Chi-
nese Communists-fearful of resistance from the Chinese in 
Hong Kong and Kowloon, who demand freedom and de-
mocracy-went out of their way to embellish an illusion of 
"one country, two systems." They promised that the present 
Hong Kong system would remain unchanged for 50 years, in 
order to confuse the world and to bilk the people of Hong 
Kong and Kowloon. 
The Central Daily News on October 10, 1984, reported another 
ROC rejection of the Hong Kong solution for reunification. The pa-
per reported a remark by ROC President Chiang: "They have used 
nationalism and patriotism as a curtain over deception and blackmail 
in reaching a so-called 'accord' with Great Britain; and they have 
taken further advantage of this opportunity to pull hair over the eyes 
of the world via an all out propaganda campaign on the question of 
the reunification of China." 
Regardless of these rejections of the "PRC's One Nation, Two 
Systems Integration Model," the People's Daily reported on June 2, 
1984, that the PRC was sincere in its offers by referring to the PRC's 
constitution. The paper reported that Hong Kong would become a 
special administrative region and be subject to a different system from 
that on the mainland, according to Article 31 of the constitution. In 
addition to winning the confidence of the people of Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, the People's Daily emphasized the PRC-Britain Accord, 
which was signed in September 1984, saying that the PRC would 
carry out its "One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model." They 
would allow Hong Kong and Taiwan to maintain their capitalism sys-
tem for 50 years after the PRC gained sovereignty of both islands. As 
political appeals, these attempts have not yet worked. Once the grow-
ing trade and the economic functions among the three areas become 
interdependent, the "PRC's One Nation, Two systems Integrative 
Model" might have a better chance of succeeding if trade continues to 
grow between the PRC and the ROC through Hong Kong. 
The survey discovered that the two newspapers did not report 
objectively on the growing trade and economic interdependent reality. 
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An analysis of the reality from sources other than the reports of the 
two newspapers could help give an understanding of its potentiality. 
First, an economic interdependence between the PRC and Hong 
Kong has existed for the past 35 years in various degrees; it has in-
creased since the PRC-Britain Accord was signed. Hong Kong is 
needed economically by both the PRC and Britain. If economic self-
interest were the only consideration, Britain and the PRC could prob-
ably carry out their agreement to leave Hong Kong as it is as a new 
symbol of the PRC's sovereignty. Then, the "PRC's One Nation, Two 
Systems Integrative Model" could be executed. The benefits to 
London of preserving the status quo in what has become the world's 
third largest financial center are obvious: Hong Kong is London's di-
rect connection with the most dynamic region in the world economy. 
The PRC also has a great deal to gain from allowing Hong 
Kong's vitality to survive after the formal transfer of sovereignty. 
First, since Hong Kong in a microcosm reflects the legal, commercial 
and monetary problems posed by PRC's own opening to the West, the 
steps taken in Hong Kong to settle these matters and to preserve in-
vestor confidence could demonstrate the priority that the PRC at-
taches to its modernization. 11 Second, the PRC's trade surplus with 
Hong Kong has grown from $1.741 billion in 1977 to $4.4 billion in 
1983; nearly 40 percent of the PRC's hard currency income is derived 
from Hong Kong. 12 
Third, since 1970, Hong Kong has moved from twentieth to first 
position in PRC's re-export trade. Trade in goods imported for tran-
shipment to PRC has grown considerably. In 1979, Hong Kong's re-
exports to the PRC increased 514.5 percent from 1970. They fell to 
73.3 percent after the PRC's economic retrenchment in 1981. They 
are expected to grow even more in the next few decades. 13 
Fourth, Hong Kong will continue to play a vital role in the 
PRC's modernization well into the next century. The PRC's own 
transport facilities-road, rail, and port-are likely to remain inade-
quate, despite the heavy emphasis placed on infrastructure in the Five 
Year Plan (1981-1986) adopted by the National Party Congress in No-
vember 1982. 14 Fifth, Hong Kong plays an irreplaceable role as a 
"political filter" for trade with Taiwan, Indonesia, South Korea, Israel 
11. Richard Nations, "Hong Kong," in Johnson, Packard, and Wilhelm, eds., op. cit., 
pp. 371-372. 
12. Ibid., p. 372. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. 
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and South Africa. 15 To understand further about the potential inter-
dependent trade and economic function between the PRC and the 
ROC, the existing indirect trade between them through third countries 
or areas via Hong Kong must be analyzed. 
Thematic category #48 "Indirect Trade Between the Two Sides 
Through Hong Kong" did not have enough loading points to be in-
cluded in this factor. The indirect trade between the two sides 
through Hong Kong is a possible basis for the "spill-over" function as 
Hypothesis V predicted that economic function may have an effect on 
eventual political integration. Trade between the PRC and the ROC 
through Hong Kong grew from $70 million in 1979, to $460 million in 
1981, to $550 million in 1984, to $500 million in the first six months of 
1985. It is expected to reach $1.5 billion by the end of 1985. 16 
The Central Daily News on April 14, 1985, reported that the 
ROC government prohibits the people of Taiwan from trading directly 
with the PRC. Two days later, the paper reported the ROC govern-
ment would regard any trade with the people of the mainland by the 
people of Taiwan as illegal smuggling. Nevertheless, on April 28 the 
paper reported that the ROC government would not intervene in indi-
rect trade between the mainland and Taiwan through Hong Kong at 
present because it is estimated to be only one percent of the ROC's 
total foreign trade. The People's Daily, on the other hand, has not 
reported any prohibition on trading with Taiwan, directly or 
indirectly. 
Without any direct intervention by either government, trade be-
tween the two economies via Hong Kong has been brisk in the past 
five years. There are several things that have contributed to this trade. 
First the PRC maintains a duty-free policy for Taiwan goods, estab-
lished in 1981, regarding them as domestic goods. The policy was 
designed to draw a favorable image of the PRC for the people of Tai-
wan. The policy was cancelled in 1982 when the PRC saw that some 
Hong Kong businessmen took advantage of the policy by importing 
Korean goods with faked Taiwan labels. Some ROC citizens have 
feared that an unrestrained expansion of exports to the PRC through 
Hong Kong may eventually lead to over-dependence on that market, 
and to non-voluntarily "spill-over" integration with the PRC. 17 Some 
think that the trade is too risky because the PRC is too volatile under 
the Communist system. Any unfavorable change could plunge ROC 
15. Ibid. 
16. Economic News (Taipei), April 22-28, 1985, No. 3230, p. 16. 
17. Ibid. 
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exporters into serious setbacks; furthermore, should the ROC one day 
really become dependent on the PRC market, the PRC might use it as 
a weapon against the ROC. Some believe that the PRC's rapidly ris-
ing demand for ROC products is part of a political picture aimed at 
reunification under the present communist system. But the ROC gov-
ernment says shipments made by Taiwan manufacturers to meet or-
ders from intermediaries in Hong Kong are in accord with ROC 
government regulations and the ROC government cannot do anything 
about them. 18 
The ROC Institute for Economic Research has said that the 
PRC's increasing purchases of ROC products simply reflect a rise in 
its overall imports of foreign goods made possible by the PRC's eco-
nomic reforms since 1979. An indication of this is that the PRC's 
imports from other areas, especially Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong 
and Singapore, all showed increases in 1984. Judging by this fact, the 
institute said that the PRC has not intentionally increased its 
purchases from the ROC for political purposes. The institute con-
cluded that the ROC need not worry so much about indirect exports 
to the PRC; because indirect exports are part of free trade, the ROC 
government cannot and should not interfere with them. Indirect trade 
through Hong Kong, therefore, will likely continue to be a booming 
business. It can be considered a potential alternative function of 
"spill-over" for China's national integration. 19 
As for thematic category #54, "Neutral Economic Report About 
the Other Side," the People's Daily reported on economic issues about 
the other side with a fairly objective attitude. Both sides watch the 
other side's economic activities more closely than before. Economic 
activities have become regarded as a healthy source of competition be-
tween them. 
Thematic category #51, "PRC's Special Economic Zones," Fac-
tor V, have been reported by the People's Daily and the Central Daily 
News with a close amount of frequency. Both newspapers paid atten-
tion to this theme for different reasons. The People's Daily sought to 
promote the success of the zones in order to use the model for the rest 
of the mainland. It also considered the zones important in later ab-
sorbing Taiwan, since Taiwan has used similar zones for 25 years. 
The Central Daily News has mainly reported on its concern over 
the PRC's political aims of absorbing Taiwan and competing with Tai-
wan's foreign-trade-oriented economy. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Ibid. 
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On December 25, 1981, the People's Daily reported about the 
Shenzhen special economic zone in Guangdong province with four 
pictures. These four zones were officially approved by the PRC gov-
ernment on August 26, 1980. The current active zones are Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, and Shantou of Guangdong province, and Xiamen of Fujian 
province. 20 As the four zones are located near Taiwan, the ROC has 
felt threatened both economically and politically. The Xiamen zone is 
only a mile from the ROC-held island of Quemoy. This has worried 
the ROC the worst. 21 The four special economic zones, however, have 
been no direct threat to the integration of Taiwan economically. 
Along with the growing indirect trade between the PRC and the ROC 
through Hong Kong, and the common attention paid to the economic 
development of the other side by the two newspapers, and to the eco-
nomic reforms in the PRC, these new economic trends have strength-
ened the potential for success of the "PRC's One Nation, Two Systems 
Integrative Model" for economic integration, if not immediate polit-
ical integration. 
4. Factor IV: U.S.-China Policy 
Factor IV with loadings of thematic categories' #22 "Promoting 
a Warmer Relationship with the United States," #23 "Calling on the 
United States to Maintain a Colder Relationship with the Other side," 
#24 "The Diplomatic Relationship with the United States," #29 
"Emphasis of its Strategic Importance to Asia, the United States or 
the World," and # 1 "One Greater China Territory," made Hypothe-
sis IV valid in predicting the factor as a "U.S.-China Policy" factor. 
Thematic categories #22 and #23 have almost the same load-
ings in Factor IV: .793 and .791, respectively. These two themes 
often appeared side by side in the same article or on the same page. 
The Central Daily News, however, showed a four-times higher fre-
quency than the People's Daily for #22, and a seven-times greater fre-
quency than the People's Daily for #23. This suggests that the Central 
Daily News has shown more concerned than the People's Daily with 
the U.S. role in relations between the two Chinas. 
The five thematic categories loaded in Factor IV reveal that both 
the PRC and the ROC intended to influence the United States in 
China's national integration. In particular, the PRC tried to ask the 
United States to press the ROC to join in peace talks. The ROC, how-
20. Jung-feng Chang, "A Study of Special Economic Zones," in Economic Papers (Sep-
tember 1983), No. 40, p. 8. 
21. Ibid., p. 13. 
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ever, has kept resisting any possibilities of peace talks from the United 
States. On the other hand, Factor IV showed that the United States 
respects the consensus on the territorial claim of the PRC and the 
ROC that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States, however, 
insists that China's national integration should be achieved by peaceful 
means. 
The significance of the five thematic categories in Factor IV is 
particularly evident in several reports in both newspapers. 
The People's Daily on April 26, 1984, commented on President 
Reagan's Trip to the PRC: 
It cannot be denied that the current development of Sino-
American relations is very far from what it ought to be. Re-
lations between the countries have suffered certain interfer-
ence from time to time. In particular, the Taiwan issue 
remains a major obstacle between China and the United 
States. The only principles for solving this problem are those 
guiding Sino-American relations as affirmed in the series of 
PRC-U.S. joint communiques. We believe that as long as 
the two sides earnestly abide by the three communiques, re-
spect each other's sovereignty and territory integrity, andre-
frain from interfering in each other's internal affairs, the 
relations between the two countries will be freed from turbu-
lence and instability and will grow steadily and continually. 
It is clear that the PRC hoped the United States would give up its 
relations with the ROC in accordance with the PRC's interpretation 
of the "three communiques." Therefore, an analysis of the "three 
communiques" would be a better way to describe Factor IV of "U.S.-
China Policy." 
(1) The Shanghai Joint Communique 
The Shanghai Joint Communique of February 28, 1972, signed by 
President Nixon and PRC Premier Chou, established a starting point 
from which future contacts could develop. It made clear that a coop-
erative relationship could occur despite disagreement on ideological, 
regional and global issues between Washington and Peking. 22 Most 
significantly, the Shanghai Communique stated the U.S. intention to 
gradually withdraw all U.S. military forces form Taiwan, thereby al-
lowing cooperation with the PRC. 23 The communique affirmed the 
22. Downen, "The Diplomatic Dimension," op. cit., 64. 
23. Ibid. 
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U.S. interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the 
Chinese without outside interference. It also acknowledged the exist-
ence of "one China" with Taiwan as a subordinate part. 24 This aspect 
of U.S. policy, as documented with the Shanghai Communique, has 
been reiterated frequently: 
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either 
side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and 
that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States govern-
ment does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its inter-
est in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the 
Chinese themselves. 25 
The PRC text in Chinese uses the term "ren-shi" for acknowl-
edge. This term conveys the same meaning of recognition but not nec-
essarily agreement.26 
(2) The Normalization Joint Communique 
The Normalization Joint Communique of December 15, 1978, 
signed by President Carter and PRC Premier Hua Quofeng, says the 
United States "acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one 
China and Taiwan is a part of China, ... [and] recognizes the People's 
Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. Within this 
context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, com-
mercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.'m 
However, there is a serious linguistic discrepancy in the English and 
Chinese texts of the communique concerning to the two parties' posi-
tions on the status of Taiwan.28 
The term "acknowledges" was not accidently chosen in the Eng-
lish version. Following the Shanghai Communique, the term indi-
cated recognition of, but not necessarily agreement with, the PRC's 
position29; however, the PRC used the word "acknowledges" as 
"cheng-ren" in the Chinese version of the communique. This trans-
lates more literally as "recognizes," a term carrying a clear connota-
tion of acceptance or agreement. 30 When one reads the Chinese texts 
of the two communiques together, it appears that the United States 
24. Ibid. 
25. Downen, To Bridge the Taiwan Strait, op. cit., p. 52. 
26. Victor Hao Li, "The 'Taiwan Question' in U.S.-China Relations," in Tien, ed., op. 
cit., p. 198. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
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has increased the degree of its acceptance of the Chinese position from 
"ren-shi" to "cheng-ren."31 In interpreting this phrase, U.S. officials 
have said that the United States will adhere only to the English ver-
sion; the PRC only to the Chinese version. 32 
The 1978 Normalization Joint Communique reaffirmed all of the 
political goals set forth by the 1972 Shanghai Communique, also it 
added references to continuing "cultural, commercial, and other unof-
ficial relations with the people of Taiwan." For the most part it was a 
formal reiteration of the same objectives sought by a different presi-
dential administration, establishing official political ties between the 
PRC and the United States.33 
(3) The Joint Communique of August 17, 1982 
In the Joint Communique of August 17, 1982, often called the 
"Shanghai Communique II," the United States affirmed: 
It has no intention of. . .interfering in China's internal af-
fairs, or pursuing a policy of 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one 
Taiwan.' The United States government understands and 
appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful reso-
lution of the Taiwan question ... The new situation which has 
emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides 
favorable conditions for the settlement of United States-
China differences over the question of United States arms 
sales to Taiwan. 34 
The most significant provision of the communique was a U.S. 
commitment to limit arms sales to the ROC. The United States 
agreed not to "carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan," 
not to "exceed ... the level of those supplied in recent years"; and to 
"reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan ... "35 
In an interview with the U.S. media afterward, President Reagan 
explained, "In that communique, the People's Republic has agreed 
that they are going to try and peacefully resolve the Taiwanese issue. 
We, in tum, linked our statement about weaponry to that .. .If the day 
ever comes that those two [the PRC and ROC] find that they can get 
together and become one China, in a peaceful manner, then there 
wouldn't be any need for arms sales to Taiwan. And that's all that 
31. Ibid., p. 30. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Downen, "The Diplomatic Dimension," op. cit., p. 46. 
34. Downen, To Bridge the Taiwan Strait, op. cit., p. 52. 
35. Ibid., p. 53. 
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was meant in the communique."36 
The Central Daily News on December 17, 1982, expressed the 
ROC's disapproval of the communique but accepted it as long as the 
United States still supplied it with defensive weapons. The paper re-
ported its view on the communique and Taiwan's strategic importance 
in an article restating President Chiang's reply to an interview by the 
Far Eastern Economic Review: 
The rupture of diplomatic ties between the Republic of 
China and the United States and the "August 17 Communi-
que" issued jointly by the United States and the Chinese 
Communist regime have inflicted tremendous damage on the 
Republic of China; they have also done much to undermine 
the international reputation of the United States. 
The damage of the Republic of China directly affects 
the stability and prosperity of the entire Asian-Pacific region. 
The countries in this region do not like this state of affairs, 
an unfavorable factor for the United States as a member of 
the Asian-Pacific community. 
This indicates that the United States and the Republic 
of China have common interests. Therefore, we always be-
lieve that the strengthening of relations between the United 
States and the Republic of China is in the best interests of 
both nations and, the Asian-Pacific region as a whole. We 
also believe that the United States, as the leader of the free 
world, will not and should not yield to the Chinese Commu-
nists' unwarranted blackmail. We are confident that the 
U.S. government will strengthen its adherence to the Taiwan 
Relations Act. 
We are also pleased to see that President Reagan is an 
American statesman of vision, principle and courage. Judg-
ing from his thorough understanding of international Com-
munism and his clear vision in world affairs, we have all the 
reasons to be optimistic over the future of U.S.-ROC 
relations. 
The reason to accept the communique was that the ROC received 
private assurances that the United States would "not play any media-
tion role between Peking and Taipei" and would "not exert pressure 
on the ROC to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Commu-
nists.'m The ROC made public these U.S. assurances on August 17, 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid. 
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1982, at the same time the ROC announced the communique. These 
assurances were reiterated to Taipei at the time of President Reagan's 
visit to the PRC in April 1984.38 It was also during that visit that 
Reagan rejected a request by Deng Xiaoping to pressure Taipei to 
come to the bargaining table. 39 The New York Times disclosed on the 
day President Reagan arrived in Peking that the United States had 
provided the ROC a six-point guarantee: 
(a) the U.S. government would not set a deadline for the 
complete cessation of arms sales to Taiwan; 
(b) the U.S. government would not negotiate with Peking in 
advance on questions concerning arms sales to Taiwan; 
(c) the U.S. government would not act as intermediary be-
tween Peking and Taipei; 
(d) the U.S. government would not agree to any proposal to 
change the Taiwan Relations Act; 
(e) the U.S. government would not change its position on 
the question concerning Taiwan's sovereignty; 
(f) the U.S. government would not put pressure on Taiwan 
to draw it to the negotiation table.40 
Obviously, the United States and the PRC interpreted the three 
communiques differently. The PRC emphasized them as a framework 
for a PRC-U.S. relationship. The PRC also interpreted each to say 
that Taiwan was a part of the PRC and that the PRC could integrate 
Taiwan whenever the United States would reduce its arms sales to 
Taiwan.41 The United States interpreted the communiques as a reaffir-
mation of its position for a peaceful settlement without U.S. media-
tion, but not necessarily a recommendation for peace talks. The 
United States did, however, subsequently begin a reduction in arms 
sales to Taiwan. 
The different interpretations of the communiques explain why the 
PRC and the ROC have argued about these issues. They also reveal 
why the People's Daily and the Central Daily News have shown high 
frequencies in reporting on the five themes on Factor IV. 
Thematic category #24 "The Diplomatic Relationship with the 
United States," reflected the beginning of the breakthrough in U.S. 
38. The Washington Post, May 1, 1984. 
39. The Washington Post. April 29, 1984. 
40. United Daily News (Taipei), April 27, 1984, and Po-tang Yeh, "An Analysis of 
Reagan's Visit to Mainland China," in Issues & Studies (July 1984), Vol. XX, No.7, p. 75. 
41. Ibid. 
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China policy and a PRC peace proposal for integration to the ROC. 
This theme deserves a detailed description. 
A breakthrough was found possible with the willingness of the 
PRC and the United States to make concessions on issues that had 
been disputed by the two sides for 30 years. Each side claimed that 
the other had made the greater sacrifice.42 For its part, the United 
States agreed to three conditions that the PRC had long insisted on: 
(a) ending recognition of the ROC on Taiwan; (b) terminating the 
U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty; (c) withdrawing the remaining U.S. 
troops on Taiwan.43 
The PRC also agreed to three conditions: (a) not to oppose con-
tinued American arms sales to the ROC, (b) to agree that the United 
States could terminate its defense treaty with the ROC with one year's 
notice, rather than immediately, and (c) not to object to an American 
declaration of continued interest in the future of Taiwan.44 
American conservative critics have argued that the United States 
essentially gave in to Peking's demands. The PRC's concessions, they 
said, were merely rhetorical. But high-level officials of the Carter ad-
ministration concluded that the United States had won essential points 
that would ensure Taiwan's independence from the PRC in the fore-
seeable future. 45 Both newspapers contributed a significant amount of 
reporting on establishment of relations between the PRC and the 
United States in December 1978. The People's Daily showed 43 fre-
quencies in that month, the Central Daily News, 112. 
Although eventual normalization of relations between Washing-
ton and Peking had been taken for granted since President Nixon's 
trip to the PRC in February 1972, the sudden announcement caught 
most of the world, particularly the ROC, by surprise.46 Among those 
most surprised were some conservative members of Congress. Many 
of them had thought Carter had promised to consult with them before 
changing the status of the Taiwan treaty.47 Many liberals, however, 
were enthusiastic about Carter's announcement; however, members of 
Congress of all political persuasions were upset because Carter had 
acted so secretly, with little advance warning, with no congressional 
42. "The Reopening of China," in China: U.S. Policy Since 1945 (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1980), p. 12. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Ibid. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Ibid., p. 13. 
47. Ibid. 
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consultation.48 Even the harshest critics, however, did concede that 
Carter had the legal authority to switch diplomatic recognition from 
the ROC to the PRC.49 
The People's Daily and the Central Daily News reported consider-
ably about the anger on Capitol Hill. The People's Daily, of course, 
condemned it, the Central Daily News welcomed it. The Central Daily 
News used a tremendous amount of space and frequency in reporting a 
suit filed by a group of congressmen led by Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-
Ariz., to have the abolition of the Taiwan defense treaty declared ille-
gal because Carter had not consulted Congress. The courts upheld the 
president's action. 
After Carter's announcement, the Central Daily News focused 
most of its attention on whether the ROC had obtained assurances 
from the United States for the future security of Taiwan. The paper 
charged that Carter's action left the ROC vulnerable to an invasion 
from the PRC and to forceful integration, or to a boycott or blockade, 
at least. Many supporters of normalization in Congress also said they 
were concerned about the future safety of Taiwan. 5° Carter adminis-
tration officials did not alleviate fears for Taiwan's security. They 
flatly that denied they had ever attempted to pressure the PRC into 
making a commitment on Taiwan's future. 5 1 In a statement accompa-
nying the communique, however, Carter did say: "[The United States] 
will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Tai-
wan issue."52 Referring to that phrase, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
said: "We have expressed very clearly our deep concern that the wel-
fare of the people of Taiwan be protected, and that the transition be a 
peaceful transition, that the Taiwan solution be a peaceful solution. 
This has not been contradicted by the People's Republic of China."53 
On the one hand, the United States is still at loggerheads with the 
PRC on the issue of China's national integration. On the other hand, 
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue has been its consistent 
policy.54 
The United States has shown a reduced interest in the strategic 
importance of Taiwan and demonstrated an increased interest in that 
of the PRC. The Central Daily News has continued to emphasize its 
48. Ibid. 
49. Ibid. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid. 
52. Ibid. 
53. Ibid. 
54. Downen, To Bridge the Taiwan Strait, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 
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country's strategic role while the People's Daily has promoted the 
change in U. S. attitude. Still, the United States has not changed its 
policy regarding a peaceful settlement of the integration issue. 
5. Factor V: U.S. Protecting-Taiwan Policy 
Factor V with loadings of thematic categories #26 "U.S. arms 
Sales" and #25 "U.S. Taiwan Relations Act" also supported Hypoth-
esis IV in its prediction of Factor V as a "U.S.-China Policy" factor. 
It did, however, emphasize a particular aspect of U.S. policy on Tai-
wan, making it appropriate to name Factor V, "U.S. Protecting-Tai-
wan Policy" factor. This emphasis shows an acceptance by the PRC 
in allowing continued American arms sales to Taiwan. Even during 
the Carter administration, Secretary of State Vance and other officials 
repeatedly said the strongest assurance for the safety of Taiwan was 
the "reality" of the military situation in east Asia. "It simply does not 
make sense," Vance said, "for the People's Republic of China to do 
anything other than proceed in a peaceful fashion." 55 
President Carter said that the PRC "did not have the capability" 
of launching a successful invasion of Taiwan, 100 miles off the main-
land and "heavily fortified and heavily armed." One official said the 
PRC would have to commit almost its entire armed forces to such an 
invasion, and that would mean withdrawing troops from the Russian 
front, which was the PRC's greatest security concern. 56 
Officials said, however, that a PRC naval blockade of Taiwan 
might be successful. Taiwan did not have an adequate capability to 
ward off the large mainland Chinese submarine fleet. Because Taiwan 
depends on imports for most of its food, oil and raw materials, a pro-
longed blockade could seriously damage its economy. The main con-
cern, however, for the United States to continue arms sales to the 
ROC was to protect it from the PRC's efforts to force negotiations or 
integration. 57 
The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, loaded in Factor V, now gov-
erns U.S. unofficial relations with the ROC. It protects the island 
from the PRC's military threats to integrate it by force. 
The House and Senate agreed that "the United States' decision to 
establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation 
that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means," and 
that the United States would consider "any effort to determine the 
55. "The Reopening of China," op. cit., p. 13. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid. 
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future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts 
or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific 
area and of grave concern to the United States."58 
The most distinguishing policies of the Taiwan Relations Act 
were the preservation of Taiwan's ability peacefully to determine its 
own future and the assurance of its social, political, and economic sys-
tems through continued U.S. unofficial interaction. 59 
This policy statement by the U.S. Congress pledged the continua-
tion of U.S. defensive weapons sales and defensive services to the ROC 
along with continued commercial exchanges; it offered other means of 
cooperation for the indefinite future, and also added a new dimension: 
a commitment in support of "the preservation and enhancement of the 
human rights of all the people of Taiwan" as "objectives of the United 
States." No formal U.S. commitment of equal visibility and force has 
yet been made with respect to human rights in the PRC. 60 
According to the People's Daily, the continuing sale of U.S. de-
fense weapons to the ROC and the Taiwan Relations Act, which au-
thorized those sales, are the major barriers to China's national 
integration. Both the act itself and the arms sales are interpreted by 
the paper as blatant U.S. "intervention in China's internal affairs," 
which impede both China's national integration and future progress in 
U.S.-PRC relations. By "intervening" in this fashion, the People's 
Daily maintains, the United States violates the 1978 Normalization 
Joint Communique.61 
The most fundamental issue that remains unresolved in view of 
the People's Daily is the authority of the Taiwan Relations Act. Con-
tinuing to argue that the act is illegitimate, the paper writes: "The 
'Taiwan Relations Act' seriously contravenes the principles embodied 
in the [1978] joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between [Washington and Peking]."62 The People's Daily on 
July 4, 1981, attacked the Taiwan Relations Act because it "ob-
structed" Taiwan's unification with the mainland; "as a result, China 
may be forced to resort to non-peaceful methods to settle the Taiwan 
problem." The United States, however, has reiterated that the act is 
"the law of the land" and has stipulated that in case of any conflict 
between the act and the joint communique, the law "clearly will take 
preference." 
58. Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8). enacted April 10, 1979. 
59. Ibid. 
60. Ibid. 
61. People's Daily, May 4, 1983. 
62. Ibid., January 12, 1984. 
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Peking and Washington were negotiating the establishment of 
diplomatic relations in 1978. The U.S. government asked the PRC to 
use peaceful means to solve the Taiwan issue. The PRC promised it 
would. On a visit to Washington on January 29, 1979, PRC Vice Pre-
mier Deng said that his country would not use arms against Taiwan in 
the next five years. In his talks with Reagan in Peking in April 1984, 
Deng said that both sides of the Taiwan Strait "could gradually in-
crease their contacts and achieve peaceful reunification through 
negotiations." 
Interviewed by newsmen after his talks with Deng, Reagan said 
the Taiwan issue should be settled by people on both sides of the strait 
and that the United States should not serve as an intermediary. Presi-
dent Reagan had also expressed his attitude in an interview with PRC 
reporters at the White House before his visit to Peking. On April 18, 
1984, the People's Daily reported it: 
I realize that there is a difference there and it has been dis-
cussed. On a recent visit [by PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang] 
here, this was one of the subjects of discussion. I think our 
position is pretty well-known to the leaders of the People's 
Republic of China, that we have a long and historic friend-
ship with the Chinese people on Taiwan; we are not going to 
tum our back on old friends in order to strengthen or make 
new friends. 
A firm and consistent U.S. policy on Taiwan has made the Tai-
wan Relations Act and arms sales to Taiwan effective. Factor V of 
"U.S. Protecting-Taiwan Policy" has been one of the important issues 
on which the People's Daily and the Central Daily News have not 
agreed in their reporting. 
CHAPTER V 
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the beginning it was postulated that the concept of China's 
national integration reported by the two Chinese party newspapers is a 
multidimensional phenomenon. Through factor analysis, five factors 
were established; each accounted for most of the variation in China's 
national integration; each represented an important element in the 
views that the two newspapers express on China's national integration; 
each showed similarities and differences in the view of the two newspa-
pers or parties; and each could be used as a basis in evaluating the 
implications of the research. Below, eight conclusions or assessments 
are drawn, and two overall conclusions from this study on China's 
national integration. 
1. The Problem of China's national integration has been and 
will remain a multidimensional phenomenon for a 
considerable time before it can be solved. 
Both newspaper or parties have recognized China's national inte-
gration as a multidimensional phenomenon; no single factor or a single 
leader can achieve integration. The study reveals how complex the 
process of integration is. Notwithstanding the media's tendency to 
oversimplify, the political unification of the mainland and Taiwan re-
mains elusive and unresolved, within the foreseeable future. Realisti-
cally, it almost certainly will not occur until a major transformation 
occurs in the mutual understanding between the two sides, and the 
understanding of the political leadership or elites of one or both sides. 
The inherent complexity of integration also affects the timing and 
strategies of both PRC and ROC reunification plans. The two have 
followed different timetables; how long the integration process should 
take is not the same for both Chinas. In the late 1970s, PRC vice pre-
mier Deng Xiaoping was reported to have said that the PRC could 
wait five or one hundred years for integration to be completed; how-
ever, by 1980, he listed integration as one of the three major national 
objectives of the next decade. 1 
In contrast, the ROC's position has been unchanging in its es-
sence, "Reunification but not now." It is doubtful that the ROC lead-
1. Hsi-sheng Chi, "An Agenda for China: Through the Year 2,000," paper presented 
at the Association of Asian Studies Convention, San Francisco, California, March 25-27, 
1983, p. 1. 
(109) 
110 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
ership has ever set a timetable for itself, being inclined to look at 
reunification as a distant objective. In the summer of 1982, ROC Pre-
mier Sun Yun-suan said that his government hoped the obstacles to 
reunification would be reduced with the passage of time to allow the 
political, economic, social and cultural gaps between the two sides to 
narrow gradually.2 
The reasons for these sharply different timetables are not difficult 
to understand. For the PRC, the separate existence of the ROC on 
Taiwan has served as a constant reminder of its unfinished revolution. 
The surviving members of the first generation of the communist 
revolution know that time is running out for them. They strongly de-
sire to see the revolution completed before dying. Adding to this sense 
of urgency is a belief that the current ROC government under Presi-
dent Chiang Ching-kuo represents the last tenuous emotional link be-
tween the two peoples. Those who were born after 1950 will likely feel 
much less attachment to the mainland. PRC leaders are concerned 
that it will become more difficult to appeal on a patriotic or sentimen-
tal level to future leaders. 3 In contrast, the ROC believes it can put off 
the issue of reunification. The ROC can still maintain a large military 
for its own defense, will sustaining a high rate of economic growth.4 
Unless the ROC leadership is confronted with some extraordinary cri-
sis or is offered extremely attractive benefits, reunification will be given 
a low priority, perhaps left off the political agenda for many years to 
come. The present state of multidimensional factors in China's na-
tional integration and their state in the coexistence between the PRC 
and the ROC may continue for a long time even if not entirely 
satisfactory. 
2. As long as a consensus on one-China nationalism as the 
basis for future integration exists between the PRC 
and the ROC, there is a possibility of 
eventual integration. 
Both newspapers have used nationalism as the common ground 
for their stands on integration since 1945; nevertheless, world history 
has demonstrated that nationalism by itself has seldom been sufficient 
enough to reintegrate divided nations. One-China nationalism could 
be reinforced if the two parties realized that China's national integra-
tion is a multidimensional phenomenon. 
2. Ibid., p. 2. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p. 3. 
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As revealed in the People's Daily and the Central Daily News, the 
PRC has promoted consensus on one-China nationalism more than 
the ROC. One-China nationalism has been advocated by the PRC 
largely in the form of peace proposals. 
The PRC has relied heavily on exploiting interpersonal relation-
ships between prominent figures on both sides, hoping to elicit a more 
favorable emotional response to the call for peaceful integration. A 
small group of people on the mainland, mostly ROC military and ci-
vilian defectors, relatives of ROC government officials in Taiwan, or 
leaders or pre-1949 democratic parties, has been used to make recur-
rent public appeals to ROC leaders to return to the motherland. 
Other peace proposals by the PRC have relied heavily on the one-
China nationalism factor. The most-used peace proposal was the nine-
point proposal. These proposals have been pursued with great tenac-
ity. The PRC leaders must be genuinely convinced of their effective-
ness. Indeed, they have occasionally expressed puzzlement and 
indignation at the ROC government's continual rejection of what they 
consider generous offers. These strategies, however, have been seri-
ously out of touch with current realities. If the Nationalists think they 
have learned any lesson from history, it is never to be trapped a third 
time. Had the PRC recognized this attitude of the Nationalists, its 
leaders might not have been surprised by the scorn and contempt that 
with which the ROC has opposed its peace proposals. Though PRC 
peace proposals based on one-China nationalism have been fully re-
jected by the ROC, both sides have maintained and have used a one-
China nationalism consensus for eventual integration. As long as this 
consensus exists, so does hope for integration. 
3. Due to fundamental ideological differences, there is no 
consensus on any integrative method or model 
between the two newspapers or parties, 
making the realization of integration 
indefinite. 
Study results suggest that the PRC and the ROC have not agreed 
on any integrative method or model because of fundamental ideologi-
cal differences. Because of these differences, no schedule can be deter-
mined for China's national integration. At least two reservations can 
be raised about the feasibility of the integrative methods or models 
that have been proposed by either side. The first reservation equalizes 
those methods or models to a renunciation of war by the PRC. Since 
the 1950s, the PRC has rejected similar demands brought up by the 
U.S. government. Taiwan is China's internal problem, and the PRC 
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would neither allow foreign interference nor give up the possible use of 
force in response to a foreign demand. The PRC regards China's na-
tional integration as an entirely different matter, however, in the form 
of an internally initiated mutual relaxation of relations with the ROC. 5 
A second reservation, the process of peaceful integration, could occur 
only if military pressure is removed. The ROC has lived under the 
shadow of a PRC attack for 35 years, preventing it from softening its 
attitude toward the PRC. If military pressure from the PRC were 
stepped up, and if the ROC were to become even more isolated inter-
nationally, ROC leaders might view independence as a lesser evil than 
total surrender to the PRC.6 From the PRC's point of view, indepen-
dence would be worse than the current situation. It might leave the 
PRC feeling it had no alternative but to resort to war. 
By and large, these two reservations would be far outweighed by 
the positive gains that the two parties could realize from peaceful 
reunification. Only by removing the threat of war could there exist an 
atmosphere favorable to conducting serious discussions on eventual in-
tegration. Each side might also become more receptive to internal de-
mands for political reform if there were no fear that such reforms 
would be exploited by the other side to destabilize its government. 7 
The PRC's peace negotiations cannot be conducted in a spirit of 
good will if one side still expressly reserves the right to use force 
against the other. The ROC's suspicion that the PRC merely uses 
these proposals as an attempt to wear down its vigilance is understand-
able. Would the PRC proposals be better received if they presented an 
intention to implement the least threatening measures first? The PRC 
has argued that once the "One Nation, Two Systems," "Nine-Point," 
and "Three-Link, Four-Exchange" peace proposals are accepted, the 
details can be worked out later. From the ROC's view, expressed in 
the Central Daily News, it is most dangerous to accept the proposals 
without the power to control the course of subsequent developments; 
however, the PRC is certain to continue to press to accelerate its pub-
licity campaign of direct negotiations with leaders of the ROC. 
The ROC is likely to continue to reject talks and proposals made 
solely on the PRC's terms. Virtually every PRC overture has involved 
a fundamental concession of principle on the ROC's part. The most 
dramatic gestures, involving retention of economic, social, and mili-
tary privileges for the island, assume the ROC's submission to the 
5. Ibid., p. 12. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid., p. 13. 
CHINA REUNIFICATION ISSUE 113 
PRC's authority and control. The lesser offers, suggesting immediate 
trade, mail, and tourist contacts, have been closely tied to the initia-
tion of talks. In both cases, the basic precondition has been accept-
ance of the mainland's political dominance; therefore, the reaction of 
the ROC in the Central Daily News remained disinterest. The Central 
Daily News appears to be in no hurry for the ROC to enter the PRC's 
political embrace for vague assurances of continuity of conditions the 
ROC already enjoys. The paper sees the ROC as being placed in a 
subordinate position from the outset, as being a local province ac-
cepting the motherland's offer to sit down to talks on repatriation. 
With these attitudes, the PRC and the ROC will likely retain separate 
identities and make no progress toward integration. 
4. The common rejection of the disintegrative model of the 
"Taiwan Independence Movement" has been a unique 
consensus between the two newspapers or parties. 
This model of thematic category #46 did not have any loadings 
to become one of the factors because of its uniqueness in being rejected 
by both sides. 
Though unable to agree on any particular integrative method or 
model, the People's Daily and the Central Daily News have both stuck 
to one-China nationalism and rejected the disintegrative model of the 
"Taiwan Independence Movement" (TIM), the People's Daily showing 
11 reporting frequencies in rejecting the model of an independent Tai-
wan, the Central Daily News, 371. This suggests that the Central 
Daily News felt more directly threatened by the TIM than the People's 
Daily. 
The TIM constitutes another sort of opposition to the ROC gov-
ernment besides the PRC. It has not been very active in Taiwan since 
the United States recognized the PRC in January 1979 and acknowl-
edged that Taiwan was a part of China. 8 
The TIM was organized in Japan in 1947, with main centers of 
activity in the United States and Japan, where there are sizeable num-
bers of Taiwanese-Chinese with foreign citizenship. The organization 
has been active in both countries for some time; it advocates a Taiwan 
ruled by Taiwanese-Chinese and the overthrow of the ROC govern-
ment by force, if necessary. Some would also expel mainlander-Chi-
nese from the island. During the 1960s, the movement received 
8. John F. Copper, "Political Development in Taiwan," in Chiu, ed., China and the 
Taiwan Issue, op. cit., p. 64, and John F. Copper, "The Taiwan Independence Movement 
Factor," in Chen, ed., China Policy and National Security, op. cit., pp. 81-90. 
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considerable publicity when the United States and Japan seemed to be 
moving toward a two-China policy. At this time, it also allegedly re-
ceived support from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in Japan and 
the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States. The TIM, how-
ever, declined in importance in the 1970s. The movement suffered a 
major setback when President Nixon signed the Shanghai Communi-
que in 1972, which said that there was only one China. It had been 
assumed that the United States was moving toward a two-China pol-
icy, one China and one Taiwan. Soon after this, Japan recognized the 
PRC and severed official relations with the ROC. Members of the 
ruling party in Japan as well as businessmen became cautious about 
their support of the TIM.9 The TIM is still active in the United States, 
though without any public support from the U.S. government or from 
the majority of the people in Taiwan. 10 
Six incidents in the last 17 years have given the movement 
notoriety: 
(1) In 1968, Professor Ming-min Peng, a TIM member, secretly 
fled from Taiwan to the United States through Sweden after he had 
been released from prison in the ROC and was under surveillance. 11 
(2) On April 24, 1970, two TIM members attempted to assassi-
nate then ROC Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo in New York. The 
assassins were Taiwan-born graduates of National Chengchi Univer-
sity in Taipei. The university was a former cadres-training school for 
the Nationalist Party. 12 
(3) On October 10, 1976, a TIM member attempted to assassi-
nate the governor of Taiwan, Hsieh Tung-ming, in Taipei. Hsieh lost 
his left arm to a letter bomb. 13 
( 4) TIM members were responsible for a series of bombings of 
ROC offices and airline counters in Washington, D.C., New York and 
Los Angeles in August and December 1979, and January, April and 
September 1980. The bombings led to the California announcement in 
1981 that TIM members were international terrorists. 14 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid., and Ming-min Peng, "President Reagan and Taiwan," in Tien, ed., Mainland 
China, Taiwan, and U.S. Policy, op. cit., pp. 233-237. 
12. Copper, "Political Development in Taiwan," op. cit., p. 64, and Copper, "The Tai-
wan Independence Movement Factor," op. cit., p. 84. 
13. "Announcement of Taiwan Headquarters, World United Formosans for Indepen-
dence," Tai-tu Journal, No. 57, November 28, 1976. 
14. Heng-shi Ho, "An Analysis of the Taiwan Independence Movement," in United 
Monthly, No. 21, April, 1983, pp. 51-52. 
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(5) On December 10, 1979, TIM members and sympathizers 
were involved in a violent riot in the industrial city of Kaohsiung in 
southern Taiwan. The clash between rioters and authorities caused 
183 military and civilian policemen to be injured. More than 30 riot-
ers and the staff of the Formosa Magazine, which organized the riot, 
were jailed. Later, some of the rioters and some of the initiators of the 
1977 ballot dispute riot in Chungli, a small town in northern Taiwan, 
joined the movement in the United States. 15 
(6) On July 3, 1981, a Taiwan-born Chinese-American professor, 
Wen-cheng Chen, died in Taipei after being questioned at ROC mili-
tary security headquarters for activities sympathetic to the TIM in the 
United States. The headquarters announced that Chen's fall from a 
university-campus building was a suicide. This caused an uproar and a 
U.S. congressional threat to cut off arms sales to the ROC. 16 
The Central Daily News has consistently reported on the move-
ment in condemnation. The People's Daily has also reported unfavora-
bly on TIM, except in the cases of the Kaohsiung riot and Cheng's 
death. The paper labeled the rioters as patriotic democrats fighting 
against the ROC, and fighting for reunification with the PRC. 17 The 
paper also charged the ROC with political murder in Chen's death. 18 
In general, the two newspapers or parties have commonly re-
jected the TIM for its perception of opposition to "One Unified China 
with the Mainland and Taiwan" and its disintegrative model of "a new 
and independent Taiwan." 19 
5. The PRC integrative model of "National Regional 
Autonomy, Tibet" has been a uniquely disputed 
model between the two newspapers or parties. 
This model of thematic category # 35 did not meet any loadings 
to become one of the factors. This is due to its uniqueness as a model 
of "national regional autonomy," a model that the PRC offered and 
the ROC rejected. The People's Daily showed 38 reporting frequencies 
on this theme, the Central Daily News, 200. The model was first of-
15. A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, "The Political Culture of the Republic of 
China," in The Republic of China and U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public 
Policy Center, 1983), pp. 72-73, and Dan C. Sanford, The Future Association of Taiwan 
with the People's Republic of China (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1981), 
p. 62. 
16. The Washington Post, January 24, 1985. 
17. People's Daily, January 28, 1980. 
18. Ibid., August 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 11 and 13, 1981. 
19. People's Daily, April 9, 1984, and Central Daily News, December 13, 1983. 
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fered to the ROC by the PRC in the 1981 nine-point peace proposal, 
without mentioning the name of Tibet. Point #3 said, "After the 
country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a 
special administrative region and it can retain its armed forces. The 
Central Government will not interfere with local affairs on Taiwan."20 
It was the same offer that the PRC had given to Tibet in an agreement 
on May 23, 1951. Article # 3 of that agreement said, "The Tibetan 
people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under 
the unified leadership of the Central People's government."21 
The day after the PRC's nine-point proposal was issued on Sep-
tember 30, 1981, and reported in the People's Daily, a three-member 
delegation of Tibetan exiles in India sent by the Dalai Lama requested 
that the PRC accord Tibet the same treatment as the proposal offered 
to the ROC. The request was rejected by the PRC: "Tibet has been 
liberated for more than three decades. . . the nine-point principle, 
therefore, is not applicable." The experiences of the Tibetan people 
have affected the ROC's attitudes toward the PRC's "Tibet Model." 
In 1953, the PRC said in an agreement with Tibet that it would not 
alter "the existing political system in Tibet," or "the established status, 
functions, and powers of the Dalai Lama." The agreement also said, 
"Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual."22 In 1959, the 
PRC took Tibet by force, killing thousands and driving large numbers 
of refugees into India, dissolving the Tibetan government under the 
Dalai Lama. 23 
The Central Daily News on December 14, 1982, responded to the 
PRC's "Tibet Model" with an article entitled "Trilogy of the Fall of 
Tibet by a Taiwan author, Peng-hsiao Huang." The article said: 
As soon as Peking completed its military occupation of Ti-
bet, it forgot completely the promises it had made to the 
Tibetans and started tightening its iron-fisted rule. 
Finally in 1954, the Chinese Communist authorities dis-
banded the Tibetan armed forces and appointed puppets to 
high positions while the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama 
were in Peking attending the First National People's 
Congress. 
20. People's Daily, October 1, 1981. 
21. The Agreement of the Central's People's Government and the Local Government 
of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, signed in Peking, May 23, 1951. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Chiu, "Prospects for the Unification of China," op. cit., p. 1084; The Question of 
Tibet and the Rule of Law (Geneva, 1959), and Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic 
(Geneva, 1960), the International Commission of Jurists. 
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By the time the Tibetan leaders returned to their home-
land they had become virtual prisoners in their own fief. 
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On December 17, 1982, the Central Daily News reported a speech 
made by ROC President Chiang. Chiang used Peng's article to call on 
the people of Taiwan to regard events in Tibet as a lesson for the ROC. 
Responding to the ROC's concern, the PRC published three long arti-
cles explaining the situation in Tibet. The conclusion of the second 
article said: 
Following more than 30 years of liberation, Xizang (Tibet) 
has accomplished its democratic and socialist reforms and 
abolished the serf system. Under the direct leadership of the 
central people's government, Xizang practices national au-
tonomy, the people will never allow the wheels of history to 
be turned back. That is why earlier this year, when the Dalai 
Lama said the Xizang autonomous region must also be al-
lowed to enjoy autonomous right like those of Taiwan, which 
will become a special administrative region after its return to 
the motherland, the Chinese Communist Party flatly refused. 
This is understandable and it meets with the people's 
approval. 24 
Provisions for the PRC's "special administrative region" model 
are outlined in Article 31 of the PRC Constitution, adopted on De-
cember 1982. It provides: "The state may establish a special adminis-
trative region when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special 
administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the Na-
tional People's Congress in light of the specific conditions."25 
PRC leaders made it clear that this article was enacted for the 
purpose of unifying Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. 
The ROC rejected the proposal to establish Taiwan as a "special 
administrative region" in January 1983: 
Article 31 of Communist China's Constitution is the base 
melody in the Communists' orchestration to solve the "Tai-
wan problem," i.e., destroy the ROC and establish Commu-
nist China's "sovereignty" over Taiwan. What deserves 
special notice is this: the "special administrative regions" are 
to be established "when necessary" and when the necessity is 
24. "Commentary by Chen Guoshao: 'The Trilogy that Fishes in Muddied Waters,'" 
Beijing Zhongguo Cinwen She (Beijing China News Agency) (in Chinese), January 7, 1983, 
in FB/S, China, January 21, 1983, p. U4. 
25. Chiu, "Prospects for the Unification of China," op. cit., p. 1086. 
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no longer operative, they may be abolished. The entire sys-
tem to be practiced there will be "stipulated by law" by the 
Chinese Communists. In due course it may be revised or 
eliminated "by law." The strategy employed here is one of 
absolutely gradual, step-by-step encroachment. The ambi-
tion and the cunning that lie behind it need no comment. 26 
The PRC's Tibet model or its advanced model of a "Special Ad-
ministrative Region" model for Taiwan did not receive any favorable 
responses from the ROC. 
6. The People's Daily has been more initiating, more on the 
offensive, more flexible and more dramatic in offering 
integrative methods and models. The Central Daily News 
has been more responsive, more defensive, more consistent, 
more determined and more resistant with regard to such 
methods and models. This is a sign that the two newspapers 
lack mutual understanding in reporting about the other side. 
In this study, the Central Daily News showed three times more 
frequencies than the People's Daily in reporting on China's national 
integration. The Central Daily News tried to inform its domestic read-
ers of the party's line on the issue of integration, tried to persuade 
them to support it. The People's Daily tried to transmit party 
messages on integration via overseas and foreign media, aiming at 
overseas Chinese, foreign readers, governments, and the people and 
the ROC government on Taiwan. 
The People's Daily has offered more integrative methods or mod-
els than the Central Daily News. It has more often been the one to 
initiate any methods or models, and has done so by using a dramatic 
approach. By being the initiator, it has also been able to assume an 
apparently more flexible attitude. 
In comparison, the Central Daily News is defensive. It has as-
sumed the role of responding to the PRC's initiations of integrative 
methods or models, while its responses have been consistently resistant 
and determined. 
The newspapers have shown a lack of mutual trust and under-
standing in reporting about the other side. Both newspapers have re-
ported much more unfavorably than neutrally or favorably. At this 
time, formal agreements or contacts between the two sides should 
probably be avoided because the trust and mutual understanding nee-
26. ICM Staff Writer, "Some Key Points in the New Constitution," Inside China 
Mainland (Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies, January 1983), Supplement, p. 2. 
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essary to sustain them are still absent. The two newspapers must build 
mutual trust and understanding and must report on the other side 
more objectively if integration is indeed their common goal. 
National integration will likely be a gradual process involving the 
reduction of mutual animosity and an accompanying increase in 
confidence. 
A number of tension-reducing attempts or an increase in neutral 
reports about the other side in the two newspapers could be seen as an 
attempt to reduce tensions. It is important to maintain the momen-
tum of these changes in reporting and to continue to expand neutral 
and objective reporting about the other side in all areas. This method 
of reducing tensions and building mutual understanding could have a 
strong appeal to the readers and to the people of both sides. As mu-
tual trust, understanding and confidence are restored, attention can be 
directed more rationally to exploring integrative methods and models, 
which could also help to end the no-war, no-peace standoff between 
the two sides. 
7. The economic factor could be a function of "spill-over" into 
political integration. Indirect trade between the two sides 
through Hong Kong continues to grow and could develop 
into an interdependence between them. The recent reforms 
of the PRC's economic system, which is moving closer, 
though very slowly, to the ROC's economic system, however, 
provides an even greater possibility of future economic 
interdependence. 
A transformation of the PRC-ROC relationship is not only sub-
ject to the attitudes and intentions of both parties, but also to condi-
tions beyond the control of either.27 This study suggests that 
economic interdependence between the PRC and the ROC is growing 
and might be developing into political integration. The magnitude of 
the ROC's international economic involvement and the PRC's 
planned interdependence with key trading partners of the ROC could 
prove instrumental in building mutual understanding; however, eco-
nomic interdependence could also lead to greater misunderstanding 
and conflict. Economic interdependence can create a monster--eco-
nomic boycott. 
One PRC option in the event it fails in its reunification campaign 
might be to seek the collapse of the ROC's economy by pressuring 
foreign businessmen to withdraw support from the ROC. Threats 
27. Sanford, op. cit., p. 79. 
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themselves might create enough insecurity to frighten investors away. 
The PRC could also dump goods on the world market, similar or iden-
tical to those produced in Taiwan, but cheaper. This would reduce the 
ROC's export revenues.28 No such threat on the part of the PRC has 
been reported nor does the PRC shows any intention now of using 
such a tool to achieve its national goal of integration; furthermore, and 
more importantly, it probably does not have the capability, either now 
or in the near future. The PRC's recently scaled-down economic goals 
and revised purchase plans make it a less significant consumer of for-
eign products than was originally expected. The PRC's leverage on 
Western businessmen would be minimal, particularly as a hostile act 
toward the ROC. 29 
At this point, it appears that the PRC needs foreign companies 
more than foreigners need PRC business. The PRC has shown amaz-
ing support of the ROC's economic arrangements. It has not discour-
aged the dual operations of its trading partners.30 The PRC, however, 
does not need trade links with the ROC equal to those it has with 
Hong Kong. The ROC does not represent a crucial window for PRC 
products to move West nor is it a source from which the PRC is likely 
to build important currency reserves. 31 
Indirect trade or economic interdependence between the PRC 
and the ROC has not yet reached the "spill-over" level. Attentive to 
its growth and development, the current trends in trade have appar-
ently created a new PRC aspect for the ROC. It has also led to a 
hesitant interest in the ROC for separating economics from politics in 
foreign policy toward Communist areas. The continuation of this 
trend could lead to future peaceful associations with the PRC. 32 
Thirty-five years ago, two radically different economic philosophies 
were inherited by people of the same ethnic group. Since then, two 
very different economic situations have developed. 
In 1952, on the eve of the First Five-Year Plan in the PRC and 
the First Four-Year Plan in the ROC, the per capita incomes in the 
two countries were quite close--$46 in the PRC, and $50 in the 
ROC.33 By 1984, the PRC's per capita income had reached $295, 
28. Ibid., p. 81. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Ibid., p. 82. 
33. Yuan-li Wu, "The Taiwan Experience in Economic Development," in James C. 
Hsiung, ed., The Taiwan Experience (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 119; and Chu-yuan 
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while the ROC's had soared to $2,500.34 
The widening gap between the two economies and their different 
economic systems has begun to attract worldwide attention, especially 
regarding a future economic interdependence. These economic differ-
ences were reflected in the reports of the two newspapers in thematic 
category #49 "Advocacy of its Own Economic System." The Peo-
ple's Daily showed 63 reporting frequencies on this theme, the Central 
Daily News, 386. The Central Daily News showed a frequency five 
times higher than the People's Daily in advocating its own economic 
system. 
In light of this attention and the important role that economic 
realities might play in China's national integration, it is relevant to this 
study to provide a brief discussion of the different economic strategies 
that the two Chinese governments have pursued. 
(1) The PRC's Economic System 
The PRC followed the Marxian-Leninist doctrine of nationalizing 
land and all means of production, the entire economy being guided by 
a national plan. 35 Planning authority is concentrated at the top. All 
input and output targets for individual enterprises are decided by cen-
tral planners and are passed down through various levels of adminis-
tration. 36 In commerce, the government trading agencies purchase 
and distribute key commodities, including all capital goods and all ne-
cessities. The government monopolizes foreign trade, setting all impor-
tant prices. Workers are hired by state labor bureaus and assigned to 
factories and firms where they are paid wages set by the government. 37 
Many of Mao's economic policies, such as the Great Leap For-
ward, the People's Commune, "Agriculture learning from Tachai," 
etc. were against traditionally accepted economic laws. 38 Many see 
them as causing great losses to the national economy. Unbalanced de-
velopment strategy hampered the growth of agriculture and restricted 
the consumer goods industries. The expansion of the steel and defense 
industries has drained investment and materials from other basic in-
dustries-notably electricity, coal and transportation.39 
Cheng, "Economic Development in Taiwan and Mainland China: A Comparison of Strate-
gies and Performance," in Asian Affairs (Spring 1983), p. 60. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Cheng, ibid., p. 76. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Ibid., p. 77. 
39. Ibid., p. 78. 
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A high rate of capital formation resulted in only a moderate rate 
of economic growth and an extremely low level of per capita GNP. In 
1983, per capita GNP in the PRC was $250, about one-eleventh that 
of the ROC.40 It is against this background that large-scale reform 
programs have been undertaken in the past five years. One major re-
form has granted greater decision-making power to local governments 
and individual enterprises; another promoted management efficiency 
by introducing a new system to 100 industrial and transportation en-
terprises in Sichuan before being extended to 6,600 major enterprises 
throughout the country. These enterprises account for 60 percent of 
all production and 70 percent of all profits in the industrial sector. 
Under the new system, the enterprises have the right to design their 
own production plans and to retain up to 5 percent of planned profits 
and 20 percent of extra profits after state quotas are fulfilled. The en-
terprises are also allowed to control their own profits and their foreign 
exchange earnings. The right to retain profits is considered the heart 
of the reforms because it acts as material incentive to the enterprise 
manager to increase productivity.41 
In the rural areas, the most significant reform was to establish a 
system of contracting production with individual households. While 
the land is still collectively owned, plots of land are now contracted to 
individual farm households for cultivation. The households are obli-
gated to produce a certain amount which goes to the production team 
to be sold to the state. After fulfilling the contracted amount, the 
households may keep the rest of their production, for their own con-
sumption or for their trade at a market. With the introduction of the 
new system, rural free markets have expanded and private plots cut or 
banned during the Cultural Revolution have expanded. In some areas, 
private plots have increased from 6 percent to 15 percent of total culti-
vated land. Apparently, the new PRC leadership now assumes that 
the key to agricultural development is the promotion of material 
incentives. 42 
The strategy of economic development has also been drastically 
revised. First, there was a change in investment priorities. The share 
of capital investment for agriculture was raised from 10.7 percent in 
1978 to 18 percent in 1980. The shares of investment for textile, elec-
tronics and light industries rose from 10.1 percent in 1978 to 17.9 in 
1982. The advantage annual growth rate for light industries since 1978 
40. Ibid., and People's Daily, April 30, 1983. 
41. Cheng, op. cit., p. 79. 
42. Ibid., pp. 79-80. 
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is 11.8 percent, for heavy industry it dropped to 3.4 percent. The ratio 
between light industries and heavy industries changed from 42.7 per-
cent and 57.3 percent in 1978, to 50.2 percent and 49.8 percent in 
1982, to 49.5 percent and 50.5 percent in 1984. This policy is appar-
ently a move toward more balanced growth.43 
With leadership favoring a more open and liberal attitude toward 
foreign investment, the self-reliance principle has been abandoned. 
Direct foreign loans and joint ventures have been solicited. Thousands 
of PRC students have been sent to attend Western academic institu-
tions. Four "Special Economic Zones" have been set up in 
Quangdong and Fujian provinces. Fourteen coastal cities are open for 
foreign investment. The PRC is willing to revise the old Stalin-Marx-
ian economic doctrine to a new doctrine-the "Chinese Socialist 
System. "44 
The PRC is moving closer, though very slowly, to the economic 
system of the ROC. For five years, the leadership of the PRC has been 
searching for a new developmental model. In the 1977-1978 period, 
the PRC leaders considered the Yugoslavia model an attractive alter-
native. But after three years of intensive study, they realized that Yu-
goslavia was plagued with numerous problems. 45 After the 
Yugoslavian model proved inadequate, the impressive achievements of 
the ROC began to catch the attention of PRC leaders. Since then, the 
PRC has adopted many strategies employed by the ROC. For exam-
ple, they have opened the door for foreign consumer goods industries 
and begun promoting foreign trade. 46 
To energize the PRC economy, more fundamental changes in the 
economic system must be carried out. As former President Richard 
M. Nixon observed, "The key to China's future economic success lies 
in its becoming less Communist and more Chinese. Its failures during 
the third of a century since Mao Tse-tung took power have been a 
direct result of Communist dogma generally and Maoist dogma partic-
ularly."47 At the heart of the present economic expansion in the PRC 
is the introduction of economic reforms, which liberalize the rules for 
private enterprise. Small scale private activities are now permitted in 
industry, services and agriculture, however, the PRC is still very much 
43. Ibid., and China Times (Taipei), May 24, 1985. 
44. Cheng, op. cit., p. 80. 
45. Chu-yuan Cheng, "Leadership Changes and Economic Policies in China," Journal 
of International Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 1978), pp. 255-273. 
46. Ibid. 
47. Cheng, "Economic Development in Taiwan and Mainland China," op. cit., p. 84. 
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a socialist country and is likely to remain so. 48 
Ma Hong, the president of the PRC Academy of Social Sciences 
and advisor to the Planning Commission, has written, "In our current 
efforts to reform the economic management system, we should have a 
correct understanding of the nature of our socialist economy. Socialist 
construction in an economically underdeveloped country such as ours 
requires that commodities and money be fully utilized. In other 
words, our socialist economy is a planned one which should actively 
develop commodity production and exchange. "49 
(2) The ROC's Economic System 
The ROC on Taiwan has followed a mixed economic system. 
While the ROC government owns some of the island's major basic 
industries such as steel, ship building, defense, railroads, public utili-
ties, electric power and petrochemicals, almost all the light industries 
and virtually all the services and trading firms are privately owned. 50 
The government sets goals for the economy by designing long-term 
developmental plans. At every phase in Taiwan's development, the 
government has exercised direct control or indirect influence to guide 
economic activities. 51 
Important regulations used by the government include foreign ex-
change, import controls, bank credit allocations, interest rate policies, 
investment licensing, and tax rebates. These controls provide incen-
tive or disincentive by fostering a growth which conforms to the plans 
of the government agencies. 52 Despite these interventions, govern-
ment policies improve the investment climate rather than limit private 
activities. The mixed economic system allows the government to influ-
ence the direction of economic activities while preserving private en-
terprise and individual initiative. 53 
Realizing that agriculture is an important base for an industrial-
ized nation, the ROC has paid great attention to promoting agricul-
tural productivity. One of its major measures was a land-reform 
48. L. R. Klein, "Taiwan-China: Mainland-China, Some Economic Impressions," 
World Journal (New York), November 18, 1984. 
49. New Strategy for China's Economy (Beijing: New Word Press, 1983), p. 95. 
50. Cheng, "Economic Development in Taiwan and Mainland China," op. cit., p. 71. 
51. Ibid. 
52. Gustav Ranis, "Industrial Development," in Galenson, ed., Economic Growth and 
Structural Change in Taiwan, pp. 259-262. 
53. Cheng, "Economic Development in Taiwan and Mainland China," op. cit., pp. 71-
72. 
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program between 1949 and 1953.54 Prior to land reform, land owner-
ship in Taiwan, as in many less-developed countries, was unequal. 
With a large tenant population, the competition for land was fierce, 
and rent often consumed as 50 percent of the expected harvest. 55 The 
land redistribution program enabled 48 percent of Taiwan's farm fami-
lies to purchase land. The annual growth rate for total farm yield aver-
aged 5.2 percent for the period 1953 through 1968.56 
Aware of its limited domestic market, the ROC promoted export 
expansion to ensure economic growth. As early as the 1950s, many 
export programs were started. One of the most important measures, a 
tax rebate on exportable industrial products, reduced the cost of ex-
ports and increased their competitiveness in the international 
market. 57 
Between 1952 and 1962, total trade volume went up 80 percent, 
with an average annual growth rate of 6.1 percent. Between 1962 and 
1974, trace increased 22 times, with an annual growth rate of 29.4 
percent. The highest growth rate was achieved in the 1970 to 1974 
period, 41.5 percent, passing even Japan's postwar record. In recent 
years, the ROC foreign trade has exceeded its gross national product 
to become the island's most significant sector. 58 From the early 1950s, 
the ROC government has systematically sought foreign investment 
and expertise; these have created a favorable investment climate for 
the development program of the island. The annual flow of foreign 
capital has risen sharply from a few million U.S. dollars a year in the 
1950s to a high of almost a quarter of a billion dollars in the 1970s. 59 
During the past 35 years, the economic system and development 
strategies adopted by the ROC government have transformed Taiwan 
from a relatively poor, underdeveloped, agrarian economy to a mod-
em industrial economy, ranking third among Asian countries in per 
capita income. The ROC's real GNP has increased sevenfold in 35 
years, averaging an annual groWth of 9 percent, which is among the 
highest in the world. In foreign trade, the ROC now ranks as the 
seventh largest trading partner of the United States and is among the 
20 largest trading nations in the world. 60 
54. Ibid., p. 72. 
55. Erik Thorbecke, "Agricultural Development," in Galenson, ed., op. cit., p. 153. 
56. Cheng, "Economic Development in Taiwan and Mainland China," op. cit., p. 73. 
57. Ibid., p. 74. 
58. Ibid. 
59. Ibid. 
60. John C. H. Fei, Gustav Ranis and Shirley Kuo, Growth with Equity, The Taiwan 
Case (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 41; and China Times, op. cit. 
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With a much richer natural resources base, if the PRC were to 
more fully adopt the ROC's economic system, its GNP could conceiv-
ably rise rapidly, reducing the economic gap between the two coun-
tries. The possibility of future economic interdependence through 
direct or indirect trade would be greater. Eventually the economic 
function of "spill-over" could lead to the realization of political 
integration. 
8. Both the PRC and the ROC have attempted to influence the 
United States to support their respective policies on China's 
national integration. The United States, however, has 
continued to support a peaceful integration by the PRC and 
the ROC themselves. To maintain this policy, the United 
States maintains unofficial but substantial relations with the 
ROC 
The People's Daily and the Central Daily News have revealed their 
intentions of involving the United States in their differing integration 
goals. The United States has been consistent in its established policy 
of supporting a peaceful settlement of the reunification issue without 
outside interference. To protect the ROC from forceful integration, 
the United States has provided continuous arms sales and has main-
tained unofficial relations through the Taiwan Relations Act; however, 
this policy has upset the PRC, which regards it as an obstacle to inte-
gration. The ROC is well aware of its relatively small position in 
American strategic plans, especially when compared with the strategic 
importance of the PRC; therefore, it has tried to highlight its eco-
nomic importance to the United States and to strengthen the long-
standing U.S. ideological and sentimental ties with the island.61 
The United States will likely seek a balance in its China policy, 
maintaining close unofficial ties with the ROC and maintaining cordial 
official relations with the PRC. Such balance is not necessarily easy to 
achieve. Positive developments could include a reduction in PRC 
pressure over continued U.S. relations with the ROC. The PRC may 
come to believe that integration is unlikely without the support of the 
United States. A continued hard line on U.S.-Taiwan relations could 
alienate American opinion from the PRC and jeopardize chances for 
integration with Taiwan. The PRC domestic political situation could 
stabilize and its leaders could reach a compromise with the United 
States over the ROC without repercussions inside the PRC. 
Future trends also could work against U.S. interests. The PRC 
61. Sutter, op. cit., p. 321. 
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might remain uncompromising on U.S.-Taiwan relations; might even 
increase pressure on the United States to cut off U.S. arms shipments 
to the ROC; might demand that the United States explicitly recognize 
PRC sovereignty over Taiwan; could demand that the United States 
actively support PRC proposals for integration, could require that the 
United States apply pressure on the ROC to come to terms with the 
PRC. If the United States refused, the PRC could respond by down-
grading diplomatic relations; could shift PRC policy away from the 
United States and confront American interests more directly in sensi-
tive areas, notably Taiwan62; or could establish better relations with 
the Soviet Union. Any of these trends, combined with a harder PRC 
line on the ROC, could make it more difficult for U.S. leaders to jus-
tify compromise over Taiwan. 
U.S.-Taiwan relations could also again become a major partisan 
issue in U.S. politics. For this reason, the Reagan administration 
might try to accommodate PRC demands by cutting back on military 
and other ties with the ROC, and by playing down past American 
commitments made in the Taiwan Relations Act. Conservatives would 
have a tough time accusing Ronald Reagan of being "soft" on Taiwan, 
but they might be able to attack his aides who have been prominently 
involved in PRC relations. Meanwhile, if the Reagan administration 
fails to accommodate the PRC and relations are downgraded, Demo-
cratic leaders could exploit the administration's "mismanagement" of 
U.S. China policy.63 China's national integration presents difficulties 
for U.S. China policy. Legally, the Taiwan Relations Act deliberately 
provides a deterrent level of support. The United States provides arms 
under the Taiwan Relations Act as interpreted by the U.S.-PRC un-
derstanding of August 1982. The island also remains a major U.S. 
trading and investment partner. These factors indicate that the United 
States would respond to an attack on the island; nevertheless, those 
same factors strain the U.S.-PRC relationship, a matter of far greater 
importance to U.S. interests. 
Apart from U.S.-PRC-Taiwan considerations, longer-term Amer-
ican foreign policy could be influenced heavily by shifts in Soviet pol-
icy. As the United States or the PRC cooperate with each other 
against suspected Soviet expansionism, the United States might ac-
commodate PRC interests in Taiwan. If Soviet power were seen by 
the United States, growing and strategic concerns might push the 
62. Ibid., p. 323. 
63. Ibid., p. 324. 
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United States into favoring the PRC over the ROC.64 
Under these circumstances, the United States would presumably 
be more willing to cut off military supplies to the island, to recognize 
PRC sovereignty over Taiwan, and to pressure the ROC to join in 
peace talks with the PRC. Arguments against such action would con-
tinue to focus on the moral commitment to the ROC and on U.S. 
economic interests on the island. The relative importance of these fac-
tors would fade in comparison with broader U.S. strategic interests 
which would depend on how threatened the United States felt in the 
face of Soviet expansion and how useful the PRC appeared to be as a 
partner against the Soviet Union. 65 
One general trend has stood out in U.S. policy in the past decade, 
a policy to move in the direction of meeting PRC demands and condi-
tions and gradually cut back contacts with the ROC for the sake of 
better relations with the PRC.66 Unforeseen future developments 
could change its course, but these policies are likely to continue in 
U.S.-China policy for some time to come. Ultimately, U.S.-China pol-
icy is likely to be more to the PRC's advantage than to the ROC's. 
Two overall conclusions are derived from the findings of this 
study: 
1. The theory of integration has been applied and found to be 
valid by the study's communication approach to the media 
of integrative entities. The study•s hypotheses based on the 
theory of integration have been supported: the two Chinese 
party newspapers have used their reporting media for the 
purpose of advocating their respective integrative ideologies, 
methods and models. The factor analysis of the survey 
found five factors in China•s national integration: (1) one-
China nationalism consensus, (2) mutual understanding 
about the other side, (3) economic function, (4) U.S.-China 
policy, and (5) U.S. protecting-Taiwan policy. 
The study concludes that the two Chinese party newspapers have 
focused on one-China nationalism, but without providing common 
agreeable methods for a future integrative model; have increased their 
neutral understanding about each other, but still retained a significant 
amount of unfavorable reports about the other side; have developed an 
awareness of the possible economic function of indirect trade through 
64. Ibid., p. 325. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Ibid., p. 326. 
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Hong Kong and of the narrowing economic gap through PRC's recent 
economic reforms, but without realizing serious discussions or plan-
ning for a healthy development of "spill-over" integration; have tried 
hard to influence the United States to support their respective advan-
tages over the other side on the integration issue, but without much 
success of changing established U.S. China policy; have disputed con-
tinued U.S. protection of the ROC with the Taiwan Relations Act and 
arms sales, but without direct contacts or consultations between them. 
Both sides claim integration is an internal problem. 
Sentimental appeals to one-China nationalism fill in the two 
newspapers. A fair and objective reporting policy about the other side 
seems unlikely to be accepted by the two newspapers in the near fu-
ture. Mutual understanding and confidence building seem to be be-
yond the consideration of the two newspapers' editorial policies. 
As discussed in conclusion #7, indirect trade through Hong 
Kong will probably continue to grow. The recent reforms of the 
PRC's economic system have a fairly good chance of succeeding and 
of slowly increasing the PRC's economic power. Though it may be a 
long time before reforms affect the rest of the mainland's economy, 
there is hope of reducing the economic gap between the PRC and the 
ROC. There is hope of achieving economic interdependence and even-
tual economic integration. 
As discussed in conclusion # 8, the two newspapers or parties 
will probably try to use their media influence to persuade the United 
States on integration. The United States is maintaining its established 
policy for a peaceful settlement unless other factors, such as policies of 
the Soviet Union, intrude. Nevertheless, the PRC has more to gain 
than the ROC concerning the concessions that the United States 
might have made on integration. There is an external element in 
China's national integration issue as the theory of integration 
indicates. 
2. This study, through research on the media of the two parties 
on the integration issue, has provided a scientific 
source for practical political reference in 
dealing with China's national 
integration. 
The media of the two parties are useful sources; however, access 
to both domestic editions in the United States was hard to obtain. 
This study provides a more accessible source for researching the fun-
damental policies and strategies of the two parties on particular polit-
ical issues such as China's national integration. 
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The two newspapers usually carry the full text of announcements 
or speeches made by their leaders that other Chinese newspapers do 
not report. The hidden messages between the lines must be found in 
reference books or other media since the two newspapers are very 
political and usually allow no second opinions on sensitive issues such 
as China's national integration. 
The two newspapers provide important messages and trends on 
the issue of integration, even though they are not necessarily popular 
newspapers as far as the reader's general interests are concerned. In 
other words, they are more informative on party-line messages, but 
less educational, less informative and less entertaining by ordinary 
Western newspaper standards. 
For this study on China's national integration, the two Chinese 
party newspapers certainly served the purpose of the research by pro-
viding a way to find relevant materials to either confirm or reject the 
reporting of the two newspapers on the integration issue. 
Recommendation 
The results of this study indicate that the PRC and the ROC have 
not built up a solid mutual understanding of each other. It is worth 
emphasizing again that such understanding is necessary if they are sin-
cere in pursuing national integration. Both sides could increase their 
neutral and objective reporting about the other side and decrease unfa-
vorable reporting for their integration-concerned readers. 
Both sides probably will maintain their one-China nationalism 
consensus. If their common goal is an integrated China, they might 
consider providing solid and workable integrative methods, models for 
serious academic and political discussion in their newspapers for the 
benefit of their millions of readers. The present one-way traffic which 
denounces the other side's proposals and models undermines the de-
velopment of any workable integrative method or model that could be 
accepted by both sides. Any foreign effort, particularly by the United 
States, to coerce or mediate a final solution would be ineffective and 
possibly counterproductive. The U.S. role can be limited to making as 
sure as possible that any solution, any process, will be achieved with-
out coercion or force of any kind. 
This study also recommends that the United States not stand in 
the way of all possible contacts and interaction between the PRC and 
the ROC, nor try to play a direct role in promoting any particular 
solution. 
Assuming that the PRC sticks to peaceful methods, the United 
States is recommended to adhere to its established position on continu-
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ous arms sales to the ROC, and to execute the Taiwan Relations Act 
so that the ROC not be forcefully integrated by the PRC. The United 
States might avoid promoting or coercing either party to adopt any 
particular solution, insisting only that the use of force be avoided. The 
United States can influence but "should" not control the future of 
China's national integration. The gradual evolution of PRC and ROC 
relations neither requires more benefits from excessive attention nor 
needs suspicions or false claims of urgency. Precipitous actions by 
either side would fail and be unnecessary and counterproductive. 
All five factors in this study could be watched closely by further 
academic research that monitors their development and change. 
The growing indirect trade between the two Chinese countries 
through Hong Kong, and the recent reforms of the PRC's economic 
system, are potential economic factors of the "spill-over" function rel-
evant to the study of integration theory. Observation and analysis are 
recommended. Neither the PRC nor the ROC has shown a genuine 
interest in stopping the indirect trade between them. Both sides have 
benefited in the past, and will benefit in the future. Both sides have 
watched the development of the PRC's economic reforms. 
The study also found that integration is not only an internal af-
fair, as the PRC, the ROC and the United States maintain. Each side 
has tried to involve the United States in its favor. It is this study's 
recommendation that the ultimate solution to the problem of China's 
national integration should be a Chinese solution, arrived at by the 
Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Ideally, a peaceful solu-
tion will respect the willingness and opinions of one billion Chinese on 
the mainland and the 18 million Chinese on Taiwan. 
Further research on media other than these two party newspapers 
or comparing other media to these two newspapers on the issue of 
China's national integration is recommended. Other media may have 
different perspectives that are worthy of research. Radio propaganda 
of both the PRC and the ROC is also an important media although 
difficult and complicated to survey. 
Because this study is limited to the overall factors of China's na-
tional integration found in the media survey, further research could 
concentrate on particular factors or on particular periods of time. 
Each factor involves many complex issues, events, theories and prac-
tices that are beyond the limitations of this study. Certainly, an ad-
vanced study could provide more concrete results or suggestions on 
workable and acceptable integrative methods or models for the people 
and the leaders of both sides to consider. 
Any study on the integration issue would be extremely valuable 
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and is encouraged. The interests of one billion Chinese are at stake. 
Thirty-five years of disintegration between the mainland and Taiwan is 
not a long time compared to other periods of disintegration in Chinese 
history. The Chinese on both sides could be open-minded, patient and 
enthusiastic in evaluating a workable and peaceful integrative method 
or model. 
The final, idealistic recommendation for future research is to con-
duct an opinion survey the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait. Is national integration is felt necessary? Or desirable? Why, 
when and how could national integration be achieved? Answers to 
these questions would offer a solid reference to the issues of China's 
national integration. 
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-----: The People's Daily, 250 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, SO. 
The two newspapers, a total of 300. 
FIGURE 16 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #11 "COMMENTARY FAVORABLE TO THE OTHER 
SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR II: MUTUAL 
UNDERSTANDING) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----· The People's Daily, 206 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 1,958. 
The two newspapers, a total of 2,164. 
FIGURE 17 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NE~vSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #12 "COMMENTARY UNFAVORABLE TO THE OTHER 
SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 175 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 69. 
The two newspapers, a total of 244. 
FIGURE 18 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #45 "THE PRC'S PEACE PROPOSAL FOR 
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COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 
(FACTOR I: NATIONALISM CONSENSUS) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 118 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Dailv News, 90. 
The two newspapers, a total of 208. 
FIGURE 19 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE T\'70 NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #41, "THE PRC'S 1981 NINE-POINT PEACE 
PROPOSAL TO INTEGRATE THE ROC," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 
(FACTOR I: NATIONALISM CONSENSUS) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 560 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 1,386. 
The two newspapers, a total of 1,946. 
FIGURE 20 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #6 "THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
OF ONE CHINA," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM 
CONSENSUS) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 183 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 88. 
The two newspapers, a total of 271. 
FIGURE 21 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY i42 "THE PRC'S THREE-LINK, FOUR-
EXCHANGE PEACE PROPOSAL TO BEGIN TO INTEGRATE THE ROC," 
DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISH CONSENSUS) 
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-----: The People's Daily, 201 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 798. 
The two newspapers, a total of 999. 
FIGURE 22 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #5 "THE HSIN-HAI REVOLUTION IN 1911 LED BY 
SUN YAT-SEN AND HIS NATIONALIST PARTY," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 
1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM CONSENSUS) 
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rime Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 38 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 1,989. 
The two newspapers, a total of 2,027. 
FIGURE 23 
rREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
rHEMATIC CATEGORY #39 "PRC'S FORCEFUL INTEGRATION WITH THE 
ROC," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM 
:ONSENSUS) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 180 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 14. 
The two newspapers, a. total of 194. 
FIGURE 24 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #9 "THE SEPARATED RELATIVES DIVIDED BY THE 
TAIWAN STRAIT," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: 
NATIONALISM CONSENSUS) 
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-----: The People's Daily, 163 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 453. 
The two newspapers, a total of 616. 
FIGURE 25 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #43 "THE PRC'S PEACE-TALK PROPOSAL TO THE 
ROC," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM 
CONSENSUS) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 440 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 698. 
The two newspapers, a total of 1,138. 
FIGURE 26 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #4 "SUN YAT-SEN AS THE REVOLUTIONARY 
LEADER, AND SOONG CHING LING, SUN'S WIDOW," DECEMBER 
1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM CONSENSUS) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 106 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 49. 
The two newspapers, a total of 155. 
FIGURE 27 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE NEWSPAPERS IN THEMATIC 
CATEGORY #8 "THE SEPARATION OF PEOPLE FROM NATIVE TOWNS 
RESULTING FROM POLITICAL SEPARATION BETWEEN THE MAINLAND AND 
TAit'IAN," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM 
CONSENSUS) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 2 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 124. 
The two newspapers, a total of 126. 
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FIGURE 28 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
TH~~TIC CATEGORY #40 "ROC'S PROPOSAL TO INTEGRATE UNDER ITS 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE," 
DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM CONSENSUS) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 46 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 223. 
The two newspapers, a total of 269. 
FIGURE 29 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #28 "TRANSFER OF AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC 
TECHNOLOGY," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR II: MUTUAL 
UNDERSTANDING) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 75 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 75. 
The two newspapers, a total of 150. 
FIGURE 30 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #34 "THE PRC'S ONE NATION, TWO SYSTEMS 
INTEGRATIVE MODEL," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR III: 
ECONOMIC FUNCTION) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 183 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 436. 
The two newspapers, a total of 619. 
FIGURE 31 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #36 "THE PRC'S HONG KONG INTEGRATIVE 
MODEL," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR III: ECONOMIC 
FUNCTION) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 51 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 39. 
The two newspapers, a total of 90. 
FIGURE 32 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #51 "PRC'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN 
GUANGDONG AND FUJIAN PROVINCES," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 
(FACTOR III: ECONOMIC FUNCTION) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 356 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 1,795. 
The two newspapers, a total of 2,151. 
FIGURE 33 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #22 "PROMOTING A WARMER RELATIONSHIP WITH 
THE UNITED STATES," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR IV: U.S. 
CHINA POLICY) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 181 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 716. 
The two newspapers, a total of 897. 
FIGURE 34 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #23 "CALLING ON THE UNITED STATES TO 
MAINTAIN A COLDER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OTHER SIDE," 
DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR IV: U.S. CHINA POLICY) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 167 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 327. 
The two newspapers, a total of 494. 
FIGURE 35 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY 124 "THE PRC'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP 
WITH THE UNITED STATES," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR IV: 
U.S. CHINA POLICY) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 72 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 149. 
The two newspapers, a total of 221. 
FIGURE 36 
TREND OF REPORTING .FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS !N 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #29 "EMPHASIS ON PRC'S OR ROC'S STRATEGIC 
IMPORTANCE TO ASIA, THE UNITED STATES OR THE WORLD," 
DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR IV: U.S. CHINA POLICY) 
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-----: The People's Daily, 323 reporting frequencies. 
The Centr~l Daily News, 442. 
The two newspapers, a total of 765. 
FIGURE 37 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY #1 "ONE GREATER CHINA TERRITORY," DECEMBER 
1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR IV: U.S. CHINA POLICY) 
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Time Series: December 1978-May 1985 
-----: The People's Daily, 94 reporting frequencies. 
The Central Daily News, 81. 
The two newspapers, a total of 909. 
FIGURE 38 
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THEMATIC CATEGORY # 2 6 "U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAil'lAN, " DECEMBER 
1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR V: U.S. PROTECTING-TAIWAN POLICY) 
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The two newspapers, a total of 460. 
FIGURE 39 
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TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN 
THE~~TIC CATEGORY #25 "U.S. TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT," DECEMBER 
1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR V: U.S. PROTECTING-TAIWAN POLICY) 
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APPENDIX 
COMMUNIQUE 
1: FEBRUARY 28, 1972. THE U.S.-PRC SHANGHAI 
The Shanghai Communique, February 28, 1972 
President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the Peo-
ple's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's 
Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the 
President was Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to 
the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials. 
President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist 
Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank ex-
change of views on Sino-US relations and world affairs. 
During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held be-
tween President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of rela-
tions between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, 
as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of 
State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same 
spirit. 
President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial 
and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, con-
tinuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest. 
The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of 
America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years with-
out contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. 
They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great 
upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes. 
The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts 
both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. 
The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills 
the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because 
it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individ-
ual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside 
pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce 
tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have dif-
ferent ideologies so as to Jessen the risks of confrontation through accident, mis-
calculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual 
respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ulti-
mate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be 
prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. Tite United 
States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine 
their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has 
been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic 
(173) 
174 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
APPENDIX 
COMMUNIQUE 
1: FEBRUARY 28, 1972. THE U.S.-PRC SHANGHAI 
(Continued) 
of Vietnam and the United States on Jaunary 27, 1972 represents a basis for the 
attainment of that objective; in the absence .of a negotiated settlement the 
United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of aU U.S. forces from the 
region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indo-
china. The United States will maintain· its close ties with and support for the 
Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication 
in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly 
relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Con-
sistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 
1971, the United States favors the continuation of the cease fire between India 
and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own terri-
tories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the 
United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own 
future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the 
subject of great power rivalry. 
Tite Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. 
Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revo-
lution-this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, 
should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should 
not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony 
and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports 
the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation 
and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems 
according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign 
aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be 
withdrawn to their own countries. 
The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm 
support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this 
year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration ·of 
the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-
point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Govern-
ment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the 
stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Re-
habilitation of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of 
Japanese militarism and finnly supports tlte Japanese people's desire to build an 
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independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that 
India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on 
the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their re· 
spective territories and to their own sides of the ceascfire line in Jammu and 
Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their strug· 
glc to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and 
Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination. 
There are essential differences between China and the United States in 
their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that 
countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on 
the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, 
JHm-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. lnterna· 
tional disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or 
threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are pre· 
pared to apply these principles to their mutual relations. 
With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides 
stated that: 
-progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the 
United States is in the interests of all countries; 
-both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict; 
-neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is op· 
posed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such 
hegemony; and 
-neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter 
into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states. 
Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the 
peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other 
countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest. 
TI1e two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China 
and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan 
question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations be· 
tween China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic 
of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China 
which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is 
China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and 
all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. TI1c 
Olinesc Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of 
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"one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and 
"independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be 
determined." 
The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese 
on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Tai· 
wan is a part of China. Tite United States Government does not challenge tluot 
position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question 
by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate 
objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Tai· 
wan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installa· 
lions on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. 
The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding he· 
tween the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as 
science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people 
contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to 
facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges. 
Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit 
can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual 
benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to 
facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries. 
The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various chan· 
nels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to 
time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations be· 
tween the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common 
interest. 
The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit 
would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. Titcy 
believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only 
in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the 
relaxation of tension in Asia and the world. 
President NiXon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their 
appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and 
people of the People's Republic of China. 
Dtf'{lrtmcnt of Stalt Bulletin 66, no. 1708 (March 20, 1972): 435-38. 
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APPENDIX 4: JANUARY 1, 1979. JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.AND 
THE PRC1 DECEMBER 15, 1978, U.S. AND PRC STATEMENTS 
I.CCOMPANYING THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE 
Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
between the United States of America and the People's Republic 
of China, January 1, 1979 
(The communique was released on December 15, 1978, in Washington and 
Peking) 
llte United States of America and the People's Republic of China have 
agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of Janu-
ary 1,1979. 
The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's 
Republic of China as ttie sole legal Government of China. Within this context, 
the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other 
unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. 
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm 
the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and em-
phasize once again that: 
•Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict. 
•Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other 
region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or 
group of countries to establish such hegemony. 
•Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter 
into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states. 
•The Government of the United States of America acknowledges• the 
Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. 
•Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only 
in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the 
cause of peace in Asia and the world. 
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will ex-
change Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March I, 1979. 
•The Chinese text uanslated the word .. acknowledges"~ into Cheng-jrn. which, if 
retranslated into English, would mean .. recognize." 
Dcptirtment of Stau Bull.,in 79, no. 2022 (January 1979): 25. 
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United States Statement Accompanying the Joint Communique on 
the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United 
States and the People's Republic of China, December IS, 1978 
As of January I, 1979, the United States of America recognizes the Peo-
ple 's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. On the same date, 
the People's Republic of China accords similar recognition to the United States 
of America. The United States thereby establishes diplomatic relations with the 
People's Republic of China. 
On that same date, January I, 1979, the United States of America will 
notify Taiwan that it is terminating diplomatic relations and that the Mutual De-
fense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China is being 
terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. The United States 
also states that it will be withdrawing its remaining military personnel from Tai-
wan within four months. 
In the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will main-
tain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official government repre-
sentation and without diplomatic relations. 
The Administration will seek adjustments to our laws and regulations to 
permit the maintenance of commercial, cultural, and other nongovernmental 
relationships in the new circumstances that will exist after normalization. 
TI1e United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful 
and prosperous future. The United States continues to have an interest in the 
peaceful resolu lion of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will 
be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves. 
The United States believes that the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with the People's Republic will contribute to the welfare of the American peo-
ple, to the stability of Asia where the United States has major security and eco-
nomic interest, and to the peace of the entire world. 
Deportment of State Bulletin 19, no. 2022 (lanuary 1979): 26. 
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People's Republic of China Statement Accompanying the Joint 
Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between 
the United States and the PRC, December I 5, 1978 
As of January I, 1979, the People's Republic of China and the United 
States of America recognize each other and establish diplomatic relations, there-
by ending the prolonged abnormal relationship between them. 1l1is is a historic 
event in Sino-U.S. relations. 
As is known to all, the Government of the People's Republic of China is 
the sole legal Government of China and Taiwan is a part of China. TI1e question 
of Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations be-
tween China and the United States. It has now been resolved between the two 
countries in the spirit of the Shanghai Communique and through their joint 
efforts, thus enabling the normalization of relations so ardently desired by the 
people of the two countries. As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the em· 
brace of the motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China's in-
ternal affair. 
At the invitation of the U.S. Government, Tcng llsiao-ping, Vice-Premier 
of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, will pay an official visit 
to the United States in January 1979, with a view to further promoting the 
friendship between the two peoples and good relations between the two coun-
tries. 
Peki11g Review 21, no. 51 (December 22,1978): 8-9. 
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TEXT OF NPC STANDING COMMITTEE MESSAGE 
TO TAIWAN COMPATRIOTS 
Beijing,january I, 1979 
(cmpha.sis added) 
Tu.t of the New Ycar"s Day message of the Standina; Committee of 
lhc National People's Congress to compatriots in Taiwan, which wu 
rndoncd after discussion at the committee's fifth plenary session on 
December 26: 
Dear compatriots in Taiwan: 
Today is New Year's Day 1979. We hereby extend our cor· 
dial and sincere greetings to you on behalf of the people of all 
nationalities on the mainland of our motherland. 
As an old saying goes, "a special festival calls up affectionate 
remembrances of our beloved ones." On this happy occasion as 
we celebrate New Year's Day, our thoughts tum all the more to 
our kith and kin, our old folks, our brothers and sisters, in 
Taiwan. We know you·have the motherland and your kinsfolk 
on the mainland in mind too. This mutual feeling of many 
years standing grows with each passing day. From the day when 
Taiwan was regrettably separated from the motherland in 1949, 
we have not been able to communicate with or visit each 
other, our motherland has remained disunited, relatives have 
been unable to have a reunion, and our nation, country and 
people have suffered great losses as a result. All Chinese com· 
patriots and people of Chinese descent throughout the world, 
without exception, look forward to an early termination of 
this sad situation. 
Our Chinese nation is a great nation. It accounts for almost a 
quarter of the world's population and has a long history and 
excellent culture, and its outstanding contributions to world 
civilization and human progress are universally recognized. 
Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient 
times. The Chinese nation has great vitality and cohesiveness. 
All through past history, foreign invasions and internal strife 
have failed to split our nation permanently. Taiwan's separation 
from the motherland for nearly 30 years has been artificial and 
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against our national interests and aspirations, and this state of 
affairs must not be allowed to continue. Every Chinese, in 
Taiwan or on the mainland, has a compelling responsibility for 
the survival, growth and prosperity of the Chinese nation. The 
important task of reunifying our motherland, on which hinges 
the future of the whole nation, now lies before us all; it is an 
issue no one can evade or should try to. If we do not quickly set 
about ending this disunity so that our motherland is reunified at 
an early date, what can we say to our ancestors or to our 
descendants? This sentiment is shared by all; and who among 
the descendants of the Yellow Emperor wishes to be branded a 
traitor of all ages? 
Radical changes have taken place in China's status in the 
world over the past 30 years. Our country's international 
prestige keeps rising and its international role becomes ever 
more important. The people and governments of almost all 
countries now place tremendous hopes on us in the struggle 
against hegemonism and in safeguarding peace and stability in 
Asia and the world as a whole. Every Chinese is proud to see 
the growing strength and prosperity of our motherland. If we 
can end the present disunity and join forces soon, there will be 
no limit to our contributio11s to the future of mankind. Early 
reunification of our motherland is not only the common 
desire of all the people of China, including all compatriots in 
Taiwan, but the common wish of all peace-loving peoples and 
countries the world over. 
Reunification of China now fits in with the direction of 
popular feeling and the general trend of development. The 
world in general recognizes only one China, with the Govern· 
ment of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal govern· 
ment. The recent conclusion of the China-] apan treaty of peace 
and friendship and the normalization of relations between 
China and the United States show still more clearly that no one 
can stop this trend. The present situation in the motherland, 
one of stability and unity, is better than ever. The people of all 
nationalities on the mainland are working hard and with one 
will for the great goal of the four modernizations. h is our 
fervent hope that Taiwan returns to the embrace of the mother· 
land at an early date so that we can work together for the great 
cause of national development. Our state leaders hat•e firmly 
declared that they will take present realities into account i11 
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accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and 
respect the status qua 011 Taiwan and the opinions of people in 
all walks of lrfe there and adopt reasonable policies and mea-
sures in settli11g the question of reunification so as not to cause 
the people of Taiwa11 any losses. On the other hand, people in 
all walks in Taiwan have expressed their yearning for their 
homeland and old friends, stated their desire "to trace their 
roots and return," and raised diverse proposals which express 
their earnest hope for an early return to the embrace of the 
motherland. With all conditions now favorable for reunification 
and everything set, 110 o11e should go against the will of the 
nation and counter the trend of history. 
We place great hopes on the 17 million people on Taiwan and 
also the Taiwan authorities. The Taiwan authorities have always 
taken a firm stand of one China and opposed an independent 
Taiwan. This is our common stand and the basis for our cooper-
ation. We have always taken the position that all patriots belong 
to one family. The responsibility for reunifying the motherland 
rests with each of us. We hope the Taiwan authorities will place 
national interests paramount and make valuable contributions 
to the reunification of the motherland. 
The Chinese Govemment has ordered the People's Liberation 
Army to stop the bombardment of Quemoy and other islands as 
from today. A state of military confrontation between the two 
sides still exists along the Taiwan straits. This can only create 
artificial tension. We hold that first of all this military confron-
tation should be ended through discussion between the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China and the Taiwan authori-
ties so as to create the necessary prerequisites and a secure 
environment for the two sides to make contacts and exchanges 
in whatever area. · 
The prolonged separation has caused a lack of mutual under-
standing between the compatriots on the mainland and on 
Taiwan and various inconveniences for both sides. Since many 
Overseas Chinese residing in foreign lands far away can return 
for visits and tours and reunion with their families, why should-
n't compatriots living so near, on the mainland and Taiwan, 
visit each other freely? We believe that there is no reason for 
such barriers to continue. We hope both sides will bring about 
at an early date the setting up of transportation and postal ser-
vices to make it easier for compatriots of both sides to contact 
185 
186 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
APPENDIX 6: JANUARY 1, 1979. PRC'S "A MESSAGE TO 
COMPATRIOTS IN TAIWANn (Continued) 
each other directly, write to each other, vtstt relatives and 
friends, exchange tours and visits and make acadt·mic, ntltural, 
sports and technological interchange. 
Economically speaking, Taiwan and the mainland of the 
motherland were originally an entity. Unfortunately, economic 
ties have been suspended for many years. Now, construction is 
going on vigorously in the motherland and we also wish Taiwan 
growing economic prosperity. There is every reaso11 for us to 
develop trade between us, each making up what the other lacks 
and create economic interflow. 
This is our mutual need and will benefit both parties without 
doing any harm. 
Dear compatriots in Taiwan: 
The bright future of our great motherland belongs to us and 
also to you. The reunification of the motherland is the sacred 
mission history has bequeathed to our geueratiou. Times arc 
moving along and the situation is developing. The earlier we 
fulfil this mission, the sooner we can jointly write an unpre-
cedented, brilliant page in the history of our country, catch up 
with advanced powers and work together for this glorious goal! 
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Beijing, September 30, 1981 
(emphasis added) 
Ye Jianying, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress, in an interview with Xinhua today, 
elaborated on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the 
motherland for the realization of China's peaceful reunification. 
The full text of his statement follows: 
Today, on the eve of the 32nd anniversary of the founding of 
the People's Republic of China and at the approach of the 70th 
anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, I wish, first of all, to ex· 
tend my festive greetings and cordial regards to the people of 
all nationalities throughout the country, including the compa· 
triots in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, and Chinese nationals 
residing in foreign countries. 
On New Year's Day 1979, the Standing Committe of the 
National People's Congress issued a message to the compatriots 
in Taiwan, in which it proclaimed the policy of striving to 
reunify the motherland peacefully. The message received warm 
support and active response from the people of all nationalities 
throughout China, including the compatriots in Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Macao, and those residing abroad. A relaxed atmos-
phere has set in across the Taiwan Straits. Now, I would take 
this opportunity to elaborate on the policy concerning the 
return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of peace-
ful reunification: 
( 1) In order to bring an end to the unfortunate separation of 
the Chinese nation as early as possible, we propose that talks be 
held between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomin-
tang of China ott a reciprocal basis so that the two parties will 
cooperate for the third time to accomplish the great cause of 
national reunification. The two sides may first send people to 
meet for an exhaustive exchange of views. 
(2) It is the urgent desire of the people of all nationalities of 
both sides of the Straits to communicate with each other, 
reunite with their relatives, develop trade and increase mutual 
understanding. We propose that the two sides make arrange-
ments to facilitate the exchange of mails, trade, air and shipping 
services, and visits by relatives and tourists as well as academic, 
cultural and sports exchanges, and reach an agreement there-
upon. 
(3) After the country is reumfied, Taiwan ca11 enjoy a /u:~tlt 
degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and it can 
retain its armed forces. The central government will not inter-
fere with local affairs on Taiwan. 
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(4) Taiwan's current sodo-economic system will remain 
unchanged, so will its way of ltfe and itJ· economic and cultural 
relations with foreign countries. There will be no encroachment 
on the proprietary rights and lawful right of inheritance over 
pn·vale property, houses, land and enterprises, or on for.-ign 
investments. 
(5) People in authority and representative personages of 
various circles in Taiwan may lake up posts of leadership in 
national political bodies and participate in running the state. 
(6) When Taiwan's local finance is in difficulty, tht: central 
government may subsidize it as is fit for the circumstances. 
(7) For people of all nationalities and public figures of 
various circles in Taiwan who wish to come and settle on the 
mainland, it is guaranteed that proper arrangements will he 
made for them, that there will be no discrimination against 
them, and that they will have the freedom of entry and exit. 
(8) Industrialists and businessmen in Taiwan are welcome to 
invest and engage in various economic undertakings on the 
mainland, and their legal rights, interests and profits are guar· 
anteed. 
(9) The reunification of the motherland is the responsibility 
of all Chinese. We sincerely welcome people of all nationalities, 
public figures of all circles and all mass organizations in Taiwan 
to make proposals and suggestions regardir.g affairs of state 
through various channels and in various ways. 
Taiwan's return to the embrace of the motherland and the 
accomplishme.nt of the great cause of national reunification is a 
great and glorious mission history has bequeathed on our gener-
ation. China's reunification and prosperity is in the vital interest 
of the Chinese people of all nationalities - not only those on 
the mainland, but those in Taiwan as well. It is also in the 
interest of peace in the Far East and the world. 
We hope that our compatriots in Taiwan will give full play to 
their patriotism and work energetically for the early realization 
of the great unity of our nation and share the honor of it. We 
hope that our compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao and Chi-
nese nations residing abroad will continue to act in the role of a 
bridge and contribute their share to the reunification of the 
motherland. 
We hope that the Kuomintang authorities will stick to their 
one-China position and their opposition to "two Chinas" and 
that they will put national interests above everything else, 
forget previous ill-will and join hands with us in accomplishing 
the great cause of national reunification and the great goal of 
making China prosperous and strong, so as to win glory for our 
ancestors, bring benefit to our posterity and write a new and 
glorious page in the history of the Chinese nation. 
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Taiwan Relations Act, 1979 
SHORT TITLE 
Section I, This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Relations Act". 
SEC. 2. (a) The President having terminated governmental relations be· 
tween the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by 
the United States as the Republic of China prior to January I, 1979, the Con· 
gress finds that the enactment of this Act is necessary-
(!) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; 
and 
(2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the 
continuation of commercial, cultural, a~d other relations between the people of 
the United States and the people on Taiwan. 
(b) It is the policy of the United States-
( I) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, 
cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the 
people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all otl1cr peo· 
pies of the Western Pacific area; 
(2) to declare tl1at peace and stability in the area arc in the political, se· 
curity, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters ofintcrna· 
tiona) concern; 
(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic 
relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the 
future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; 
(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than 
peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and 
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; 
(S) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and 
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to 
force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardi1.e the security, or the social 
or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. 
(c) Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the 
United States in human rights especiaUy with respect to the huma·n rights of all 
the approximately 18 million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and en· 
hancement of the human rights of aU the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed 
as objectives of the United States. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY 
WITH REGARD TOT AIWAN 
SEC. 3. (a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, 
the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense 
services in such :jUantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a 
sufficient self-defense capability. 
(b) The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity 
of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the 
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needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such deter-
mination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States mili· 
tary authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the 
Congress. 
(c) TI1c President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any 
threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan 
and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The 
President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional 
processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such dan-
ger. 
APPLICATION OF LAWS; INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS 
SEC. 4. (a) TI1e absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not 
affect the application of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, 
and the laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the man-
ncr that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to 
January I, 1979. 
(b) TI1e application of subsection (a) of this section shall include, but shall 
not be limited to, the following: 
(I) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign coun-
tries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include 
and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan. 
(2) Whenever authorized by or pursuant to the laws of the United States 
to conduct or carry out programs, transactions, or other relations with respect to 
foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similiar entities, the President 
or any agency of the United States Government is authorized to conduct and 
carry out, in accordance with section 6 of this Act, such programs, transactions, 
and other relations with respect to Taiwan (including, but not limited to, the 
performance of services for the United States through contracts with commercial 
entities on Taiwan), in accordance with the applicable laws of the United States. 
(3) (A) The absence of diplomatic relations and recognition with respect 
to Taiwan shall not abrogate, infringe, modify, deny, or otherwise affect in any 
way any rights or obligations (including but not limited to those involving con-
tracts, debts, or property interests of any kind) under the laws of the United 
States heretofore or hereafter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan. 
(B) For all purposes under the laws of the United States, including actions 
in any court in the United States, recognition of the People's Republic of China 
shall not affect in any way the ownership of or other rights or interests in 
properties, tangible and intangible, and other things of value, owned or held on 
or prior to December 31, 1978, or thereafter acquired or earned by the govern-
ing authorities on Taiwan. 
(4) Whenever the application of the laws of the United States depends 
upon the law that is or was applicable on Taiwan or compliance therewith, the 
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law applied by the people on Taiwan shall be considered the applicable law fut 
that purpose. 
(5) Nothing in this Act, nor the facts of the President's action in extending 
diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, the absence of diplo· 
matic relations between the people on Taiwan and the United States, or the lack 
of recognition by the United States, and attendant circumstances thereto, shall 
be construed in any administrative or judicial proceeding as a basis for any 
United States Government agency, commission, or department to make a finding 
of fact or determination of law, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, to deny an export license application or 
to revoke an existing export license for nuclear exports to Taiwan. 
(6) For purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Taiwan may be 
treated in the manner specified in the first sentence of section 202(b) of that 
Act. 
(7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in courts in the United 
States, in accordance with the laws of the United States, shall not be abrogated, 
infringed, modified, denied, or otherwise affected in any way by the absence of 
diplomatic relations or recognition. 
(8) No requirement, whether expressed or implied, under the laws of the 
United States with respect to maintenance of diplomatic relations or recogni-
tion shall be applicable with respect to Taiwan. 
(c) For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States, 
the Congress approve the continuation in force of all treaties and other interna-
tional agreements, including multilateral conventions, entered into by the United 
States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States 
as the Republic of China prior to January I, 1979, and in force between them 
on December 31, 1978, unless and until tenninated in accordance with law. 
(d) Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the ex-
clusion or explusion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international 
fmancial institution or any other international organization. 
OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
SEC. 5. (a) During the three-year period beginning on the date of enact-
ment of this Act, the S 1,000 per capita income restriction in clause (2) of the 
second undesignated paragraph of section 231 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 shall not restrict the activities of the Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion in determining whether to provide any insurance, reinsurance, loans, or 
guaranties with respect to investment projects on Taiwan. 
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, in issuing in-
surance, reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with respect to investment projects on 
Taiwan, the Overseas Private Insurance Corporation shall apply the same cri-
teria as those applicable in other parts of the world. 
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SEC. 6. (a) Programs, transactions, and other relations conducted or car-
ried out by the President or any agency of the United States Government with 
respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the Presi-
dent, be conducted and carried out by or through-
(!) The American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation incor-
porated under the laws of the District of Columbia, or 
(2) such comparable successor nongovernmental entity as the President 
may designate, (hereafter in this Act referred to as the "Institute"). 
(b) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Govern-
ment is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to 
enter into, perform, enforce, or have in force an agreement or transaction rela-
tive to Taiwan, such agreement or transaction shall be entered into, performed, 
and enforced, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, by 
or through the Institute. 
(c) To the extent that any law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the 
District of Columbia, or of any State or political subdivision thereof in which 
the Institute is incorporated or doing business, impedes or otherwise interferes 
with the perfom1ance of the functions of the Institute pursuant to this Act, such 
law, rule, regulation, or ordinance shall be deemed to be preempted by this Act. 
SERVICES BY THE INSTITUTE TO UNITED STATES 
CITIZENS ON TAIWAN 
SEC. 7. (a) The Institute may authorize any of its employees on Taiwan-
( I) to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, affi-
davit, or deposition, and to perform any notarial act which any notary public is 
required or authorized by law to perform within the United States; 
(2) to act as provisional conservator of the personal estates of deceased 
United States citizens; and 
(3) to assist and protect the interests of United States persons by perform-
ing other acts such as are authorized to be performed outside the United States 
for consular purposes by such laws of the United States as the President may 
specify. 
(b) Acts performed by authorized employees of the Institute under this 
section shall be valid, and of like force and effect within the United States, as if 
performed by any other person authorized under the laws of the United States 
to perform such acts. 
TAX EXEMPT STATUS Of' THE INSTITUTE 
SEC. 8 (a) The Institute, its property, and its income are exempt from all 
taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States (except to the extent 
that section II (a) (3) of this Act requires the imposition of taxes imposed 
under chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, relating to the Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act) or by any State or local taxing authority of the 
United States. 
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(b) For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Institute 
shall be treated as an organization described in sections 170(b)(IXA), 179(c), 
2055(a), 2106(a)(2)(A), 2522, and 2522b). · 
fURNISHING PROPERTY AND SERVICES TO AND 
OBTAINING SERVICES FROM TilE INSTITUTE 
SEC. 9. (a) Any agency of the United States Government is authorized to 
sell, loan, or lease property (including interests therein) to, and to perform 
administrative and technical support functions and services for the operations of, 
the Institute upon such terms and conditions as the President may direct. Reim· 
bursements to agencies under this subsection shall be credited to the current 
applicable appropriation of the agency concerned. 
(b) Any agency of the United States Government is authorized to acquire 
and accept services from the Institute upon such terms and conditions as the 
President may direct. Whenever the President determines it to be in furtherance 
of the purposes of this Act, the procurements of services by such agencies from 
the Institute may be effected without regard to such laws of the United States 
normally applicable to the acquisition of services by such agencies as the Presi-
dent may specify by Executive order. 
(c) Any agency of tlte United States Government making funds available 
to the Institute in accordance with this Act shall make arrangements with the 
Institute for the Comptroller General of the United States to have access to the 
books and records of the Institute and the opportunity to audit the operations 
of tlte Institute. 
TAIWAN INSTRUMENTALITY 
SEC. I 0. (a) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States 
Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United 
States to render or provide to or to receive or accept from Taiwan, any per· 
formance, communication, assurance, undertaking, or other action, such action 
shall, in the manner and to tlte extent directed by the President, be rendered or 
provided to, or received or accepted from, an instrumentality established by Tai· 
wan which the President determines has the necessary authority under the laws 
applied by the people on Taiwan to provide assurances and take other actions on 
behalf of Taiwan in accordance with the Act. 
(b) The President is requested to extend to the instrumentality established 
by Taiwan the same number of offices and complement of personnel as were 
previously operated in the United States by the governing authorities on Taiwan 
recognized as the Republic of China prior to January I, 1979. 
(c) Upon the granting by Taiwan of comparable privileges and immunities 
with respect to the Institute and its appropriate personnel, the President is 
authori1.ed to extend with respect to the Taiwan instrumentality and its ap-
propriate personnel, such privileges and immunities (subject to appropriate con· 
ditions and obligations) as may be necessary for the effective performance of 
their functions. 
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SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL FOR 
EMPLOYMENT WITH THE INSTITUTE 
SEC. II. (a) (I) Under such terms and conditions as the President may 
direct, any agency of the United States Government may separate from Govern-
ment service for a specified period any officer or employee of that agency who 
accepts employment with the Institute. 
(2) An officer or employee separated by an agency under paragraph (I) 
of this subsection for employment with the Institute shall be entitled upon 
termination of such employment to reemployment or reinstatement with such 
agency (or a successor agency) in an appropriate position with the attendant 
rights, privileges, and benefits which the officer or employee would have had or 
acquired had he or she not been so separated, subject to such time period and 
other conditions as the President may prescribe. 
(3) An officer or employee entitled to reemployment or reinstatement 
rights under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall, while continuously employed 
by the Institute with no break in continuity of service, continue to participate 
in any benefit program in which such officer or employee was participating 
prior to employment by the Institute, including programs for compensation for 
job-related death, injury, or illness; programs for health and life insurance; pro-
grams for annual, sick, and other statutory leave; and programs for retirement 
under any system established by the Jaws of the United States; except that em-
ployment with the Institute shall be the basis for participation in such programs 
only to the extent that employee deductions and employer contributions, ~s 
required, in payment for such participation for the period of employment with 
the Institute, are currently deposited in the program's or system's fund or de-
pository. Death or retirement of any such officer or employee during approved 
service with the Institute and prior to reemployment or reinstatement shall be 
considered a death in or retirement from Government service for purposes of 
any employee or survivor benefits acquired by reason of service with an agency 
of the United States Government. 
(4) Any officer or employee of an agency of the United States Govern-
ment who entered into service with the Institute on approved leave of absence 
without pay prior to the enactment of this Act shall receive the benefits of this 
section for the period of such services. 
(b) Any agency of the United States Government employing alien person-
nel on Taiwan may transfer such personnel, with accrued allowances, benefits, 
and rights, to the Institute without a break in service for purposes of retirement 
and other benefits, including continued participation in any system established 
by the laws of the United States for the retirement of employees in which the 
alien was participating prior to the transfer to the Institute, except that employ-
ment with the Institute shall be creditable for retirement purposes only to the 
extent that employee deductions and employer contributions, as required, in 
payment for such participation for the period of employment with the Institute, 
are currently deposited in the system's fund or depository. 
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(c) Employees of the Institute shall not be employees of the United States 
and, in representing the Institute, shall be exempt from section 207 of title 18, 
United States Code. 
(dXI) For purposes of sections 911 and 913 of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954, amounts paid by the Institute to its employees shall not be treated as 
earned income. Amounts received by employees of the Institute shall not be in· 
eluded in gross income, and shall be exempt from taxation, to the extent that 
they are equivalent to amounts received by civilian officers and employees of the 
Government of the United States as allowances and benefits which are exempt 
from taxation under section 912 of such Code. 
(2) Except to the extent required by subsection (aX3) of this section, 
service performed in the employ of the Institute shall not constitute employ-
ment for purposes of chapter 21 of such Code and title II of the Social Security 
Act. 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
SEC. 12. (a) The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text 
of any agreement to which the Institute is a party. However, any such agreement 
the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President, 
be prejudicial to the national security of the United States shall not be so trans· 
mitted to the Congress but shall be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only 
upon due notice from the President. 
(b) For purposes of subsection (a), the term "agreement" includes-
( I) any agreement entered into between the Institute and the governing 
authorities on Taiwan or the instrumentality established by Taiwan; and 
(2) any agreement entered into between the Institute and an agency of the 
United States Government. 
(c) Agreements and transactions made or to be made by or through the 
Institute shall be subject to the same congressional notification, review, and ap· 
proval requirements and procedures as if such agreements and transactions were 
malic by or through the agency of the Uniteli States Government on behalf of 
which the Institute is acting. 
(d) During the two-year period beginning on the effective date of this Act, 
the Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representa· 
lives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, every six months, a 
report describing and reviewing economic relations between the United States 
and Taiwan, noting any interference with normal commercial relations. 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
SEC. 13. The President is authorized to prescribe such rules and regula· 
lions as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of tltis Act. During 
the three-year period beginning on the effective date of this Act, such rules and 
regulations shall be transmitted promptly to the Speaker of the House of Repre· 
sentatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Such action 
shall not, however, relieve the Institute of the responsibilities placed upon it by 
this Act. 
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CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
SEC. 14. (a) The Committee on Foreign Mfairs of the House of Repre· 
sentatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and other ap· 
propriate committees of the Congress shall monitor-
(!) the implementation of the provisions of this Act; 
(2) the operation and procedures of the Institute; 
(3) the legal and technical aspects of the continuing relationship between 
the United States and Taiwan; and 
(4) the implementation of the policies of the United States concerning 
security and cooperation in East Asia. 
(b) Such committees shall report, as appropriate, to their respective 
Houses on the results of their monitoring. 
DEFINITIONS 
SEC. 15. For purposes of this Act-
(1) the term "laws of the United States" includes any statute, rule, regula· 
tion, ordinance, order, or judicial rule of decision of the United States or any 
political subdivision thereof; and 
(2) the term "Taiwan" includes, as the context may require, the islands of 
Taiwan and the Pescadores, the people on those islands, corporations and other 
entities and associations created or organized under the laws applied on those 
islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States 
as the Republic of China prior to January I, 1979, and any successor governing 
authorities (including political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities there· 
of). 
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS 
SEC. 16. In addition to funds otherwise available to carry out the pro· 
visions of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of 
State for the fiscal year 1980 such funds as may be necessary to carry out 
such provisions. Such funds are authorized to remain available until expended. 
SEVERABILITY Ol' PROVISIONS 
SEC. 17. If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any 
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the applica-
tion of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected 
thereby. 
EFFECTIVE DATE 
SEC. 18. This Act shall be effective as of January I, 1979. 
Conguuio1111l Record-House 125, No. 38 (March 16, 1979): H1668-70. 
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Otina-US Joint Communique 
August 17, 1982 
(I) In the Joint Communique on the Es.tablish-
ment of Diplomatic Relations on January ', 
1979, issued by the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the 
People's Republic of China, the United States of 
America recoganized the Government of the 
People's Republic of China as the sole legal 
Government of China, and it acknowledged the 
Chinese position that there is but one China and 
Taiwan is part of China. Within that context, the 
two sides agreed that the people of the United 
States would continue to maintain cuitural, com-
mercial, and other unofficial relations with the 
people of Taiwan. On this basis. relations between 
the United States and China were normalized. 
(2) Tite question of United S:ates arms sales to 
Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotia· 
tions between the two countries en establishing 
diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing 
positions, and the Chinese side staled that it would 
raise the iSSJ.!e again following nQrmalization. Re-
cognizing that this issue would seriously hamper 
the development of United States-China relations, 
they have held further discussions on it, during 
and since the meetings between President Ronald 
Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and between 
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. and 
Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua in 
October 1981. 
(3) Respect for each other's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental 
principles guiding United States-China relations. 
These principles were confumed in the Shanghai 
Communique of February ::!S, 1972 and reaffirm· 
ed in the Joint Communique on the Establishment 
of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on 
January I. 1979. Both sides emphatically state 
that the>e principles .:-ontinue to govc:rn all aspects 
of their relations. 
(4) The Chinese Government reiterates 'that 
the question of Taiwan i.s China's internal affair. 
The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued by 
China on January I, 1979 promulgated a funda-
mental policy of striving for p~aceful reunificatior, 
of the motherland. TI1e Nme-Point Proposal put 
forward by China on September 30, 1981 repre-
sented a further major effort under this funda-
mental policy to strive for a peaceful solution to 
the Taiwan question. 
tS) l11e United States Government att3ches 
great importan..:e to its relations with China, and 
reiterates that it has no intention of inflinging 011 
Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, 01 
interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursu;11~ 
a policy of "rwo Chinas" or "one China. 1111~ 
·Taiwan." Tite United States Government und~r­
stands and appreciates the Chinese pulky uf 
striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiw.;n 
question as indicated in China's Mossage t'l ('0111• 
patriots in Taiwan issued on January I, 1979 and 
the Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China un 
September 30, 1981. The new situation which h.l\ 
emerged with regard to the Taiwan question ah·• 
provides favourable conditions for the settlement 
of United States-China differences over Unite.! 
States arms sales to Taiwan. 
(6) Having in mind the foregoing statements of 
both sides, the United States qovernment slates 
that it does not seek to carry out a long·tcuu 
policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sab 
to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitath·e ur 
in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied 
in recent years since the establishment of dipl()o 
matic relations between the United States and 
China, and Jhat it intends gradually to reduce at~ 
sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period oi 
time, to a final resolution. In so stating, the United 
States acknowledges. China's consistent positinn 
reg~rding the thorough settlement of this issue. 
(7) In order to bring about, over a period of 
time, a final settlement of the question of Unit.-d 
States arms sales to Taiwan, which is an i~sue 
rooted in history. the two Goverruneilts will make 
every effort to adopt measures and create condr· 
lions conducive to the thorough settlement of tlus 
issue. 
(8) The development of United States.('hinJ 
relations is not only in the interests of the t11u 
peoples but also conducive to peace and stabihay 
in the world.The two sides are determined, on ll>e 
principle of equality and mutual benefit, to stren~· 
then their ties in the economic, cultural, edU(J· 
tiona!, scientific, technologica( and other fieiJ, 
and make strong, joint efforts for the continued 
development of relations between the Govetn·. 
ments and peoples of the United States and Chin• 
(9) In order to bring about the he tlthy dcvdup-
ment of United States-China relations. maintJm 
world peace and oppose aggression and expan>r••n. 
the two Governments reaffirm the prim:ll':~, 
a~reed on by the two sides in the Shanghai ('om· 
mun!GUe and the Joint Communique on thr 
Establisl:ment of Diplomatic Relation>. l1;e t"'' 
sirle> wili maintain contact and hold appropriate 
consultations on bilateral and internationJl i..·u<• 
of common interest. 
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From the moment of its founding, the Republic of China 
has dedicated itself to abolishing unequal treaties affecting 
China, and to establishing a China that is of the people, by the 
people, and for the people. 
Hongkong and Kowloon are Chinese territory, and the 
right of sovereignty over them should naturally be returned 
to the Republic of China. But the British government has had 
the effrontery to arrange an "agreement" on the so-called 
Hongkong problem with the Chinese Communists, that total-
ly ignores the will and wishes of the 5.5 million free residents 
of Hongkong and Kowloon, and would force them into a 
slave system of Communist totalitarianism. This is not only a 
disgraceful episode in human history, but also a grievous of-
fence to all seekers of peace and devotees of democracy in the 
world. Therefore, the government and the people of the 
Republic of China can not recognize such an "agreement." 
To achieve their purpose of swallowing Hongkong, the 
Chinese Communists-fearful of resistance from the Chinese 
in Hongkong and Kowloon, who demand freedom and de-
mocracy-went out of their way to embellish an illusion of 
"one country, two systems." They "promised" that the pre-
sent Hon&kong system would remain unchanged for SO years, 
in order to confuse the world and to bilk the people of Hong-
kong and Kowloon. 
It is no secret that throughout the history of the Commu-
nists, there has never been any record established of their 
good faith nor any "agreement" that was not later trashed. 
No matter what the illusion the Chinese Communists attempt 
to create today, the basic policy identified in their "four 
principles" is in sharp illustration of the fact that Commu-
nism's totalitarian nature will never change. 
Freedom cannot be faked, nor can it be divided, nor con-
fined in fences. What the whole Chinese people seek is an 
eternal, perfected, and fully realized state of well-being nour-
ished on freedom and democracy. We believe that the people 
of Hongkong and Kowloon-patrons of peace and ofdemoc-
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racy-will never tolerate the saddle of Communist artifice 
and deceit. 
Hongkong and Kowloon are, tragically, being ushered 
toward an era of darkness. The government and people of the 
Republic of China extend their deepest concern to the resi-
dents of these Chinese areas .. 
On behalf of the government and people of the Republic 
of China, with emotions of deep grief, I solemnly declare the 
following points of assistance for our beloved compatriots in 
Hongkong and Kowloon: 
1. We will continue to expose Chinese Communist in-
trigues directed toward Hongkong and Kowloon and their sly 
and execrable intent with regard to the inhabitants of Hong-
kong and Kowloon. We will make clear for our compatriots in 
Hongkong and Kowloon and people round the world that any 
pledge made by the Chinese Communists is but a mirage 
radiating from consistent practices of trickery and hypocrisy. 
2. We will continue to rouse public opinion in the world 
to help assure the freedom and prosperity of Hongkong, and 
to support our compatriots in fully expressing their aspirations 
for freedom and democracy and their rejection of Communist 
rule. We will also call upon the nations and peoples of the free 
world to take on squarely the issue of the future of Hongkong 
and Kowloon, calling on them to uphold international justice 
and to render active assistance to the inhabitants of Hongkong 
and Kowloon. 
3. We urge the Chinese residents of Hongkong and 
Kowloon to more vigorously pursue their struggle against 
Communism, for freedom. We will assist and support this 
struggle using various methods and via different channels. 
4. We hope the Chinese residents of Hongkong and 
Kowloon will work together in solidarity and extend them-
selves to participate in as many local "elections" as possible 
so that their strength will be burnished to deal with Chinese 
Communist ambitions for control, and thereby to help protect 
ano secure freedom and democracy. 
CHINA REUNIFICATION ISSUE 203 
APPEND IX 13 : SEPTEMBER 2 6 , 19 8 4 • PRE~liER YO KUO-HUA • S 
REMARKS ON HONG KONG ISSUE (Continued) 
5. The ROC Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission has 
set up a special office to offer information and assistance to 
those Chinese in Hongkong and Kowloon who wish to come 
to Taiwan. 
6. Chinese residents of Hongkong and Kowloon may 
apply via presently established procedures for multiple entry 
permits to travel to Taiwan. 
7. For the dedicated anti-Communist Chinese residents 
of Hongkong and Kowloon, we will make ready arrangements 
so they may return here at any time. 
8. For patriotic Chinese of Hongkong and Kowloon who 
wish to come and settle down here, we will make things as 
easy as possible, and we will assist them to obtain loans to 
purchase homes. 
9. To those Chinese of Hongkong and Kowloon who wish 
to come here to arrange to invest and to do business, we will 
give prior consideration to their cases and render assistance 
and guidance. 
IO. If the Chinese residents of Hongkong and Kowloon 
wish to deposit their savings in Taiwan, our Offshore Banking 
Unit will provide appropriate services so remittances can be 
freely made and encounter no restriction. 
II. To those Hongkong-Kowloon Chinese who wish to 
arrange education for their children in Taiwan, we will give 
prior consideration and provide assistance, guidance, and ap-
propriate arrangements for them. 
Finally, I would like to say to our compatriots in Hong-
kong and Kowloon that though night falls, dawn will surely 
follow. If you sharpen your awareness to avoid being en-
trapped by Chinese Communist deceptions, join in solidarity, 
and act in consonance with us here in Taiwan, the Hongkong 
and Kowloon area will one day definitely be reunited with the 
Republic of China. 
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TAIWAN 
1978 AND 1982. PRC CONSTITUTIONS REGARDING 
1978 Constitution 
Preamble 
" ... Taiwan is the sacred territory of China. We must definite-
ly liberate Taiwan and complete the great work of unifying the 
fatherland ... " 
1982 Constitution 
Adopted on December 4, 1982 by the Fifth National People'r Congress 
of the People's Republic of China At Its Fifth Session 
Preamble 
" ... Taiwan is a part of the sacred territory of the People's 
Republic of China. The great endeavor of accomplishing unifica-
tion of the fatherland is the sacred responsibility of the people 
of all China, including the compatriots of Taiwan ... " 
Chapter One 
General Principles 
Article Four 
" ... Regional autonomy applies in areas where people of 
national minorities live in compact communities; autonomous 
organs will be established to exercise the rights of autonomy. 
National autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's 
Republic of China ... " 
Article Thirty 
"The state may, when necessary, establish special adminis-
trative districts. The system practiced in the special adminis-
trative districts will be stipulated by law in accordance with the 
concrete situation." 
(It is interesting to note that the PRC's 1954 and 1975 
Constitutions neither mention Taiwan by name nor address the 
issue of national reunification. In addition, the question of 
the governance of China's "national autonomous regions": 
Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, and Xi:tang (Tihet) 
receives a considerable degree of legalistic attention in the 1982 
Constitution that is largely absent in the 1954, 1975, and 1978 
versions. In addition to reflecting Beijing's increased concern for 
legal norms, this section also probably re fleets Beijing's sensi tiv-
ity to Taiwan's charges that the PRC's actions in Tihet since 
1959 are an "object lesson" in Communist perfidy). 
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